The Temporal Logic of the Tower Chief System

The purpose is to describe the logic used in the reasoning scheme employed in the Tower Chief system, a runway configuration management system. First, a review of classical logic is given. Defensible logics, truth maintenance, default logic, temporally dependent propositions, and resource allocation and planning are discussed

Evidence -- 1963 Tennessee Survey

The doctrine of judicial notice is that an indisputable proposition of fact or a proposition of law of the jurisdiction is not subject to proof. The doctrine thus serves to relieve the litigant of the burden of proving certain facts and law, and is one of immense theoretical implication for the trial lawyer. A fact which is judicially noticed has much greater probative value than a fact which is proved, no matter how strong the proof. Judicial notice thus offers the trial lawyer an extremely effective, but apparently largely unused, device in litigation. None of the cases involving judicial notice during the survey period wa

Evidence: A Functional Meaning

A trial always involves two basic problems-the problem of ascertaining the truth of the matter in issue, and the problem of re-solving a dispute. The former can be characterized as the probative problem, arising from the problem of proving, and the latter as the forensic problem, arising from the procedural problem of proving-in-a-trial. The probative problem is a problem of evidence in that it is the problem of using evidence to ascertain the truth by the ratiocinative process of continuous persuasion. \u27 The forensic problem is a problem of the admissibility of evidence, and it is the forensic problem which has loomed largest in the field of evidence. The law of evidence consists of procedural rules devised by the law, and based on litigious experience and tradition, to guard the tribunal (particularly the jury) against erroneous persuasion. The unsatisfactory state of these procedural rules is no longer open to question. Most would agree that, The law of evidence is sagging to the point of collapse under its own weight. Few would dispute that much of the law of evidence is archaic, paradoxical: and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counter privilege to the other. A primary factor contributing to this condition seems to be that the prominence of the forensic problem in the law of evidence has obscured the importance of this probative problem

Evidence -- 1964 Tennessee Survey

The difficulty in dealing with presumptions arises in part from the fact that the term embraces a host of different meanings, varying with the purposes underlying the presumption in a given situation. Unfortunately, the courts seldom articulate the meaning which they are attributing to the term and consequently do little to clear up the confusion... In Arnett v. Fuston, a negligence action, plaintiff argued that a verdict of not guilty against one of the two co-defendants was not supported by any evidence, and that a presumption should apply against him for his election to stand on his motion for directed verdict and his failure to offer any evidence, because the facts of the accident were peculiarly within his knowledge and \u27is silence gives rise to the presumption that his testimony, if given, would be contrary to his contention in his plea of not guilty

The Types of Evidence: An Analysis

Since the purpose of this article is to analyze evidence in functional terms, it may be helpful at the outset to state the basic ideas which underlie the discussion. 1. Evidence consists of propositions of fact which are related to another proposition, a proposed conclusion. Evidence is thus to be distinguished from the fact or facts which are its basis. 2. The essential relationship of propositions which are evidence to the proposition which is the proposed conclusion is relevancy. 3. The relevancy of evidence to the proposed conclusion is determined by the inference drawn from the evidence. If the evidence will support an inference which coincides with the proposed conclusion it is relevant. Otherwise it is not. 4. There are two basic types of evidence, direct and circumstantial, which, for purposes of analysis, are best defined in functional terms, by relating the propositions which are evidence to the proposed conclusion. 5. Real evidence and demeanor evidence are facts presented to the senses of the trier of fact and as such should not be thought of as evidence, but only as exhibits which are bases of evidence. 6. Proving in a trial is a process which involves two basic steps by the trier: a determination of the reliability of the evidence, and the drawing of inferences therefrom. The first step is the credibility step, requiring a credibility inference; the second step is the probative step, requiring a probative inference. 7. Proof is the inference drawn from the evidence. Although evidence is generally called proof, it is in fact only the basis of proof. To develop these ideas, this article first states the meaning of evidence. It then analyzes direct and circumstantial evidence in functional terms, and compares the resulting meanings with the traditional meanings of direct, circumstantial, real, and demeanor evidence. Finally, it discusses the significance of the analysis in relation to the rules of evidence and proving in a trial

Letter from Richard R. Lyman

Letter concerning a position at Utah Agricultural College

Book Review

A revolution wrought by judges with the pen is more rare than one carried out by citizens with arms. The Warren Court did make a revolution-- the due process revolution, as the-- author calls it--and it is this transformation in our law that is the subject of Fred Graham\u27s book, The Self-Inflicted Wound. The wound referred to in the title is Miranda v. Arizona,\u27 in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that before the police can interrogate an accused in custody, they must warn him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that anything he says may be used against him in court. The author makes clear his view that the Court in this case went too far in its protection of the rights of criminal defendants. But, using his experience as a lawyer and as Supreme Court reporter for the New York Times, he has organized and presented the material to enable the reader to make his own reasoned judgment of the Court\u27s actions