19 research outputs found
Ontogenesis versus Morphogenesis towards an Anti-realist Model of the Constitution of Society
This article firstly criticizes Margaret Archerâs Morphogenetic Approach for being indecisive about the realist notion of emergence it proposes as well as for her inadequate account of structural conditioning. It is argued that critical realistsâ conceptualizations of emergence cannot but lead to inconsistencies about the adequate placement of agents as parts of emergent entities. The inconsistencies to which these conceptualizations lead necessitate an anti-realist model of the constitution of societies which takes into account that social structures are existentially dependent upon ideational elaboration. This alternative anti-realist theoretical perspective is provided by Ontogenesis, within the framework of which the realistsâ idea of the ânecessary and internal relationsâ give their place to the ontological pervasiveness of the culturally shared imaginary schemata. Archerâs denial of a collective synchronic impact to social forms is implied in her analysis of morphogenetic cycles, according to which, structural elaboration post-dates social interaction; and this denial is also expressed in this very idea of emergent structures. Instead, for Ontogenesis, social forms are synchronically dependent on the collective impact of the differently socially placed agents, who have different interests and material resources, and whose interaction only becomes meaningful when drawing on these culturally shared imaginary schemata
Centralidade de gĂȘnero no processo de construção da identidade de mulheres envolvidas na rede do trĂĄfico de drogas
A Neo-Meadian approach to human agency: relating the social and the psychological in the ontogenesis of perspective-coordinating persons
How can human agency be reconciled with bio-physical determinism? Starting with a discussion of the long standing debate between determinism and agency, we argue that the seeds of a reconciliation can be found in George Herbert Meadâs ideas concerning social acts, perspectives, differentiation, self-other interactivity, and conscious understanding. Drawing on more recent reformulations of Meadâs ideas, we present an integrated account of the ontogenesis of human agency. Human agency, we argue, should be conceptualized in terms of distanciation from immediate experience, and we show how social interactions, institutions and symbolic resources foster the development of agency in increasingly complex ways. We conclude by situating our work in relation to other developmental accounts and the larger project of theorizing and empirically supporting a compatibilist rendering of human agency as the âdeterminedâ self-determination of persons