Governance Through Regime Complexity: What Role for the EU in the African Security Regime Complex?

The international response to armed conflict in Africa often takes the form of a regime complex characterized by institutional proliferation, overlap, unclear hierarchies, and multiple interconnections. At the same time, the course of conflict is hardly predictable. In such an environment, how can component units (institutional fora) of a regime complex effectively govern through complexity? We explore this question by focusing on the EU as an important actor within regime complexes. Building on the regime complexity literature and complexity theory, we identify four conditions. We argue that actors who operate as resource hubs, create complementarity, support system self-organization, and practice adaptive forms of peacebuilding are best placed to manage regime complexity. Empirically we probe these assumptions in the context of the Sahelian security regime complex and the role the EU is playing in it

Parliamentary involvement, party ideology and majority-opposition bargaining : Belgian participation in multinational military operations

This article examines the impact of parliamentary involvement in troop deployment decisions on restrictions on military mandates by examining the Belgian contribution to the 2011 Libya intervention and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State. More specifically, we analyse (1) the effect of party ideology on mandate preferences, and (2) the impact of bargaining between majority and opposition parties on the outcome of mandate negotiations. Our case study demonstrates that left-wing parties show a strong inclination toward imposing restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals, while right-wing preferences tend to depend on the national interests at stake in the operation. With regard to majority-opposition bargaining, our study shows that the impact of opposition parties is dependent on the degree of contention between government and opposition parties, as well as on the extent to which the executive needs to seek support across its own majority

Is liberal internationalism worth saving? : ad hoc coalitions and their consequences for international security

Published online: 06 February 2024Slow responses and blocked decision-making of international organizations provide opportunities for ad hoc coalitions to fill functional and political gaps. Compared to UN peace operations, ad hoc coalitions avoid gridlock and high transaction costs, they are fast to set up, can be task and time specific, flexible and easily dissolved. However, they also have much lighter human rights and financial accountability frameworks, a patchy record of longer-term impact and can contribute to a more fragmented response to armed conflicts and threats to international peace and security

Ad hoc coalitions : from hierarchical to network accountability in peace operations?

Published online: 28 November 2023Launching multinational peace operations are time and politically sensitive decisions that frequently involve the use of force. As a result, a host of accountability issues arise. To date, mainly backward-looking and hierarchical accountability measures have been developed to guide the implementation of multinational peace operations led by the most prominent actors in this policy domain: intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and ad hoc coalitions (AHCs). We argue that the existing accountability mechanisms have their flaws, which hypothetically speaking could at least be partly addressed by converting AHCs into network hubs with an emphasis on pluralistic and horizontal accountability practices. AHCs bring a diverse set of actors together and operate with a light institutional framework, in which actors meet on equal grounds. If used as network hubs, AHCs can facilitate an open information exchange and exchange of best practices

Strengthening parliamentary oversight of defence procurement:lessons from Belgium

This paper asks: to what extent can a dedicated or special committee with access to classified information empower parliaments to oversee major defence procurement decisions? These decisions often involve a mixture of political, military, economic and societal interests. Particularly after episodes of contestation or controversy, questions tend to arise about how to empower parliaments. The central argument in this paper is that being institutionally empowered and incentivised does not guarantee rigorous oversight. The availability of expertise is an oft-ignored factor in studies of parliamentary oversight. An analysis of oversight behaviour by the Belgian Federal Parliament during the acquisition of new fighter jets (2015–2018) shows that members of parliament also need to be capable of mobilising the necessary expertise in order to translate technical information in such a way that it allows them to influence decision-making, which is often executive-dominated. In this way, this paper contributes to managing expectations about the capacity of parliaments to cope with complex military problems.status: Published onlin

Tracing Autonomy in UN Security Council Authorized-Military Interventions: A Principal-Agent Analysis of the NATO-led operation in Libya (2011)

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Peace Operations (Second Edition) (Review of Diehl and Balas)

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