Mechanisms for Automated Negotiation in State Oriented Domains

This paper lays part of the groundwork for a domain theory of negotiation, that is, a way of classifying interactions so that it is clear, given a domain, which negotiation mechanisms and strategies are appropriate. We define State Oriented Domains, a general category of interaction. Necessary and sufficient conditions for cooperation are outlined. We use the notion of worth in an altered definition of utility, thus enabling agreements in a wider class of joint-goal reachable situations. An approach is offered for conflict resolution, and it is shown that even in a conflict situation, partial cooperative steps can be taken by interacting agents (that is, agents in fundamental conflict might still agree to cooperate up to a certain point). A Unified Negotiation Protocol (UNP) is developed that can be used in all types of encounters. It is shown that in certain borderline cooperative situations, a partial cooperative agreement (i.e., one that does not achieve all agents' goals) might be preferred by all agents, even though there exists a rational agreement that would achieve all their goals. Finally, we analyze cases where agents have incomplete information on the goals and worth of other agents. First we consider the case where agents' goals are private information, and we analyze what goal declaration strategies the agents might adopt to increase their utility. Then, we consider the situation where the agents' goals (and therefore stand-alone costs) are common knowledge, but the worth they attach to their goals is private information. We introduce two mechanisms, one 'strict', the other 'tolerant', and analyze their affects on the stability and efficiency of negotiation outcomes.Comment: See http://www.jair.org/ for any accompanying file

A Local-Dominance Theory of Voting Equilibria

It is well known that no reasonable voting rule is strategyproof. Moreover, the common Plurality rule is particularly prone to strategic behavior of the voters and empirical studies show that people often vote strategically in practice. Multiple game-theoretic models have been proposed to better understand and predict such behavior and the outcomes it induces. However, these models often make unrealistic assumptions regarding voters' behavior and the information on which they base their vote. We suggest a new model for strategic voting that takes into account voters' bounded rationality, as well as their limited access to reliable information. We introduce a simple behavioral heuristic based on \emph{local dominance}, where each voter considers a set of possible world states without assigning probabilities to them. This set is constructed based on prospective candidates' scores (e.g., available from an inaccurate poll). In a \emph{voting equilibrium}, all voters vote for candidates not dominated within the set of possible states. We prove that these voting equilibria exist in the Plurality rule for a broad class of local dominance relations (that is, different ways to decide which states are possible). Furthermore, we show that in an iterative setting where voters may repeatedly change their vote, local dominance-based dynamics quickly converge to an equilibrium if voters start from the truthful state. Weaker convergence guarantees in more general settings are also provided. Using extensive simulations of strategic voting on generated and real preference profiles, we show that convergence is fast and robust, that emerging equilibria are consistent across various starting conditions, and that they replicate widely known patterns of human voting behavior such as Duverger's law. Further, strategic voting generally improves the quality of the winner compared to truthful voting

Integrating planning and reactive control

Artificial intelligence research on planning is concerned with designing control systems that choose actions by manipulating explicit descriptions of the world state, the goal to be achieved, and the effects of elementary operations available to the system. Because planning shifts much of the burden of reasoning to the machine, it holds great appeal as a high-level programming method. Experience shows, however, that it cannot be used indiscriminately because even moderately rich languages for describing goals, states, and the elementary operators lead to computational inefficiencies that render the approach unsuitable for realistic applications. This inadequacy has spawned a recent wave of research on reactive control or situated activity in which control systems are modeled as reacting directly to the current situation rather than as reasoning about the future effects of alternative action sequences. While this research has confronted the issue of run-time tractability head on, in many cases it has done so by sacrificing the advantages of declarative planning techniques. Ways in which the two approaches can be unified are discussed. The authors begin by modeling reactive control systems as state machines that map a stream of sensory inputs to a stream of control outputs. These machines can be decomposed into two continuously active subsystems: the planner and the execution module. The planner computes a plan, which can be seen as a set of bits that control the behavior of the execution module. An important element of this work is the formulation of a precise semantic interpretation for the inputs and outputs of the planning system. They show that the distinction between planned and reactive behavior is largely in the eye of the beholder: systems that seem to compute explicit plans can be redescribed in situation-action terms and vice versa. They also discuss practical programming techniques that allow the advantages of declarative programming and guaranteed reactive response to be achieved simultaneously

The Pricing War Continues: On Competitive Multi-Item Pricing

We study a game with \emph{strategic} vendors who own multiple items and a single buyer with a submodular valuation function. The goal of the vendors is to maximize their revenue via pricing of the items, given that the buyer will buy the set of items that maximizes his net payoff. We show this game may not always have a pure Nash equilibrium, in contrast to previous results for the special case where each vendor owns a single item. We do so by relating our game to an intermediate, discrete game in which the vendors only choose the available items, and their prices are set exogenously afterwards. We further make use of the intermediate game to provide tight bounds on the price of anarchy for the subset games that have pure Nash equilibria; we find that the optimal PoA reached in the previous special cases does not hold, but only a logarithmic one. Finally, we show that for a special case of submodular functions, efficient pure Nash equilibria always exist

Acyclic Games and Iterative Voting

We consider iterative voting models and position them within the general framework of acyclic games and game forms. More specifically, we classify convergence results based on the underlying assumptions on the agent scheduler (the order of players) and the action scheduler (which better-reply is played). Our main technical result is providing a complete picture of conditions for acyclicity in several variations of Plurality voting. In particular, we show that (a) under the traditional lexicographic tie-breaking, the game converges for any order of players under a weak restriction on voters' actions; and (b) Plurality with randomized tie-breaking is not guaranteed to converge under arbitrary agent schedulers, but from any initial state there is \emph{some} path of better-replies to a Nash equilibrium. We thus show a first separation between restricted-acyclicity and weak-acyclicity of game forms, thereby settling an open question from [Kukushkin, IJGT 2011]. In addition, we refute another conjecture regarding strongly-acyclic voting rules.Comment: some of the results appeared in preliminary versions of this paper: Convergence to Equilibrium of Plurality Voting, Meir et al., AAAI 2010; Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative Voting, Meir, COMSOC 201

Reaching Consensus Under a Deadline

Committee decisions are complicated by a deadline, e.g., the next start of a budget, or the beginning of a semester. In committee hiring decisions, it may be that if no candidate is supported by a strong majority, the default is to hire no one - an option that may cost dearly. As a result, committee members might prefer to agree on a reasonable, if not necessarily the best, candidate, to avoid unfilled positions. In this paper, we propose a model for the above scenario - Consensus Under a Deadline (CUD)- based on a time-bounded iterative voting process. We provide convergence guarantees and an analysis of the quality of the final decision. An extensive experimental study demonstrates more subtle features of CUDs, e.g., the difference between two simple types of committee member behavior, lazy vs.~proactive voters. Finally, a user study examines the differences between the behavior of rational voting bots and real voters, concluding that it may often be best to have bots play on the voters' behalf

Collected notes from the Benchmarks and Metrics Workshop

In recent years there has been a proliferation of proposals in the artificial intelligence (AI) literature for integrated agent architectures. Each architecture offers an approach to the general problem of constructing an integrated agent. Unfortunately, the ways in which one architecture might be considered better than another are not always clear. There has been a growing realization that many of the positive and negative aspects of an architecture become apparent only when experimental evaluation is performed and that to progress as a discipline, we must develop rigorous experimental methods. In addition to the intrinsic intellectual interest of experimentation, rigorous performance evaluation of systems is also a crucial practical concern to our research sponsors. DARPA, NASA, and AFOSR (among others) are actively searching for better ways of experimentally evaluating alternative approaches to building intelligent agents. One tool for experimental evaluation involves testing systems on benchmark tasks in order to assess their relative performance. As part of a joint DARPA and NASA funded project, NASA-Ames and Teleos Research are carrying out a research effort to establish a set of benchmark tasks and evaluation metrics by which the performance of agent architectures may be determined. As part of this project, we held a workshop on Benchmarks and Metrics at the NASA Ames Research Center on June 25, 1990. The objective of the workshop was to foster early discussion on this important topic. We did not achieve a consensus, nor did we expect to. Collected here is some of the information that was exchanged at the workshop. Given here is an outline of the workshop, a list of the participants, notes taken on the white-board during open discussions, position papers/notes from some participants, and copies of slides used in the presentations

Compromise in negotiation: exploiting worth functions over states

AbstractPrevious work by G. Zlotkin and J.S. Rosenschein (1989, 1990, 1991, 1992) discussed interagent negotiation protocols. One of the main assumptions there was that the agents' goals remain fixed—the agents cannot relax their initial goals, which can be achieved only as a whole and cannot be partially achieved. A goal there was considered a formula that is either satisfied or not satisfied by a given state.We here present a more general approach to the negotiation problem in non-cooperative domains where agents' goals are not expressed as formulas, but rather as worth functions. An agent associates a particular value with each possible final state; this value reflects the degree of satisfaction the agent derives from being in that state.With this new definition of goal as worth function, an agreement may lead to a situation in which one or both goals are only partially achieved (i.e., agents may not reach their most desired state). We present a negotiation protocol that can be used in a general non-cooperative domain when worth functions are available. This multi-plan deal type allows agents to compromise over their degree of satisfaction, and (in parallel) to negotiate over the joint plan that will be implemented to reach the compromise final state. The ability to compromise often results in a better deal, enabling agents to increase their overall utility.Finally, we present more detailed examples of specific worth functions in various domains, and show how they are used in the negotiation process

Intelligent Agent Architectures: Reactive Planning Testbed

An Integrated Agent Architecture (IAA) is a framework or paradigm for constructing intelligent agents. Intelligent agents are collections of sensors, computers, and effectors that interact with their environments in real time in goal-directed ways. Because of the complexity involved in designing intelligent agents, it has been found useful to approach the construction of agents with some organizing principle, theory, or paradigm that gives shape to the agent's components and structures their relationships. Given the wide variety of approaches being taken in the field, the question naturally arises: Is there a way to compare and evaluate these approaches? The purpose of the present work is to develop common benchmark tasks and evaluation metrics to which intelligent agents, including complex robotic agents, constructed using various architectural approaches can be subjected