Conceptualising humiliation

Humiliation lacks an empirically derived definition, sometimes simply being equated with shame. We approached the conceptualisation of humiliation from a prototype perspective, identifying 61 features of humiliation, some of which are more central to humiliation (e.g. losing self-esteem) than others (e.g. shyness). Prototypical humiliation involved feeling powerless, small, and inferior in a situation in which one was brought down and in which an audience was present, leading the person to appraise the situation as unfair and resulting in a mix of emotions, most notably disappointment, anger, and shame. Some of the features overlapped with those of shame (e.g. looking like a fool, losing self-esteem, presence of an audience) whereas other features overlapped with those of anger (e.g. being brought down, unfairness). Which specific features are present may determine whether the humiliation experience becomes more shame- or anger-like (or a combination thereof)

Belief in karma is associated with perceived (but not actual) trustworthiness

Believers of karma believe in ethical causation where good and bad outcomes can be traced to past moral and immoral acts. Karmic belief may have important interpersonal consequences. We investigated whether American Christians expect more trustworthiness from (and are more likely to trust) interaction partners who believe in karma. We conducted an incentivized study of the trust game where interaction partners had different beliefs in karma and God. Participants expected more trustworthiness from (and were more likely to trust) karma believers. Expectations did not match actual behavior: karmic belief was not associated with actual trustworthiness. These findings suggest that people may use others’ karmic belief as a cue to predict their trustworthiness but would err when doing so

Relational utility as a moderator of guilt in social interactions

The capacity to experience guilt is assumed to benefit individuals, as the rewards of repeated, cooperative interactions are likely to exceed the rewards of acting selfishly. If that assumption is true, the extent to which people experience guilt over interpersonal transgressions should at least partly depend on the utility of another person for the attainment of personal goal(s) through social interaction (relational utility). Three experiments confirmed the relational utility hypothesis by showing that people felt guiltier (a) over excluding someone from a fun game if this person could subsequently distribute more money in a dictator game, (b) over hypothetical social transgressions toward a person who was instrumental to the attainment of a salient goal than toward a person who was not instrumental to the attainment of that goal and toward the same person when no goal was salient, and (c) over a low contribution in a social dilemma game if they were more dependent on their group members for performing well in a subsequent debating contest. Closeness with the other person, differences in severity of the transgression, and strategic motives for expressing guilt were consistently excluded as alternative accounts of the effects. By showing that relational utility may affect guilt, these findings (a) provide support for the individual level function of guilt; (b) extend research on the antecedents of guilt in social interactions, which mainly focused on retrospective appraisals; and (c) bear implications for the status of guilt as a moral emotion

The motivational properties of hope in goal striving

We argue that hope is not an expectancy based on beliefs about pathways to desired goals and personal capacities to act on them, but an experience of the mere possibility of a desired outcome. We propose that in the latter sense, hope has unique motivational consequences for goal striving. Specifically, we predicted that hope buffers against the detrimental impact of negative feedback on goal-progress. The results of the two studies confirmed this prediction. In Study 1, we measured participants’ hopes of attaining a weight-loss goal. In Study 2, we induced hope at solving an unsolvable mathematical puzzle. In both studies, receiving negative feedback on goal-progress resulted in lower levels of success (Study 1) and persistence (Study 2) in goal-striving, but not for participants who experienced hope. We discuss the role of hope as an affective mechanism that functions to regulate energy expenditure in goal-striving