Existence of positive solutions of a superlinear boundary value problem with indefinite weight

We deal with the existence of positive solutions for a two-point boundary value problem associated with the nonlinear second order equation $u''+a(x)g(u)=0$. The weight $a(x)$ is allowed to change its sign. We assume that the function $g\colon\mathopen{[}0,+\infty\mathclose{[}\to\mathbb{R}$ is continuous, $g(0)=0$ and satisfies suitable growth conditions, so as the case $g(s)=s^{p}$, with $p>1$, is covered. In particular we suppose that $g(s)/s$ is large near infinity, but we do not require that $g(s)$ is non-negative in a neighborhood of zero. Using a topological approach based on the Leray-Schauder degree we obtain a result of existence of at least a positive solution that improves previous existence theorems.Comment: 12 pages, 4 PNG figure

In defence of global egalitarianism

This essay argues that David Miller's criticisms of global egalitarianism do not undermine the view where it is stated in one of its stronger, luck egalitarian forms. The claim that global egalitarianism cannot specify a metric of justice which is broad enough to exclude spurious claims for redistribution, but precise enough to appropriately value different kinds of advantage, implicitly assumes that cultural understandings are the only legitimate way of identifying what counts as advantage. But that is an assumption always or almost always rejected by global egalitarianism. The claim that global egalitarianism demands either too little redistribution, leaving the unborn and dissenters burdened with their societies' imprudent choices, or too much redistribution, creating perverse incentives by punishing prudent decisions, only presents a problem for global luck egalitarianism on the assumption that nations can legitimately inherit assets from earlier generations – again, an assumption very much at odds with global egalitarian assumptions

Ten myths about character, virtue and virtue education – plus three well-founded misgivings

Initiatives to cultivate character and virtue in moral education at school continue to provoke sceptical responses. Most of those echo familiar misgivings about the notions of character, virtue and education in virtue – as unclear, redundant, old-fashioned, religious, paternalistic, anti-democratic, conservative, individualistic, relative and situation dependent. I expose those misgivings as ‘myths’, while at the same time acknowledging three better-founded historical, methodological and practical concerns about the notions in question

The Causal Structure of Emotions in Aristotle: Hylomorphism, Causal Interaction between Mind and Body, and Intentionality

Recently, a strong hylomorphic reading of Aristotelian emotions has been put forward, one that allegedly eliminates the problem of causal interaction between soul and body. Taking the presentation of emotions in de An. I 1 as a starting point and basic thread, but relying also on the discussion of Rh. II, I will argue that this reading only takes into account two of the four causes of emotions, and that, if all four of them are included into the picture, then a causal interaction of mind and body remains within Aristotelian emotions, independent of how strongly their hylomorphism is understood. Beyond the discussion with this recent reading, the analysis proposed of the fourfold causal structure of emotions is also intended as a hermeneutical starting point for a comprehensive analysis of particular emotions in Aristotle. Through the different causes Aristotle seems to account for many aspects of the complex phenomenon of emotion, including its physiological causes, its mental causes, and its intentional object

Educating for Autonomy: Liberalism and Autonomy in the Capabilities Approach

Martha Nussbaum grounds her version of the capabilities approach in political liberalism. In this paper, we argue that the capabilities approach, insofar as it genuinely values the things that persons can actually do and be, must be grounded in a hybrid account of liberalism: in order to show respect for adults, its justification must be political; in order to show respect for children, however, its implementation must include a commitment to comprehensive autonomy, one that ensures that children develop the skills necessary to make meaningful choices about whether or not to exercise their basic capabilities. Importantly, in order to show respect for parents who do not necessarily recognize autonomy as a value, we argue that the liberal state, via its system of public education, should take on the role of ensuring that all children within the state develop a sufficient degree of autonomy

Effects of Pacing When Using Material Handling Manipulators

Common manipulator-assisted materials handling tasks were performed in a laboratory simulation at self-selected and faster (paced) speeds. The effects of pacing on peak hand forces, torso kinematics, spine moments and forces, and muscle antagonism were determined, along with any influences of several task variables on these effects. The faster trials were performed 20% more rapidly than the self-paced trials. It was found that (a) achieving this level of performance required 10% higher hand forces and 5%-10% higher torso moments, (b) consistent torso postures and motions were used for both speed conditions, and (c) the faster trials resulted in 10% higher spine forces and 15% higher levels of lumbar muscle antagonism. On whole, these results suggest a higher risk of musculoskeletal injury associated with performance of object transfers at faster than self-selected speeds with and without a manipulator. Further analysis provided evidence that the use of manipulators involves higher levels of motor coordination than do manual tasks. Several implications regarding the use of material handling manipulators in paced operations are discussed. Results from this investigation can be used in the design, evaluation, and selection of material handling manipulators.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/67067/2/10.1518_001872099779591240.pd

Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies

Critical disability studies (CDS) has emerged as an approach to the study of disability over the last decade or so and has sought to present a challenge to the predominantly materialist line found in the more conventional disability studies approaches. In much the same way that the original development of the social model resulted in a necessary correction to the overly individualized accounts of disability that prevailed in much of the interpretive accounts which then dominated medical sociology, so too has CDS challenged the materialist line of disability studies. In this paper we review the ideas behind this development and analyse and critique some of its key ideas. The paper starts with a brief overview of the main theorists and approaches contained within CDS and then moves on to normative issues; namely, to the ethical and political applicability of CDS

Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration \ud

Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to grant some degree of moral consideration to some intelligent social robots: it sketches a novel argument for moral consideration based on social relations. It is shown that to further develop this argument we need to revise our existing ontological and social-political frameworks. It is suggested that we need a social ecology, which may be developed by engaging with Western ecology and Eastern worldviews. Although this relational turn raises many difficult issues and requires more work, this paper provides a rough outline of an alternative approach to moral consideration that can assist us in shaping our relations to intelligent robots and, by extension, to all artificial and biological entities that appear to us as more than instruments for our human purpose