836 research outputs found
In the Name of Liberty: An Argument for Universal Unionization
For years now, unionization has been under vigorous attack. Membership has been steadily declining, and with it union bargaining power. As a result, unions may soon lose their ability to protect workers from economic and personal abuse, as well as their significance as a political force. In the Name of Liberty responds to this worrying state of affairs by presenting a new argument for unionization, one that derives an argument for universal unionization in both the private and public sector from concepts of liberty that we already accept. In short, In the Name of Liberty reclaims the argument for liberty from the political right, and shows how liberty not only requires the unionization of every workplace as a matter of background justice, but also supports a wide variety of other progressive policies
Two Theories of Economic Liberalism
Within the Anglo-American world, economic liberalism is generally viewed as having only one progenitorâAdam Smithâand one offspringâneoliberalism. But it actually has two. The work of G. W. F. Hegel was also very influential on the development of economic liberalism, at least in the German-speaking world, and the most powerful contemporary instantiation of economic liberalism within that world is not neoliberlaism, but ordoliberalism, although this is generally unknown and certainly unacknowledged outside of Continental Europe. Accordingly, what I am going to be doing in this piece is trying to bring ordoliberalism more directly into the lightâI will argue that by comparing and contrasting the views of Smith and Hegel or at least between how Smith and Hegel tend to be currently (mis)understood, we can better understand both the roots and the nature of these two contemporary incarnations of economic liberalism, and the light this sheds, in turn, brings some interesting and important features of these two contemporary theories into view. From Smith, for example, neoliberals took the idea of the invisible hand, although I am going to argue that contemporary advocates of invisible hand theory have largely misconstrued or at the very least overstated the significance of this metaphor. From Hegel, in contrast, ordoliberals took the idea of the civil society, and I will argue that the civil society is a much better metaphor not only for Hegel's but also for Smith's views. Indeed, I will argue that ordoliberalism, not neoliberalism, is a better and more coherent instantiation of economic liberalism than neoliberalism could ever be
Twenty-One Statements about Political Philosophy: An Introduction and Commentary on the State of the Profession
While the volume of material inspired by Rawlsâs reinvigoration of the discipline back in 1971 has still not begun to subside, its significance has been in serious decline for quite some time. New and important work is appearing less and less frequently, while the scope of the work that is appearing is getting smaller and more internal and its practical applications more difficult to discern. The discipline has reached a point of intellectual stagnation, even as real-world events suggest that the need for what political philosophy can provide could not be more critical. What follows then is a set of statements about how I believe that we, as political philosophers, should approach what we do. It contains my view as to what political philosophy should be about, how political philosophy should be done, and how courses in political philosophy should be taught, interlaced with commentary on the current state of the profession
MACROSCOPIC SIMULATION OF NEAR-THRESHOLD HIGH HARMONIC GENERATION USING MICROSCOPIC TDSE/TDDFT CALCULATIONS
\begin{wrapfigure}{r}{0pt}
\includegraphics[width=.45\linewidth]{500000c_0um.eps}
\caption{Angle-resolved high-order harmonic spectrum from hydrogen atoms. Note the difference in structure of harmonic peaks versus off-harmonic lines}
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Modelling strong-field induced radiation near the ionization threshold requires careful treatment of excited state dynamics. Solution of the time dependent Schrodinger equation (TDSE) provides accurate data in this regime, but the computational time needed prohibits direct calculation of the macroscopic response (e.g., from a gas jet) due to the range of intensities to be considered. We apply a method of interpolation of (precalculated) TDSE results as a function of laser intensity at a given wavelength to simulate the macroscopic propagation of the high harmonic signals using the discrete dipole approximation. This allows investigation of the angular dependence of harmonic and off-harmonic radiation near and below the ionization threshold (see Fig. 1). The method can be extended beyond the hydrogen atom through the Single Active Electron (SAE) approximation or Time Dependent Density Functional Theory (TDDFT). Results for the helium atom (SAE) and molecule (TDDFT) will be presented.
This work was supported by AFOSR MURI (Grant No. FA9550-16-1-0121) and DOE-BES (Award No. DE-SC0001771
Propulsion and Space Vehicle Systems Analysis Program Tensor I, volume I Technical report no. 341
Computer program for space vehicle and propulsion systems analysi
Hope in an Illiberal Age?
In this commentary on Darrel Moellendorfâs Mobilizing Hope: Climate Change & Global Poverty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), I discuss his use of the precautionary principle, whether his hope for climate-friendly âgreen growthâ is realistic given the tendency for inequality to accelerate as it gets higher, and what I call his assumption of a liberal baseline. That is, I worry that the audience to whom the book is addressed are those who already accept the environmental and economic values to which Moellendorf appeals, while those who are blocking effective action on climate change in fact reject those values and are therefore unlikely to be moved by the arguments the book presents
Incommensurability and moral value
Some theorists believe that there is a plurality of values, and that in many circumstances these values are incommensurable, or at least incomparable. Others believe that all values are reducible to a single super-value, or that even if there is a plurality of irreducible values these values are commensurable. But I will argue that both sides have got it wrong. Values are neither commensurable nor incommensurable, at least not in the way most people think. We are free to believe in incommensurability or not, depending on what particular conception of morality we want to embrace. Incommensurability is accordingly not a theory about value. It is a presupposition that provides a necessary background condition for a certain kind of value to exist. It is therefore not the kind of view that can be morally true or false. As a presupposition, it can only be accepted or rejected on grounds that do not presuppose that morality already exists. Incommensurability is, like the rejection of hard determinism, one of the presuppositions on which morality as we know it happens to be based.</jats:p
Can Liberal Capitalism Survive?
For a long time, economic growth has been seen as the most promising source of funds to use toward reducing economic inequality, as well as a necessity if we are aiming at achieving full employment. But one of the most troubling aspects of the recent exponential rise in economic inequality is that this rise has occurred despite continued economic growth. Increases in national income have gone almost exclusively to the super-rich, while real wages for almost everybody else have stagnated or even declined. And while the unemployment rate dropped significantly before the coronavirus pandemic hit, good, permanent, high-wage jobs with benefits had by then often been replaced by temporary, part-time, low-wage jobs without benefits, leaving even the employed feeling economically insecure. And now, of course, unemployment is again skyrocketing, and it is unclear how long it might take to come down. As a result, we have now arrived at a point of reckoning: can we continue to believe that liberal capitalism is the most promising combination of economic and political ideologies for securing a prosperous and just future? If not, what might replace it? Is the problem capitalism, or is it liberalism? Are we up against economic forces that we cannot influence or control, or is it our political will and the liberal values we endorse that are being tested? This paper looks at all these questions, and suggests how we might think about the prospects for a liberal future
Neutrality and Excellence
In Liberalism with Excellence, Matthew Kramer makes an argument for how excellence may enter in into liberalism, despite liberalismâs strong commitment to neutrality. Kramer seeks to challenge not only the uncompromising rejection of this position by liberals such a Jonathan Quong, but also the so-called âblendedâ approach of âsoft-perfectionistâ scholars such as Joseph Raz and George Sher. In this essay, I do not so much challenge Kramerâs approach as offer an alternative for accomplishing the same thing. Under my proposal, certain forms of excellence and neutrality can both be accommodated as long as state support for the form of excellence at issue is proportional to the support for such a form of excellence within the relevant polity, competing forms of excellence are non-rivalrous, and no one is forced to embrace a form of excellence with which they disagree. My proposal is therefore not what Ronald Dworkin derogatively characterized as âa checkerboard solution.â Rather than allowing the state to support contrary moral positions at one and the same time, it is a solution that takes morally compatible but nevertheless competing conceptions of excellence seriously, and exhibits neutrality by giving them proportional rather than full support. This neither forces anyone to pursue the particular forms of excellence the state supports nor prevents them from pursuing some other form of excellence entirely or, if they wish, no form of excellence at all
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