Reference and Indexicality

Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nº 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference. Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons

Metalinguistic Value Disagreement

SRFH/BPD/84612/2012, PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014In a series of publications Burgess, Plunkett and Sundell have developed a metalinguistic negotiation view that they call ‘Conceptual Ethics.’ I argue that their position adequately captures our intuition that some cases of value disputes are metalinguistic, but that they reverse the direction of justification when they state that speakers ‘negotiate’ the best use of a term or concept on the basis of its prior social role. Borrowing ideas from Putnam (1975b), I instead suggest distinguishing two meanings of general terms and value predicates. Core meaning represents the lowest common denominator between speakers and is primarily based on our needs to coordinate behavior. In contrast to this, the noumenal meaning of a general term or value predicate is intended to capture an aspect of reality and represents what a term really means. Like many other disputes about theoretical terms, terms for abstract objects, and predicates, metalinguistic value disputes are about noumenal meaning on the basis of a shared core meaning. This direction towards reality is what sets the account apart from mere metalinguistic negotiation.publishersversionpublishe

Towards a Model of Argument Strength for Bipolar Argumentation Graphs

UID/FIL/00183/2013Bipolar argument graphs represent the structure of complex pro and contra arguments for one or more standpoints. In this article, ampliative and exclusionary principles of evaluating argument strength in bipolar acyclic argumentation graphs are laid out and compared to each other. Argument chains, linked arguments, link attackers and supporters, and convergent arguments are discussed. The strength of conductive arguments is also addressed but it is argued that more work on this type of argument is needed to properly distinguish argument strength from more general value-based components of such argu- ments. The overall conclusion of the article is that there is no justifiably unique solution to the problem of argument strength outside of a particular epistemological framework.publishersversionpublishe

Value Disagreement and Dual Aspect Semantics

FCT Fellowship SRFH/BPD/84612/2012, FCT Project PTDC/MHC-FIL/0521/2014publishersversionpublishe

Valores

UID/FIL/00183/2019publishersversionpublishe

Reference and Indexicality

iv This thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference. Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicator

Moral Choice Without Moralism

UID/FIL/00183/2013Decision Theory is often considered the foundational framework for analyzing possible courses of action and making a rational decision, yet no particular role is given to the moral attributes of alternatives in multi-criteria decision making. In this article, I lay out several ways of defining a decision as moral on the basis of attributes that have already been identified as morally relevant, while at the same time allowing the application of moral rules to be permeable or ‘soft’. Among these, the bipolar threshold view seems to be the most promising.authorsversionpublishe

Reference and Indexicality

Tese arquivada ao abrigo da Portaria nº 227/2017 de 25 de Julho-Registo de Grau EstrangeiroThis thesis is a general defence of a context-dependent description theory of reference with special regards to indexical reference on the basis of a truth-conditional theory of meaning. It consists of two parts. In the first part, the roots of the Frege-Russell view are laid out and contrasted with various aspects of direct reference theory and the New Theory of Reference. Two description-based accounts of the reference of proper names, nominal and external description theory, are defended against various known counter-arguments such as Kripke’s circularity objection and the Church-Langford translation test. It is shown how the resulting analysis of de dicto belief ascriptions can be made compositional, but also argued that compositionality is not mandatory. The second part deals with forms of indexical and non-indexical contextdependence. Taking into account a range of typological data, referential features of indexical expressions like their egocentricity, token-reflexivity, and the vagueness of spatial and temporal indexicals are laid out. Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives is then reformulated, but following Cresswell (1990) it is argued that full quantification over modal indices is needed. Various indicators and demonstratives are analyzed on the basis of a description theory of reference in a variant of first-order predicate logic with non-traditional predication theory and two sorts of reified contexts. Examples analyzed include: I, now, here, actually, we, the former president, the left entrance, context-shifting indexicals, and demonstratives like Japanese are. Finally, essential indexicality is addressed and it is conceded that description theory cannot deal with attitudes de se. In defense of indirect reference it is argued that the cognitive phenomena underlying essential indexicality, as for example I-thoughts, aren’t aspects of the public meaning of natural language expressions and that speaking of a ‘language of thinking’ or ‘reference in thinking’ are unfitting metaphors for general semiotic reasons