Pilot's Automated Weather Support System (PAWSS) concepts demonstration project. Phase 1: Pilot's weather information requirements and implications for weather data systems design

The weather information requirements for pilots and the deficiencies of the current aviation weather support system in meeting these requirements are defined. As the amount of data available to pilots increases significantly in the near future, expert system technology will be needed to assist pilots in assimilating that information. Some other desirable characteristics of an automation-assisted system for weather data acquisition, dissemination, and assimilation are also described

Computational Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms

Game theory has developed powerful tools for analyzing decision making in systems with multiple autonomous actors. These tools, when tailored to computational settings, provide a foundation for building multiagent software systems. This tailoring gives rise to the field of computational mechanism design, which applies economic principles to computer systems design

Optimal bidding strategies for simultaneous Vickrey auctions with perfect substitutes

In this paper, we derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidder who participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a model where all other bidders are local and participate in a single auction. For this case, we prove that, assuming free disposal, the global bidder should always place non-zero bids in all available auctions, irrespective of the local bidders’ valuation distribution. Furthermore, for nondecreasing valuation distributions, we prove that the problem of finding the optimal bids reduces to two dimensions. These results hold both in the case where the number of local bidders is known and when this number is determined by a Poisson distribution. In addition, by combining analytical and simulation results, we demonstrate that similar results hold in the case of several global bidders, provided that the market consists of both global and local bidders. Finally, we address the efficiency of the overall market, and show that information about the number of local bidders is an important determinant for the way in which a global bidder affects efficiency

Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, using an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiencies within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiencies can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids

Functionality in single-molecule devices: Model calculations and applications of the inelastic electron tunneling signal in molecular junctions

We analyze how functionality could be obtained within single-molecule devices by using a combination of non-equilibrium Green's functions and ab-initio calculations to study the inelastic transport properties of single-molecule junctions. First we apply a full non-equilibrium Green's function technique to a model system with electron-vibration coupling. We show that the features in the inelastic electron tunneling spectra (IETS) of the molecular junctions are virtually independent of the nature of the molecule-lead contacts. Since the contacts are not easily reproducible from one device to another, this is a very useful property. The IETS signal is much more robust versus modifications at the contacts and hence can be used to build functional nanodevices. Second, we consider a realistic model of a organic conjugated molecule. We use ab-initio calculations to study how the vibronic properties of the molecule can be controlled by an external electric field which acts as a gate voltage. The control, through the gate voltage, of the vibron frequencies and (more importantly) of the electron-vibron coupling enables the construction of functionality: non-linear amplification and/or switching is obtained from the IETS signal within a single-molecule device.Comment: Accepted for publication in Journal of Chemical Physic

Non-equilibrium inelastic electronic transport: Polarization effects and vertex corrections to the self-consistent Born approximation

We study the effect of electron-vibron interactions on the inelastic transport properties of single-molecule nanojunctions. We use the non-equilibrium Green's functions technique and a model Hamiltonian to calculate the effects of second-order diagrams (double-exchange DX and dressed-phonon DPH diagrams) on the electron-vibration interaction and consider their effects across the full range of parameter space. The DX diagram, corresponding to a vertex correction, introduces an effective dynamical renormalization of the electron-vibron coupling in both the purely inelastic and the inelastic-resonant features of the IETS. The purely inelastic features correspond to an applied bias around the energy of a vibron, while the inelastic-resonant features correspond to peaks (resonance) in the conductance. The DPH diagram affects only the inelastic resonant features. We also discuss the circumstances in which the second-order diagrams may be approximated in the study of more complex model systems.Comment: To be published in PR

Sellers Competing for Buyers in Online Markets: Reserve Prices, Shill Bids, and Auction Fees

We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in which both sellers set reserve prices above their production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., bidding as a buyer in its own auction). This shill bidding is undesirable as it introduces inefficiencies within the market. However, through the use of an evolutionary simulation, we extend the analytical results beyond the two seller case, and we then show that these inefficiencies can be effectively reduced when the mediating auction institution uses auction fees based on the difference between the auction closing and reserve prices

Overlapping Coalition Formation for Efficient Data Fusion in Multi-Sensor Networks

This paper develops new algorithms for coalition formation within multi-sensor networks tasked with performing wide-area surveillance. Specifically, we cast this application as an instance of coalition formation, with overlapping coalitions. We show that within this application area sub-additive coalition valuations are typical, and we thus use this structural property of the problem to we derive two novel algorithms (an approximate greedy one that operates in polynomial time and has a calculated bound to the optimum, and an optimal branch-and-bound one) to find the optimal coalition structure in this instance. We empirically evaluate the performance of these algorithms within a generic model of a multi-sensor network performing wide area surveillance. These results show that the polynomial algorithm typically generated solutions much closer the optimal than the theoretical bound, and prove the effectiveness of our pruning procedure