Emission Taxes and the Design of Refunding Schemes

We examine how emission taxes should be refunded to firms in order to create optimal incentives to invest in cleaner technologies. Since refunds cannot be made dependent on investments, an alternative way is to give back taxes to firms according to market shares. We show that universally applicable refunding schemes must be linear in market shares. Moreover, a socially optimal tax/tax refunding scheme exists if pollution is proportional to output and firms compete à la Cournot. If short-term abatement technologies exist, tax/tax refunding schemes can still provide second-best allocations. If firms are price takers, however, refunding taxes according to market shares is harmful. Since imperfect competition is a prominent phenomenon in many polluting industries, the design of socially optimal refunding schemes is an essential part of environmental regulation.

The Dixit-Pindyck and the Arrow-Fisher-Hanemann-Henry option values are not equivalent

Fisher [2000, this journal] offers a unifying framework for two concepts of (quasi-) option value suggested by Arrow, Fisher, Hanemann, and Henry (AFHH) on the one hand, and by Dixit and Pindyck (DP) on the other, and claims these two concepts to be equivalent. We show that this claim is not correct and point out the flaws in Fisher's proof. We further suggest a decomposition of the DP option value into two components, one of which corresponds exactly to the AFHH option value which captures the value of obtaining new information, and a second one which captures the postponement value irrespective of uncertainty. --option value,quasi option value,decision under uncertainty,irreversible investment

Commitment and Timing of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology and Repercussions on R&D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adopt new technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms which are subject to regulation. We consider for different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits) ex interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adaption, and two types of ex ante commitment before R&D activity. We study the second best tax and permit rules and rank the policies with respect to welfare

Optimal Abatement in Dynamic Multi-Pollutant Problems When Pollutants can be Complements or Substitutes

We analyze a dynamic multi-pollutant problem where abatement costs of several pollutants are not separable. The pollutants can be either technological substitutes or complements. Environmental damage is induced by the stock of accumulated pollution. We find that optimal emission paths are qualitatively different for substitutes and complements. We derive general properties governing optimal emission paths and present numerical examples to illustrate our main results. In particular we find that optimal emission paths need not be monotonic, even for highly symmetric pollutants. Finally, we describe a comparatively simple method to implement the optimal path without explicitly knowing its shape. --Multi-pollution,abatement technology,accumulating pollutants

Commitment and Timing of Environmental Policy, Adoption of New Technology and Repercussions on R&D

We investigate the interplay between environmental policy, incentives to adopt new technology, and repercussions on R&D. We study a model where a monopolistic upstream firm engages in R&D and sells advanced abatement technology to polluting downstream firms which are subject to regulation. We consider for different timing and commitment regimes of environmental tax and permit policies: ex post taxation (or issuing permits) ex interim commitment to a tax rate (a quota of permits) after observing R&D success but before adaption, and two types of ex ante commitment before R&D activity. We study the second best tax and permit rules and rank the policies with respect to welfare. --

Alternative Use Systems for the Remaining Cloud Forest in Ethiopia and the Role of Arabica Coffee - A Cost-Benefit Analysis

This paper presents a cost-benefit analysis of three different use systems for the remaining cloud forests in Ethiopia which at present are being depleted at a rate of 8% per year. These use systems are traditional conversion to crop land, sustainable management of the forest (e.g. by growing high-quality semi-forest coffee), and strict protection. We find that conversion to cropland yields the highest net present income value for the local population, and at discount rates of 10% is even in the best interests of the country. For discount rates of at 5% or lower, sustainable forest use is in the best interests of the country. Taking into account the global benefits of biodiversity conservation and carbon storage, sustainable forest management yields the highest total economic value. --cost-benefit analysis,biodiversity,coffee,Ethiopia

Learning-by-Doing with Spillovers in Competitive Industries, Free Entry, and Regulatory Policy

We study the impact of learning-by-doing with spillovers in competitive markets with free market entry. Within a two period model, we consider first the case where fixed costs are incurred only once, and entry is once and for all. In the second case fixed costs are incurred in each period, and both market exit after the first period and late entry in the second period is possible. For the first case first best allocations can only be decentralized by subsidizing output in the first period and additionally paying an entry premium. If exit and late entry are possible and if market exit by some firms is socially optimal, the optimal policy scheme requires a nonlinear output subsidy which serves to discriminate between exiting and staying firms. We further investigate the comparative statics effects of the different policy instruments. --learning-by-doing,spillovers,regulatory policy

Vertical Structure and Strategic Environmental Trade Policy

The idea that environmental trade policy may be used to achieve competitive advantage in international markets has important implications for the way we conceive tree-trade. This paper reconsiders the issue of strategic environmental policy in a model that makes explicit the vertical structure that supports production of the traded good. We find these intranational vertical relationships to have a substantial qualitative effect on the optimal strategic environmental trade policy. We show that under both quantity and price competition in the international market, the optimal policy to levy on the polluting input when vertical contracts are allowed is a Pigouvian tax.strategic trade, vertical contracts, environmental policy

Optimal Abatement in Dynamic Multipollutant Problems when Pollutants can be Complements or Substitutes

We analyze a dynamic multi-pollutant problem where abatement costs of several pollutants are not separable. The pollutants can be either technological substitutes or complements. Environmental damage is induced by the stock of accumulated pollution. We find that optimal emission paths are qualitatively different for substitutes and complements. We derive general properties governing optimal emission paths and present numerical examples to illustrate our main results. In particular we find that optimal emission paths need not be monotonic, even for highly symmetric pollutants. Finally, we describe a comparatively simple method to implement the optimal path without explicitly knowing its shape. --Multi-pollution,abatement technology,accumulating pollutants

Demand rationing in Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed capacities: An experiment

This study is the first to investigate the effect of demand rationing in experimental Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with fixed exogenous capacities. It is found that prices and profits are significantly higher under proportional than under efficient demand rationing. Moreover, the amount of capacity available to each firm is varied. In accordance with earlier studies, prices and profits are significantly higher when capacities are lower. Those effects accord qualitatively with the Nash equilibrium predictions of the corresponding stage games. However, the Nash equilibrium concept does poorly at quantitative predictions. Prices are significantly higher than the Nash prediction in all treatments, irrespective of whether the Nash equilibrium is in mixed or in pure strategies. Profits are higher than the Nash prediction with high capacities, but may converge to the equilibrium prediction in the long run with low capacities. The data of individual price choices feature dynamic patterns that can potentially be explained by both Edgeworth price cycles and imitation of the price set by the competitor