A general model of fluency effects in judgment and decision making

Processing or cognitive fluency is the experienced ease of ongoing mental processes. This experience infl uences a wide range of judgments and decisions. We present a general model for these fluency effects. Based on Brunswik’s lens-model, we conceptualize fluency as a meta-cognitive cue. For the cue to impact judgments, we propose three process steps: people must experience fluency; the experience must be attributed to a judgment-relevant source; and it must be interpreted within the judgment context. This interpretation is either based on available theories about the experience’s meaning or on the learned validity of the cue in the given context. With these steps the model explains most fl uency effects and allows for new and testable predictions

When It’s Okay That I Don’t Play: Social Norms and the Situated Construal of Social Exclusion

Being excluded and ignored has been shown to threaten fundamental human needs and cause pain. Such reflexive reactions to social exclusion have been conceptualized as direct and unmoderated (temporal need threat model of ostracism). Here, we propose an extension and argue that reflexive reactions depend on how social exclusion situations are construed. If being excluded is understood as a violation of an inclusion norm, individuals will react with pain and threat. In contrast, if being excluded is consistent with the prevailing norm, the exclusion situation is interpreted as less threatening, and negative reflexive reactions to ostracism should be attenuated. Four studies empirically support this conceptual model. Studies 3 and 4 further show that to guide situated construal, the norm has to be endorsed by the individual. In both Studies 1 and 3, the effect of the norm is mediated by the objective situation’s subjective construal

It takes time (not money) to understand: Money reduces attentiveness to common ground in communication

Communication is a central part of social life. Successful communication requires going beyond the semantic meaning of words by being attentive to the interaction's common ground, that is, considering what actors know and believe to be mutually known about the situation. Drawing on previous literature suggesting that thoughts about money reduce social interaction whereas thoughts about time increase it, we propose that thinking about money compared to time reduces attentiveness towards the common ground. In support of this, we find that individuals who had been thinking about money compared to time were less likely to interpret two similar questions as distinct, even though asking the same question twice would be violating conversational norms (Study 1). Moreover, they were less likely to note ambiguity in a euphemistic description (Study 2), thus illustrating that lower attentiveness to the interaction's common ground can be a double-edged sword

Processing Fluency in Education: How Metacognitive Feelings Shape Learning, Belief Formation, and Affect

Processing fluency—the experienced ease with which a mental operation is performed has attracted little attention in educational psychology, despite its relevance. The present article reviews and integrates empirical evidence on processing fluency that is relevant to school education. Fluency is important, for instance, in learning, self-assessment of knowledge, testing, grading, teacher–student communication, social interaction in the multicultural classroom, and emergence of interest. After a brief overview of basic fluency research we review effects of processing fluency in three broad areas: metacognition in learning, belief formation, and affect. Within each area, we provide evidence-based implications for education. Along the way, we offer fluency-based insights into phenomena that were long known but not yet sufficiently explained (e.g., the effect of handwriting on grading). Bringing fluency (back) to education may contribute to research and school practice alike

Less than I expected and oh so true? On the interplay between expectations and framing effects in judgments of truth

This article investigates the negativity bias in truth judgments, which holds that negatively (vs. positively) framed statements are more likely to be judged true. Throughout four studies we find that expectations moderate the negativity bias. In particular, Study 1 failed to replicate the negativity bias with standard items. In Study 2 we investigated individuals' expectations regarding the statements. When systematically adjusting the percentages in negatively framed statements to be lower than expected, a negativity bias occurred in Study 3. Building on this knowledge in Study 4, we systematically decreased and increased percentages in both framing conditions, investigating the impact of under- versus overestimation. While expectations had no consistent effects for positive frames, overestimation (vs. underestimation) led to a higher likelihood of perceived truth in the negative framing condition. Results are discussed in context of current research on language and social psychology as well as post-truth politics

Extending the brand image on new products: The facilitative effect of happy mood states

Investigates the influence of mood and brand favorability on the evaluation of brand extensions. It is argued that affective states have an impact on the likelihood that the evaluation of a new product is based on the implications of the brand rather than on the implications of the features of the new product. Specifically, participants reported more positive evaluations of a new product when it was introduced by a positive rather than a negative brand – and this differential impact of category information was more pronounced for participants in a positive compared to a neutral or a negative mood

On the ease of (dis)believing: The role of accessibility experiences in credibility judgments

Credibility judgments are common and consequential in many applied settings. Although much research has addressed human observers' ability to discriminate true and deceptive statements, less is known about the psychological processes involved in such judgments. Here, it is proposed that the process of mustering evidence for or against credibility is reflected in a feeling-based form (ease-of-retrieval) and that such feelings can be used as a basis for credibility judgments. The results of an experiment show, as predicted, that the perceived ease with which participants could identify clues strongly influenced credibility judgments. Ironically, mustering more clues in support of a truthful account lowered credibility judgments; in contrast, mustering more clues in support of a deceptive account increased credibility judgments. Mediation analyses suggest that this is because participants relied on a feeling-based as opposed to content-based judgment strategy. Practical implications are discussed, and theoretical issues regarding the process of credibility judgment are raised

Your phone ruins our lunch: Attitudes, norms, and valuing the interaction predict phone use and phubbing in dyadic social interactions

Phubbing-ignoring another person in order to use a smartphone instead-is an increasingly common behavior that disrupts interactions and harms relationships. Using the frameworks of the Theory of Planned Behavior and an interaction value approach, we examined driving factors of phubbing frequency. Four pre-registered predictors were tested: attitudes towards phubbing, subjective norms of phubbing, interaction value, that is, the extent of valuing a social interaction, and perceived interaction value of the partner. After having had lunch together, a total of 128 participants in 64 dyads filled out a survey assessing the four predictors. Dyadic linear mixed model analyses confirm that a more positive attitude towards phubbing increases phubbing, as well as being phubbed. Moreover, we disentangled screen-sharing time (i.e., using a phone together), phone use, co-present phone use (i.e., using a phone alone), and phubbing: we found that valuing the social interaction more decreased phone use, but not phubbing, and holding more accepting subjective norms on phubbing increased co-present phone use, but not phone use in general. We further found that the person that used their phone first, phubbed more. Overall, this research extends our understanding of the factors driving phubbing and may be fruitfully harnessed to reduce phubbing

You should go for diversity, but I'd rather stay with similar others: Social distance modulates the preference for diversity

Organizations often state that they value diversity. The workforce, however, is often quite homogeneous, reflecting a striking mismatch between aspirations and reality. Based on the distinction between desirability and feasibility concerns, we provide a psychological argument for this mismatch. We hypothesize that social distance influences individuals' choices regarding diversity. When being socially more distant, individuals prefer to assemble a diverse team, due to a stronger impact of pro-diversity desirability concerns. In contrast, when being socially close, individuals prefer similar team members, due to a stronger weighing of anti-diversity feasibility concerns. Four studies investigate the different decision outcomes when being socially distant compared to close. Study 1 shows that working in a diverse group is perceived as desirable, but less feasible. Study 2 investigates the impact of psychological distance on individuals' choices of working with a more different (when being socially distant) or similar partner (when being socially close). Study 3 shows that participants created a more diverse team for another person (distance condition) than for themselves (proximity condition). In Study 4, participants did not create a more diverse group for a stranger (distance condition) than for a friend (adjusted proximity condition), however, participants weighted feasibility concerns less strongly for strangers than for friends. Implications for diversity research and practice are discussed

Faced with exclusion: Perceived facial warmth and competence influence moral judgments of social exclusion

The current research investigates how facial appearance can act as a cue that guides observers' feelings and moral judgments about social exclusion episodes. In three studies, we manipulated facial portraits of allegedly ostracized persons to appear more or less warm and competent. Participants perceived it as least morally acceptable to exclude a person that appeared warm-and-incompetent. Moreover, participants perceived it as most acceptable to exclude a cold-and-incompetent looking person. In Study 2, we also varied the faces of the excluding group (i.e., the ostracizers). Results indicate that typical ostracizers are imagined as cold-and-incompetent looking. Study 3 suggests that the effect of a target's facial appearance on moral judgment is mediated by feelings of disgust. In sum, people's moral judgment about social exclusion can be influenced by facial appearance, which has many implications in intergroup research, such as for bystander intervention