Book Review: The Constitution as Political Structure. by Martin Redish.

Book review: The Constitution as Political Structure. By Martin Redish. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. 229. Reviewed by: Richard W. Murphy

Book Review: The Constitution as Political Structure. by Martin Redish.

Book review: The Constitution as Political Structure. By Martin Redish. New York: Oxford University Press. 1995. Pp. 229. Reviewed by: Richard W. Murphy

Unfoxing Judicial Review of Agency Policy Reversals or “We Were Told to Like the New Policy Better” is Not a Good Reason to Change

Part I of this Article provides context for the debate over the Fox power by tracing the evolution of leading efforts over the last century to legitimize agency policymaking and close the “democracy deficit” that it purportedly creates. Part I focuses in particular on the courts’ development of arbitrariness review as a means of controlling agency policymaking, and it also pays particular attention to the “presidentialist” model that White House control of agency policymaking democratizes and legitimizes it. Part II takes a close look at the Fox litigation itself. This discussion reveals that Justice Scalia’s Fox power, like presidentialism, presupposes that extra-statutory political influences wielded by elected officials and their proxies can legitimize agency policy changes. Part III criticizes this framework for resting on an unrealistic understanding of democratic governance and electoral accountability, and it explains why Justice Breyer was right to insist that agencies should give (expert) answers to his “Why change?” query

Punitive Damages, Explanatory Verdicts, and the \u3ci\u3eHard Look\u3c/i\u3e

Juries in most American jurisdictions can inflict punitive damages awards against tortfeasors who have committed especially blameworthy torts. Sometimes their awards are startlingly large-multi-billion dollar awards have become increasingly frequent. Nonetheless, juries are generally under no obligation to explain their use of this vast power—a punitive damages verdict typically takes the form of an unexplained number. Courts can and should change this practice. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 49(b) and analogous state rules, courts could require juries to return explanatory verdicts that set forth the bases for their punitive damages awards. Several advantages would flow from adopting this simple reform. First, taking a cue from the hard look doctrine of administrative law, courts could review such verdicts to ensure that juries exercise their punitive discretion reasonably and legally. In some cases, where an explanatory verdict revealed error, a court could correct it efficiently by asking the jury to reconsider in light of supplemental instructions. Second, punitive damages awards are supposed to send messages ; these messages would be clearer if juries used words as well as numbers to express them. Third, the power of civil juries to inflict punitive damages is controversial. Finding out how real juries in real cases justify their verdicts would shed light on whether they should possess this power

The Impact of Late-Career Health and Employment Shocks on Social Security and Other Wealth

About one-quarter of workers age 51 to 55 in 1992 developed health-related work limitations and about one-fifth were laid off from their jobs before age 62. Although late-career health and employment shocks often derail retirement savings plans, Social Security's disability insurance, spouse and survivor benefits, and progressive benefit formula provide important protections. In fact, health shocks increase Social Security's lifetime value, primarily because the system's disability insurance allows some disabled workers to collect benefits before age 62. However, if the system's disability insurance program did not exist, the onset of health-related work limitations would substantially reduce Social Security wealth

On Setting Near-term Climate Policy while the Dust Begins to Settle: The Legacy of the Stern Review

We review the explosion of commentary that has followed the release of the Stern Review: The Economics of Climate Change, and agree with most of what has been written. The Review is right when it argues on economic grounds for immediate intervention to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, but we feel that it is right for the wrong reasons. A persuasive case can be made that climate risks are real and increasingly threatening. If follows that some sort of policy will be required, and the least cost approach necessarily involves starting now. Since policy implemented in 2007 will not “solve” the climate problem, near term interventions can be designed to begin the process by working to avoid locking in high carbon investments and providing adequate incentives for carbon sequestration. We argue that both objectives can be achieved without undue economic harm in the near term by pricing carbon at something on the order of $15 per ton as long as it is understood that the price will increase persistently and predictably at something like the rate of interest; and we express support for a tax alternative to the usual cap-and-trade approach.Stern Review, climate change, climate policy, social discount rate; risk and equity aversion

Cure monitoring of a UV cured epoxy resin using a long period grating Mach- Zehnder interferometer

A cascaded long period grating Mach-Zehnder interferometer is used to monitor the change in refractive index of a UV cured epoxy resin over a cure cycle. Fourier techniques are used to calculate the phase shift and frequency spectral amplitude of the associated fringe pattern during the cure. The results are compared with the refractive index change during cure calculated using a Fresnel reflection based technique