Critical parameters and performance tests for the evaluation of digital data acquisition hardware

Recent developments of digital data acquisition systems allow real-time pre-processing of detector signals at a high count rate. These so-called pulse processing digitizers are powerful and versatile instruments offering techniques which are important for nuclear security, critical infrastructure protection, nuclear physics and radiation metrology. Certain aspects of digital data acquisition affect the performance of the total system in a critical way and therefore require special attention. This report presents a short introduction to digital data acquisition, followed by a discussion of the critical parameters which affect the performance in the lab and in the field. For some of the parameters, tests are proposed to assess the performance of digital data acquisition systems. Good practices are offered to guide the selection and evaluation of digital data acquisition systems. More general performance criteria which are not specifically related to digital data acquisition systems are discussed separately.JRC.D.4-Standards for Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguard

National Reachback Systems for Nuclear Security: State-of-play report: ERNCIP Thematic Group Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure: Deliverable of task 3.1b

Operational systems for nuclear security in Finland, France, Denmark, UK, US and Canada were reviewed. The Finnish case is a holistic approach to Nuclear Security Detection Architecture, as defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency; reachback is only one component of the system, albeit an important crosscutting element of the detection architecture. The French and US studies concentrate on the reachback itself. The Danish nuclear security system is information-driven, relying on the cooperation of the competent authorities. The British and Canadian analyses describe nuclear security planning and operations in a Major Public Event (MPE), Olympics, where cooperation between the frontline officers and the reachback centre plays a key role to reduce radiological and nuclear risks. For the implementation of an efficient reachback system there is a strong need for standardizing the data acquisition, storing, and the final distribution of the analysis results. Major nuclear powers take this activity very seriously and they have 24/7 all year national service for information processing. The case studies of Finland and France show that efficient European reachback is manageable and technically possible on a country-wide basis. The case study on Denmark reveals that countries with limited reachback resources need an adequate and standardized technical information sharing mechanism to aid their national analysis services in a precise and timely manner.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen

Remote Expert Support of Field Teams - Reachback Services for Nuclear Security, Task 2, deliverable 1

Strengthening CBRNE security in the European Union reduces the threat of and damage from CBRNE incidents. One of the main issues facing the EU security industry is its highly fragmented nature, exhibiting a lack of standardization and harmonised certification procedures. The need for standardised information exchange between competent authorities and international bodies regarding radiation measurements and data analysis has been recognised by several experts in response to Commission mandate M/487 for the establishment of European security standards. This report will suggest a way forward to develop protocols for more efficient cooperation between competent authorities and reachback centres at the national and international level. Not all EU Member States have the capabilities to process data provided by nuclear security instruments, and thus should consider instigating a coordinated capability yielding a more efficient and comprehensive approach in responding to future nuclear emergencies. This could be achieved by reachback centres across Europe (built upon existing national facilities and expertise) and would provide analysis services for alarm adjudication. Efficient data sharing and processing across EU Member States requires the use of standard data formats and protocols.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen

Information Sharing in a Nuclear Security Event - Consultation of Member States on the Report “Remote Expert Support of Field Teams; Reachback Services For Nuclear Security” ERNCIP Thematic Group Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure - Task 3B Deliverable 2

The ERNCIP thematic group for Radiological and Nuclear Threats to Critical Infrastructure (RN thematic group) produced in its working programme 2014 a report on radiological and nuclear information sharing between the EU Member States in case of a nuclear security event. As part of its working programme in 2015 the group collected views from the EU Member States regarding this report as a key step in the work towards future European format and protocol standardisation to be implemented for the technical reachback and other analysis purposes. The RN thematic group designed a simple questionnaire, which was sent to the relevant authorities in the Member States. The answers (10 out of 28) came from very different organizations working on domains of security, safety or military. The different background of the responding organizations shows that the responsibility on nuclear and radiological matters, including information sharing in a nuclear security event, varies strongly among different Member States. This knowledge alone is an important outcome of the questionnaire. Some replies showed that much work needs to be done for raising European awareness regarding prevention of, detection of and response to nuclear security events, including information sharing nationally and internationally. Some Member States have not yet identified the need of cooperation in sharing nuclear spectrometric data and analysis results. One of the basic requirements of the proposed new information-sharing system for nuclear security is that advanced national analysis resources can be provided for Member States that do not have such capabilities. Even though the future arrangements for information sharing would be based on a standard technological structure, all data exchange is voluntary and bilateral between the Member States.JRC.G.5-Security technology assessmen