Market Share, R&D Cooperation, and EU Competition Policy

Current EU policy exempts horizontal R&D agreements from antitrust con- cerns when the combined market shares of participants are low enough. This paper argues that existing theory does not support limiting the exemption to low market shares. This is done by introducing a set of non-innovating outside firms to the standard framework to assess what link might exist between the market share of innovating firms and the product market benefits of cooperation. With R&D output choices, the market share criterion, while it rules out the most socially harmful R&D cooperation agreements, also hinders the most beneficial ones. With R&D input choices, cooperation may actually be desirable in concentrated industries, and harmful in more competitive ones. If R&D cooperation does have anti-competitive effects in product markets, it seems that these are therefore best addressed by other tools than market share criteria.R&D; Cooperation; Competition; Regulation

On the Tacit Collusion Equilibria of an Investment Timing Game

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship between equilibria and common demand forms is not immediately apparent. We provide the full necessary and sufficient conditions for existence.A simple condition on demand primitives is derived that determines the type of equilibria. Common demand forms are then shown to illustrate both finite-time and infinite-delay tacit collusion.Real options; Duopoly; Collusion; Investment

Plurals: individuals and sets in a richly typed semantics

We developed a type-theoretical framework for natural lan- guage semantics that, in addition to the usual Montagovian treatment of compositional semantics, includes a treatment of some phenomena of lex- ical semantic: coercions, meaning, transfers, (in)felicitous co-predication. In this setting we see how the various readings of plurals (collective, dis- tributive, coverings,...) can be modelled

The Microstructure of the Bond Market in the 20th Century

Bonds are traded in OTC markets, where opacity and fragmentation imply large transaction costs for retail investors. Is there something special about bonds, in contrast to stocks, that precludes trading in transparent, limit-order markets? Historical experience suggests this is not the case. Before WWII, there was an active market in corporate and municipal bonds on the NYSE. Activity dropped dramatically, in the late 1920s for municipals and in the mid 1940s for corporate, as trading migrated to the OTC market. This migration occurred simultaneously with an increase in the role of institutional investors, which fare better than retail investors in OTC market. Based on current and historical high frequency data, we find that, for retail investors, trading costs in municipal bonds were half as large in 1926-1927 as they are now. The difference in transactions costs is likely to reflect the difference in market structures.

On the Timing of Vertical Relationships

We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g. an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input, and if the supplier has market power, investment occurs too late from an industry standpoint. The distortion in firm decisions is characterized by a Lerner index, which is related to the parameters of a stochastic downstream demand. When feasible, vertical restraints restore efficiency. For instance, the upstream firm can induce entry at the correct investment threshold by selling a call option on the input. Otherwise, competition may substitute for vertical restraints. In particular, if two firms are engaged in a preemption race downstream, the upstream firm sells the input to the first investor at a discount that is chosen in such a way that the race to preempt exactly offsets the vertical externality, and this leader invests at the optimal market threshold.

Complex Remanence vs. Simple Persistence: Are Hysteresis and Unit-Root Processes observationally equivalent?

The hysteresis terminology has mainly been used in two fields of economics, unemplyment and international trade, with a different meaning however, involving either linear autoregressive macro behaviour or non- linear heterogenous mico behaviour. There may nonetheless be observational equivalence between the 'persistence' characterising unit- root processes and the 'remanence' created by the aggregation of non- linear dynamics. Stochastic simulations are employed to analyse the properties of the output of an hysteretic system, subject to white noise and random walk inputs. Non-linear hysteretic systems are found to generate a sizeable proportion - two-thirds - of stationary output from stationary input, and to possibly generate an output cointegrated with the corresponding input. Such processes therefore appear significantly different from an integrated process. This stresses the specific relevance of a non-linear approach to hysteresis.hysteresis, non-linearity, aggregation, heterogeneity, experimental economics

Coordination and Cooperation in Investment Timing with Externalities ?

We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either preemption or attrition occur depending on the size of the investment externality. Coordination is less likely with more discounting, as in a repeated game, and more likely with higher growth and volatility. Optimal cooperation involves either monopoly or duopoly investment, the latter being either symmetric or asymmetric. Finally, these characterizations are validated by applications to standard speci...cations of capacity accumulation and of R&D investment. In the former setup, coordination is likelier if installed capacities and lumpy investments are both large. With R&D input choices, if investment synergies are large, coordination and cooperation result in the same outcomes.Investment Timing; Real Options; Simultaneous Equilibrium; Joint-Value Maximization; Cooperation; Investment Externalities

A comprehensive study of cycle billing

Thesis (M.B.A.)—Boston Universit

Progression of extrapyramidal signs in Alzheimer's disease. clinical and neuropathological correlates

Extrapyramidal signs (EPS) are frequent in Alzheimer's disease (AD) and core manifestation of related diseases, i.e., dementia with Lewy bodies and Parkinson's disease; furthermore, Lewy bodies and AD-type pathology occur in all three conditions