Buyer Liability Under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act

Despite the fact that the 1936 Robinson-Patman Act amendments to the Clayton Act were enacted in an attempt to curb the ability of large businesses to coerce sellers of products into granting them discriminatory price advantages over smaller purchasers, only one section of the Act, section 2(f) which prohibits the knowing inducement or receipt of discriminatory prices, is aimed at buyers. The remainder of the Act is directed toward sellers. Liability under section 2(f) is generally derivative in nature, being based on a preliminary finding of seller liability under another section of the Act. Because of this derivative nature of buyer liability and because other sections of the Act define what is and what is not a discriminatory price, it is important to understand those sections of the Act directed toward sellers

Recovery for Accidental Injuries Under the Virginia Workmen\u27s Compensation Act

The Virginia Workmen\u27s Compensation Act, first enacted in 1918, generally provides for case benefits and medical care to individuals injured in employment-related accidents. While the Act is neither tort law nor social insurance, it contains elements of both. As social legislation, the Act plays an important role in protecting citizens from loss of wages and provides an important supplement to protection available from the federal Old Age, Survivors\u27 Disability and Health Insurance Program, unemployment compensation and private health and accident insurance plans. In 1979, more than 43,000 Virginia employees filed claims under the Act. Unlike other social insurance programs, however, workmen\u27s compensation is funded by neither the employee nor the state. For a qualifying injury, death or disease, liability is borne by the employer and, presumably, passed on to the consumer

Expert Testimony on Proximate Cause

Expert testimony is common in tort litigation, especially on issues of standard of care and cause-in-fact. Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and its state counterparts abolished the prohibition of testimony on ultimate issues, leading to the possibility of expert testimony on the often crucial issue of proximate cause. The situation is easy to imagine. After counsel has qualified an expert witness and elicited an opinion that the particular act or omission caused the injury in question, counsel might very well be tempted to inquire whether the witness has an opinion as to whether the act or omission was a proximate or legal cause of the accident. Or, counsel may merge the two lines of inquiry and ask whether the act or omission proximately resulted in the accident or injury to the plaintiff. The inquiry seems harmless. The term proximate is commonly understood to mean only near or close to. The question is not innocuous, however. The issue of expert testimony on the question of proximate cause implicates several restrictions on expert testimony that survive the broad permission of Rule 704, and touches upon the serious issue of the proper roles of expert and fact-finder in the application of law to facts. The few published cases that have considered the issue of expert testimony on proximate cause are split.\u27 The question arises far more often, however, than is indicated by the relative scarcity of reported decisions. This Article addresses the usefulness and propriety of expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause. After briefly defining the concept of proximate cause, this Article argues that expert testimony on proximate cause is inadmissible under Rule 704, despite the general admissibility of testimony on ultimate issues. In addition, opinion on proximate cause is inadmissible because it fails to clear the separate hurdles of Rules 702\u27 and 4036 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. A technical expert on standard of care or actual cause is not qualified to opine on the issue of proximate cause and thus fails the expertise test of Rule 702. Furthermore, even the testimony of a genuine expert on the issue of proximate cause should be excluded because such testimony fails the helpfulness test of Rule 702. Finally, expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause is inadmissible under Rule 403 because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the possibility that such testimony will confuse the issues and mislead the jury

Fractional Branes in Non-compact Type IIA Orientifolds

We study fractional D-branes in the Type-IIA theory on a non-compact orientifold of the orbifold C^3/Z_3 in the boundary state formalism. We find that the fractional D0-branes of the orbifold theory become unstable due to the presence of a tachyon, while there is a stable D-instanton whose tachyon gets projected out. We propose that the D-instanton is obtained after tachyon condensation. We evidence this by calculating the Whitehead group of the Abelian category of objects corresponding to the boundary states as being isomorphic to Z_2.Comment: 29 pages, Latex2e minor corrections. references updated. Version accepted in JHE