Private ownership and corporate performance : some lessons from transition economies

Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, the authors compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition. They find strong evidence that private ownership--except for worker ownership-- dramatically improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the"privatization shock"that was supposed to afflict the behavior of firms undergoing rapid changes in ownership. Instead, they observe a severe shock from marketization, affecting both state and privatized firms--but a shock for which private ownership provides a powerful antidote. Among their other findings are : a) Private ownership is most effective in improving a firm's ability to generate revenues, an area in which entrepreneurship seems to be required. Ownership also affects a firm's ability to remove the rather obvious cost inefficiencies inherited from the past, but this effect is less pronounced, as both state and privatized firms engage in significant cost restructuring. b) Privatized firms generate significantly more employment gains than state firms. It is their superior ability to generate revenues, rather than competence at cost-cutting, that allows them to sustain or expand employment. This is why privatization is the dominant strategy for expanding employment in transition. c) Outsider-owned firms perform better than insider-owned firms on most performance measures, but there is enough difference between employee- and manager-owned firms to suggest that putting all insiders under a common umbrella is unjustified. Although the effects of managerial ownership are ambiguous, putting employees in control appears to offer no advantages over state ownership on any measure and creates a distinct disadvantage in terms of employment performance. d) Among outsider owners, privatization funds seem to do as well at revitalizing the privatized companies as do other outsider owners; in particular, the authors find no evidence that funds are less effective than'strategic'investors. And foreign investors provide perhaps less of an edge than might have been expected; their impact appears no stronger than that of major domestic outsiders.Small and Medium Size Enterprises,Small Scale Enterprise,Microfinance,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Microfinance,Private Participation in Infrastructure,Small Scale Enterprise,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring

The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies

This paper, based on a large sample of mid-sized manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. The study offers three main conclusions. First, we find that state enterprises represent a higher credit risk both because of their inferior economic performance and because of their lesser willingness or propensity to meet their payment obligations. Second, the brunt of the state firms\u27 lower creditworthiness is borne by their state creditors, as state enterprises deflect the higher risk away from private creditors. Third, this transfer of risks from private to state creditors is possible because state creditors impose significantly softer financial discipline on state firms. Inasmuch as such softness may reflect unwillingness to accept a likely demise of a large number of state firms that are in principle capable of successful restructuring through ownership changes, we conclude that the imposition financial of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance

Private Ownership and Corporate Performance: Some Lessons from Transition Economies

Data on mid-sized firms in three transition economies provide strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. And the privatized firms\u27 superior ability to generate revenues allows those firms to sustain or expand employment. Using a large sample of data on mid-sized firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, Frydman, Gray, Hessel, and Rapacynski compare the performance of privatized and state firms in the environment of the postcommunist transition. They find strong evidence that private ownership – for worker ownership – improves corporate performance. They find no evidence of the privatization shock that was supposed to afflict the behavior of firms undergoing rapid changes in ownership. Instead, they observe a severe shock from marketization, affecting both state and privatized firms – a shock for which private ownership provides a powerful antidote. Among their other findings: Private ownership is most effective in improving a firm\u27s ability to generate revenues, an area in which entrepreneurship seems to be required. Ownership also affects a firm\u27s ability to remove the rather obvious cost inefficiencies inherited from the past, but this effect is less pronounced, as both state and privatized firms engage in significant cost restructuring. Most important, privatized firms generate significantly more employment gains than state firms. It is their superior ability to generate revenues, rather than competence at cost-cutting, that allows them to sustain or expand employment. This is why privatization is the dominant strategy for expanding employment in transition. Outsider-owned firms perform better than insider-owned firms on most performance measures, but there is enough difference between employee- and manager-owned firms to suggest that putting all insiders under a common umbrella is unjustified. Although the effects of managerial ownership are ambiguous, putting employees in control appears to offer no advantages over state ownership on any measure and creates a distinct disadvantage in terms of employment performance. Among outsider owners, privatization funds seem to do as well at revitalizing the privatized companies as do other outsider owners; in particular, the authors find no evidence that funds are less effective than strategic investors. And foreign investors provide perhaps less of an edge than might have been expected; their impact appears no stronger than that of major domestic outsiders. This paper – a product of the Development Research Group – is part of a larger effort in the Bank to explore issues of corporate governance in transition economies. The study was funded by the Bank\u27s Research Support Budget under research project Corporate Governance in Central Europe (RPO 678-42)

The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia

I examine ownership structure of Russian firms during the 1998-2006 period, where a greater emphasis is placed on motivations behind increased government ownership in the latter years, when oligarchs' opportunistic influence on the firm diminished as state ownership correspondingly increased. As this phenomenon is also correlated with improved corporate growth during the period, I argue that state participation in corporate governance acted as an effective substitute mechanism to constrain wealth-tunnelling behaviour of corporate insiders and local bureaucrats in a country defined by a weak property rights system. © 2012 Springer-Verlag

Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia

In Volume 1, distinguished economists, legal scholars, political scientists and sociologists examine the emerging institutions of corporate governance in privatized firms in transition economies. They investigate the role of banks, investment funds, and pension funds, as well as the role and impact of residual state ownership. In Volume 2, distinguished economists, legal scholars, political scientists and sociologists examine the emerging institutions of corporate governance in privatized firms in transition economies. They look at the nature of control exercised by insiders in Central and Eastern European firms and the emergence of indigenous corporate governance institutions. The volume also addresses the role of foreign investors and the many issues involved in the design of corporate and securities law. Each paper combines experience from advanced market economies with in-country empirical work in transition settings. Together these papers represent the most comprehensive and up-to-date comparative analysis yet undertaken of privatization struggles and their impact on corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1199/thumbnail.jp

Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia

In Volume 1, distinguished economists, legal scholars, political scientists and sociologists examine the emerging institutions of corporate governance in privatized firms in transition economies. They investigate the role of banks, investment funds, and pension funds, as well as the role and impact of residual state ownership. In Volume 2, distinguished economists, legal scholars, political scientists and sociologists examine the emerging institutions of corporate governance in privatized firms in transition economies. They look at the nature of control exercised by insiders in Central and Eastern European firms and the emergence of indigenous corporate governance institutions. The volume also addresses the role of foreign investors and the many issues involved in the design of corporate and securities law. Each paper combines experience from advanced market economies with in-country empirical work in transition settings. Together these papers represent the most comprehensive and up-to-date comparative analysis yet undertaken of privatization struggles and their impact on corporate governance in Central Europe and Russia.https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/books/1199/thumbnail.jp

The Limits of Discipline: Ownership and Hard Budget Constraints in the Transition Economies

This paper, based on a large sample of mid-sized manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, argues that the imposition of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance. The study offers three main conclusions. First, we find that state enterprises represent a higher credit risk both because of their inferior economic performance and because of their lesser willingness or propensity to meet their payment obligations. Second, the brunt of the state firms\u27 lower creditworthiness is borne by their state creditors, as state enterprises deflect the higher risk away from private creditors. Third, this transfer of risks from private to state creditors is possible because state creditors impose significantly softer financial discipline on state firms. Inasmuch as such softness may reflect unwillingness to accept a likely demise of a large number of state firms that are in principle capable of successful restructuring through ownership changes, we conclude that the imposition financial of financial discipline is not sufficient to remedy ownership and governance-related deficiencies of corporate performance