24 research outputs found
Is the evidence for dark energy secure?
Several kinds of astronomical observations, interpreted in the framework of
the standard Friedmann-Robertson-Walker cosmology, have indicated that our
universe is dominated by a Cosmological Constant. The dimming of distant Type
Ia supernovae suggests that the expansion rate is accelerating, as if driven by
vacuum energy, and this has been indirectly substantiated through studies of
angular anisotropies in the cosmic microwave background (CMB) and of spatial
correlations in the large-scale structure (LSS) of galaxies. However there is
no compelling direct evidence yet for (the dynamical effects of) dark energy.
The precision CMB data can be equally well fitted without dark energy if the
spectrum of primordial density fluctuations is not quite scale-free and if the
Hubble constant is lower globally than its locally measured value. The LSS data
can also be satisfactorily fitted if there is a small component of hot dark
matter, as would be provided by neutrinos of mass 0.5 eV. Although such an
Einstein-de Sitter model cannot explain the SNe Ia Hubble diagram or the
position of the `baryon acoustic oscillation' peak in the autocorrelation
function of galaxies, it may be possible to do so e.g. in an inhomogeneous
Lemaitre-Tolman-Bondi cosmology where we are located in a void which is
expanding faster than the average. Such alternatives may seem contrived but
this must be weighed against our lack of any fundamental understanding of the
inferred tiny energy scale of the dark energy. It may well be an artifact of an
oversimplified cosmological model, rather than having physical reality.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures; to appear in a special issue of General
Relativity and Gravitation, eds. G.F.R. Ellis et al; Changes: references
reformatted in journal style - text unchange
Desenvolvimento de Habilidades MetafonolĂłgicas e Aprendizagem da Leitura e da Escrita em Alunos com SĂndrome de Down
Fidelity to Bowers, Adult Plumage Acquisition, Longevity and Survival in Male Golden Bowerbirds Prionodura newtoniana
Deconstructing Frith and Snowling's Homograph-Reading Task: Implications for Autism Spectrum Disorders
What Will You Do Next? A Cognitive Model for Understanding Othersâ Intentions Based on Shared Representations
Goal-directed action selection is the problem of what to do next in order to progress towards
goal achievement. This problem is computationally more complex in case of joint action settings
where two or more agents coordinate their actions in space and time to bring about a common goal:
actions performed by one agent influence the action possibilities of the other agents, and ultimately the
goal achievement. While humans apparently effortlessly engage in complex joint actions, a number of
questions remain to be solved to achieve similar performances in artificial agents: How agents represent
and understand actions being performed by others? How this understanding influences the choice of
agentâs own future actions? How is the interaction process biased by prior information about the task?
What is the role of more abstract cues such as othersâ beliefs or intentions?
In the last few years, researchers in computational neuroscience have begun investigating how controltheoretic
models of individual motor control can be extended to explain various complex social phenomena,
including action and intention understanding, imitation and joint action. The two cornerstones of
control-theoretic models of motor control are the goal-directed nature of action and a widespread use of
internal modeling. Indeed, when the control-theoretic view is applied to the realm of social interactions,
it is assumed that inverse and forward internal models used in individual action planning and control
are re-enacted in simulation in order to understand othersâ actions and to infer their intentions. This
motor simulation view of social cognition has been adopted to explain a number of advanced mindreading
abilities such as action, intention, and belief recognition, often in contrast with more classical
cognitive theories - derived from rationality principles and conceptual theories of othersâ minds - that
emphasize the dichotomy between action and perception.
Here we embrace the idea that implementing mindreading abilities is a necessary step towards a more
natural collaboration between humans and robots in joint tasks. To efficiently collaborate, agents need to
continuously estimate their teammatesâ proximal goals and distal intentions in order to choose what to
do next.We present a probabilistic hierarchical architecture for joint action which takes inspiration from
the idea of motor simulation above. The architecture models the casual relations between observables
(e.g., observed movements) and their hidden causes (e.g., action goals, intentions and beliefs) at two
deeply intertwined levels: at the lowest level the same circuitry used to execute my own actions is
re-enacted in simulation to infer and predict (proximal) actions performed by my interaction partner,
while the highest level encodes more abstract task representations which govern each agentâs observable
behavior. Here we assume that the decision of what to do next can be taken by knowing 1) what the
current task is and 2) what my teammate is currently doing. While these could be inferred via a costly
(and inaccurate) process of inverting the generative model above, given the observed data, we will
show how our organization facilitates such an inferential process by allowing agents to share a subset of
hidden variables alleviating the need of complex inferential processes, such as explicit task allocation,
or sophisticated communication strategies
What Will You Do Next? A Cognitive Model for Understanding Othersâ Intentions Based on Shared Representations
âWhat the Hell is That?â: Representations of Professional Service Markets in The Simpsons.
This paper makes productive connections between two forms of representationâformal scholarship on professional service workers and their depictions in The Simpsons cartoon series. In considering the show's representations of Attorney Lionel Hutz and Dr Nick Riviera, I ponder the ways in which the market-based behaviours of these 'expert' individuals are so repeatedly targeted for satire. Through a detailed dissection of The Simpsons' scripts, I demonstrate how, on the one hand, the show to a large degree reflects critical thinking on the nature of the 'professional project' yet, on the other, offers some rather more ambivalent, even sympathetic, notions of professional identity