A Comment on String Solitons

We derive an exact string-like soliton solution of D=10 heterotic string theory. The solution possesses $SU(2)\times SU(2)$ instanton structure in the eight-dimensional space transverse to the worldsheet of the soliton.Comment: 4 page

Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (Introduction)

The full book is attached to this record in STORR

Political Retributivism and Legal Moralism

A response to Dan Markel, ' Retributive Justice and the Demands of Democratic Citizenship', which criticises in particular his rejectiont of legal moralism, and his accounts both of mala in se and of mala prohibita

Torts, Crimes and Vindication: Whose Wrong is it?

It is sometimes said that tort law provides for the vindication of individual rights — which raises the question of how tort law as thus understood should relate to criminal law, which is sometimes also said to be concerned with the vindication of rights. I discuss the differences between civil and criminal modes of vindication; the ways in which we might nonetheless blur the boundaries between the tort process and the criminal process; and the light that this can throw on the central core of criminal law

Who Must Presume Whom to be Innocent of What?

This paper considers the roles that may be played by a “presumption of innocence” outside the criminal trial — a presumption that reflects a general principle of civic trust. We can understand the significance of this presumption, and the ways in which it can be qualified (without being defeated) by attending to some of the normative roles that citizens might take on, or have imposed on them, in relation to the criminal law, and the responsibilities or duties that attach to those roles. Particular attention is paid to the distinctive roles of “defendant” and of “ex-offender”, and to the question of whether it can be consistent with the presumption of innocence to treat either defendants or those who have completed their punishments as, if not guilty, at least far from unqualifiedly innocent.&nbsp

Towards a Modest Legal Moralism

After distinguishing different types of Legal Moralism (positive/negative; modest/ ambitious) I defend a modest, positive Legal Moralism: we have good reason to criminalize a type of conduct if and only if it constitutes a public wrong. Some of the central elements of the argument will be: the need to begin not (as many Legal Moralists begin) with the entire realm of moral wrongdoing, but with conduct falling within the public realm of civic life; the significance of the various different processes of criminalization (of which legislation is only one); and the need to attend to the relationship between criminal law and other modes of legal regulation. Criminal law focuses on wrongs: it identifies a set of public wrongs, and provides for those accused of committing such wrongs to be called to formal public account