Pure Awareness Experience

I am aware of the red and orange autumn leaves. Am I aware of my awareness of the leaves? Not so according to many philosophers. By contrast, many meditative traditions report an experience of awareness itself. I argue that such a pure awareness experience must have a non-sensory phenomenal character. I use Douglas Harding’s first-person experiments for assisting in recognizing pure awareness. In particular, I investigate the gap where one cannot see one’s head. This is not a mere gap because I seem to be looking from here. Critically, I claim, the experience of looking from here has a non-sensory phenomenal character. I argue that this sense of being aware cannot be reduced to egocentric visual spatial relations nor the viewpoint because it continues when I close my eyes. Neither is a multisensory origin sufficient to explain why I seem to be at this central point rather than elsewhere. Traditionally, claims of a pure awareness experience have been restricted to highly trained individuals in very restricted circumstances. The innovation of Harding’s approach is that it reliably isolates a candidate for pure awareness using methods which can be replicated at any time

A first approach to understanding and measuring naturalness in driver-car interaction

With technology changing the nature of the driving task, qualitative methods can help designers understand and measure driver-car interaction naturalness. Fifteen drivers were interviewed at length in their own parked cars using ethnographically-inspired questions probing issues of interaction salience, expectation, feelings, desires and meanings. Thematic analysis and content analysis found five distinct components relating to 'rich physical' aspects of natural feeling interaction typified by richer physical, analogue, tactile styles of interaction and control. Further components relate to humanlike, intelligent, assistive, socially-aware 'perceived behaviours' of the car. The advantages and challenges of a naturalness-based approach are discussed and ten cognitive component constructs of driver-car naturalness are proposed. These may eventually be applied as a checklist in automotive interaction design.This research was fully funded by a research grant from Jaguar Land Rover, and partially funded by project n.220050/F11 granted by Research Council of Norway

Many-body wave scattering by small bodies

Scattering problem by several bodies, small in comparison with the wavelength, is reduced to linear algebraic systems of equations, in contrast to the usual reduction to some integral equations

Chemoconvection patterns in the methylene-blue–glucose system: weakly nonlinear analysis

The oxidation of solutions of glucose with methylene-blue as a catalyst in basic media can induce hydrodynamic overturning instabilities, termed chemoconvection in recognition of their similarity to convective instabilities. The phenomenon is due to gluconic acid, the marginally dense product of the reaction, which gradually builds an unstable density profile. Experiments indicate that dominant pattern wavenumbers initially increase before gradually decreasing or can even oscillate for long times. Here, we perform a weakly nonlinear analysis for an established model of the system with simple kinetics, and show that the resulting amplitude equation is analogous to that obtained in convection with insulating walls. We show that the amplitude description predicts that dominant pattern wavenumbers should decrease in the long term, but does not reproduce the aforementioned increasing wavenumber behavior in the initial stages of pattern development. We hypothesize that this is due to horizontally homogeneous steady states not being attained before pattern onset. We show that the behavior can be explained using a combination of pseudo-steady-state linear and steady-state weakly nonlinear theories. The results obtained are in qualitative agreement with the analysis of experiments

Transverse oscillations of systems of coronal loops

We study the collective kinklike normal modes of a system of several cylindrical loops using the T-matrix theory. Loops that have similar kink frequencies oscillate collectively with a frequency which is slightly different from that of the individual kink mode. On the other hand, if the kink frequency of a loop is different from that of the others, it oscillates individually with its own frequency. Since the individual kink frequency depends on the loop density but not on its radius for typical 1 MK coronal loops, a coupling between kink oscillations of neighboring loops take place when they have similar densities. The relevance of these results in the interpretation of the oscillations studied by \citet{schrijver2000} and \citet{verwichte2004}, in which transverse collective loop oscillations seem to be detected, is discussed. In the first case, two loops oscillating in antiphase are observed; interpreting this motion as a collective kink mode suggests that their densities are roughly equal. In the second case, there are almost three groups of tubes that oscillate with similar periods and therefore their dynamics can be collective, which again seems to indicate that the loops of each group share a similar density. All the other loops seem to oscillate individually and their densities can be different from the rest

Body, Self and Others: Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa