On Web User Tracking: How Third-Party Http Requests Track Users' Browsing Patterns for Personalised Advertising

On today's Web, users trade access to their private data for content and services. Advertising sustains the business model of many websites and applications. Efficient and successful advertising relies on predicting users' actions and tastes to suggest a range of products to buy. It follows that, while surfing the Web users leave traces regarding their identity in the form of activity patterns and unstructured data. We analyse how advertising networks build user footprints and how the suggested advertising reacts to changes in the user behaviour.Comment: arXiv admin note: substantial text overlap with arXiv:1605.0653

Potential mass surveillance and privacy violations in proximity-based social applications

Proximity-based social applications let users interact with people that are currently close to them, by revealing some information about their preferences and whereabouts. This information is acquired through passive geo-localisation and used to build a sense of serendipitous discovery of people, places and interests. Unfortunately, while this class of applications opens different interactions possibilities for people in urban settings, obtaining access to certain identity information could lead a possible privacy attacker to identify and follow a user in their movements in a specific period of time. The same information shared through the platform could also help an attacker to link the victim's online profiles to physical identities. We analyse a set of popular dating application that shares users relative distances within a certain radius and show how, by using the information shared on these platforms, it is possible to formalise a multilateration attack, able to identify the user actual position. The same attack can also be used to follow a user in all their movements within a certain period of time, therefore identifying their habits and Points of Interest across the city. Furthermore we introduce a social attack which uses common Facebook likes to profile a person and finally identify their real identity

On the anonymity risk of time-varying user profiles.

Websites and applications use personalisation services to profile their users, collect their patterns and activities and eventually use this data to provide tailored suggestions. User preferences and social interactions are therefore aggregated and analysed. Every time a user publishes a new post or creates a link with another entity, either another user, or some online resource, new information is added to the user profile. Exposing private data does not only reveal information about single users’ preferences, increasing their privacy risk, but can expose more about their network that single actors intended. This mechanism is self-evident in social networks where users receive suggestions based on their friends’ activities. We propose an information-theoretic approach to measure the differential update of the anonymity risk of time-varying user profiles. This expresses how privacy is affected when new content is posted and how much third-party services get to know about the users when a new activity is shared. We use actual Facebook data to show how our model can be applied to a real-world scenario.Peer ReviewedPostprint (published version

On web user tracking of browsing patterns for personalised advertising

This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Parallel, Emergent and Distributed Systems on 19/02/2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17445760.2017.1282480On today’s Web, users trade access to their private data for content and services. App and service providers want to know everything they can about their users, in order to improve their product experience. Also, advertising sustains the business model of many websites and applications. Efficient and successful advertising relies on predicting users’ actions and tastes to suggest a range of products to buy. Both service providers and advertisers try to track users’ behaviour across their product network. For application providers this means tracking users’ actions within their platform. For third-party services following users, means being able to track them across different websites and applications. It is well known how, while surfing the Web, users leave traces regarding their identity in the form of activity patterns and unstructured data. These data constitute what is called the user’s online footprint. We analyse how advertising networks build and collect users footprints and how the suggested advertising reacts to changes in the user behaviour.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

On the Measurement of Privacy as an Attacker's Estimation Error

A wide variety of privacy metrics have been proposed in the literature to evaluate the level of protection offered by privacy enhancing-technologies. Most of these metrics are specific to concrete systems and adversarial models, and are difficult to generalize or translate to other contexts. Furthermore, a better understanding of the relationships between the different privacy metrics is needed to enable more grounded and systematic approach to measuring privacy, as well as to assist systems designers in selecting the most appropriate metric for a given application. In this work we propose a theoretical framework for privacy-preserving systems, endowed with a general definition of privacy in terms of the estimation error incurred by an attacker who aims to disclose the private information that the system is designed to conceal. We show that our framework permits interpreting and comparing a number of well-known metrics under a common perspective. The arguments behind these interpretations are based on fundamental results related to the theories of information, probability and Bayes decision.Comment: This paper has 18 pages and 17 figure

¿Cómo medir la privacidad?

En el presente estudio revisamos el estado del arte sobre métricas de privacidad en métodos con perturbación para el control estadístico de revelación. Aunque el artículo se enfoca en microagregación de datos, dichos métodos también son aplicables a una gran variedad de escenarios alternativos, tales como la ofuscación en servicios basados en la localización. Concretamente, examinamos el criterio de -anonimato y alguna de las propuestas para mejorarlo. Motivados por la vulnerabilidad de estos criterios frente a ataques de similitud y sesgo, comparamos tres recientes métricas de privacidad, basadas en conceptos de teoría de la información, que pretenden resolver dichas vulnerabilidades.Postprint (published version

On content-based recommendation and user privacy in social-tagging systems

Recommendation systems and content filtering approaches based on annotations and ratings, essentially rely on users expressing their preferences and interests through their actions, in order to provide personalised content. This activity, in which users engage collectively has been named social tagging, and it is one of the most popular in which users engage online, and although it has opened new possibilities for application interoperability on the semantic web, it is also posing new privacy threats. It, in fact, consists of describing online or offline resources by using free-text labels (i.e. tags), therefore exposing the user profile and activity to privacy attacks. Users, as a result, may wish to adopt a privacy-enhancing strategy in order not to reveal their interests completely. Tag forgery is a privacy enhancing technology consisting of generating tags for categories or resources that do not reflect the user's actual preferences. By modifying their profile, tag forgery may have a negative impact on the quality of the recommendation system, thus protecting user privacy to a certain extent but at the expenses of utility loss. The impact of tag forgery on content-based recommendation is, therefore, investigated in a real-world application scenario where different forgery strategies are evaluated, and the consequent loss in utility is measured and compared.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author’s final draft

Shall I post this now? Optimized, delay-based privacy protection in social networks

The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10115-016-1010-4Despite the several advantages commonly attributed to social networks such as easiness and immediacy to communicate with acquaintances and friends, significant privacy threats provoked by unexperienced or even irresponsible users recklessly publishing sensitive material are also noticeable. Yet, a different, but equally significant privacy risk might arise from social networks profiling the online activity of their users based on the timestamp of the interactions between the former and the latter. In order to thwart this last type of commonly neglected attacks, this paper proposes an optimized deferral mechanism for messages in online social networks. Such solution suggests intelligently delaying certain messages posted by end users in social networks in a way that the observed online activity profile generated by the attacker does not reveal any time-based sensitive information, while preserving the usability of the system. Experimental results as well as a proposed architecture implementing this approach demonstrate the suitability and feasibility of our mechanism.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

p-probabilistic k-anonymous microaggregation for the anonymization of surveys with uncertain participation

We develop a probabilistic variant of k-anonymous microaggregation which we term p-probabilistic resorting to a statistical model of respondent participation in order to aggregate quasi-identifiers in such a manner that k-anonymity is concordantly enforced with a parametric probabilistic guarantee. Succinctly owing the possibility that some respondents may not finally participate, sufficiently larger cells are created striving to satisfy k-anonymity with probability at least p. The microaggregation function is designed before the respondents submit their confidential data. More precisely, a specification of the function is sent to them which they may verify and apply to their quasi-identifying demographic variables prior to submitting the microaggregated data along with the confidential attributes to an authorized repository. We propose a number of metrics to assess the performance of our probabilistic approach in terms of anonymity and distortion which we proceed to investigate theoretically in depth and empirically with synthetic and standardized data. We stress that in addition to constituting a functional extension of traditional microaggregation, thereby broadening its applicability to the anonymization of statistical databases in a wide variety of contexts, the relaxation of trust assumptions is arguably expected to have a considerable impact on user acceptance and ultimately on data utility through mere availability.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft