Conditions and options for an autonomous "Common European Policy on Security and Defence" in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999. ZEI Discussion Papers: 1999, C 54

[From the Introduction]. According to the European Council’s Declaration on "the strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" issued at Cologne on June 4th 1999, which follows the direction given by the "British- French Joint Declaration on European Defence", adopted at St. Malo on December 4th 1998, the European Union is to provide the institutional framework for a future "autonomous" European military contribution to international security. The essential legal basis for such "action" in international crisis and conflict situations, which would not correspond to "article 5 contingencies" of the North Atlantic alliance treaty and therefore would not constitute a case for NATO "collective defence" with the commitment of all the allies including the US and Canada, is to be the Union Treaty of Amsterdam, effective as of 19993. The common security and defence policy is to be set into the framework of the CFSP as defined by the union treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam and accordingly limited to the "Petersberg Tasks" agreed upon in 1992 by the partners of the WEU and inscribed into the Amsterdam treaty. It should be conceived as a part of the latter. In the wording of the Cologne decisions and the report of the German presidency, adopted by the Council as expression of the agreement between the member-states, the "development of a common European security and defence policy" is meant to "strengthen the CFSP". To this end "capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and the readiness to do so" and "appropriate" organisms and procedures for decision-making are deemed necessary by the Chiefs of State and Government assembled at Cologne, "in order to respond to international crises". In the "Declaration of the European Council" on the "Common European Policy on Security and Defence" the "intention" is expressed to provide the EU with "the necessary means and capabilities" for "conflict prevention and crisis management" in order to "contribute to international peace and security in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter without prejudice to actions by NATO". The "measures" to be taken in such contingencies by the EU "irrespectively" of NATO require "military as well as political and economic" means

European Foreign and Security Policy since the Lisbon Treaty – From Common to single? ZEI Discussion Paper C226, 2014

Since the Lisbon Treaty, all organizational conditions have been created for the systematic use of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Military and civil structures, especially the operational headquarters and associated common structures like transport command, have been established. Until now there has been limited activity in crisis resolution, outside of Bosnia and Macedonia, and therefore little has been done in replacement of NATO. It is therefore difficult to assess the development of the common policy on conflict prevention and crisis management and it has been shown that in all cases NATO should come into play as planned from the outset

Mobility in a Globalised World 2015

The term mobility has different meanings in the following science disciplines. In economics, mobility is the ability of an individual or a group to improve their economic status in relation to income and wealth within their lifetime or between generations. In information systems and computer science, mobility is used for the concept of mobile computing, in which a computer is transported by a person during normal use. Logistics creates by the design of logistics networks the infrastructure for the mobility of people and goods. Electric mobility is one of today’s solutions from engineering perspective to reduce the need of energy resources and environmental impact. Moreover, for urban planning, mobility is the crunch question about how to optimise the different needs for mobility and how to link different transportation systems. In this publication we collected the ideas of practitioners, researchers, and government officials regarding the different modes of mobility in a globalised world, focusing on both domestic and international issues

Conditions for a European Intervention Strategy in Application of the ESDP and US/Nato Crisis Management. ZEI Discussion Paper C. 138, 2004

{From the Introduction]. Since the "Petersberg Tasks" for the "Western European Union" were adopted by the WEU council of foreign ministers in 1992, Europe has embarked on forays into the wide field of "hard security". The Petersberg decisions were a first step towards European participation in international peace support with military means, especially "tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making", as the decision read. European armed forces have been deployed in crisis contingencies, either as the improvised "Allied Rapid Reaction Force" to break up the Serbian circle of artillery fire on Sarajevo in 1995 or later under Nato command & control in Bosnia, in Macedonia, in Kosovo and since the summer of 2003 in Afghanistan. At the end of 2004 the EU was set to take over from Nato in Bosnia as parent organisation for SFOR

Structures, possibilities and limits of European crisis reaction forces for conflict prevention and resolution. Conditions for a successful EU security and defence policy, based on the decisions by the EU at Nice 9th December 2000. ZEI Discussion Papers: 2001, C83

Introduction. The following paper is based on the author’s "Conditions and options for an autonomous 'Common European Policy on Security and Defence' in and by the European Union in the post-Amsterdam perspective opened at Cologne in June 1999", written after the decisions by the European Council in June 1999 and published by the Center for European Integration Studies in Bonn. In addition, it is supplemented by a new analysis of the problems raised by the later agreements in the context of the EU summit decisions at Helsinki and Nice on European security and defence policy, the European crisis reaction forces and the "Headline Goal" for their strength and composition. The question is asked, whether these decisions and guidelines as well as the Headline Goal for the forces meet the conditions posed by the European security situation, the requirements of the European military contribution to Nato as well as those for an independent European military crisis response. This paper discusses the main aspects of the planned security, defence and crisis response policies in the limited European context against the background of crisis and conflict realities on the European periphery and beyond. It deals in particular with six central issues and problems of a general nature: the issue of political-military structures and intergovernmental decisionmaking in the EU, the problem of force structuring between participants for military operations outside Nato, the issue of standardisation, interoperability and readiness of crisis response forces, the problem of "European options" for independent use of EU forces in crisis and conflict, the issue of "European Armed Forces" and European military integration in the EU - the problem of harmony in the Atlantic alliance for an enlarged "European role". These six subjects are interrelated and must be seen in the general context. They are being dealt with in this discussion paper in three parts: I. The necessary political-military structures and political decision-making in the EU on security and defence policy for crisis response, including the requirements for flexibility in exercise of international missions and mandates under changing conditions. II. The requirements for force structuring, including interoperability and standardisation, readiness of forces and sustainability of deployments in crisis contingencies as conditions for "European" options of crisis response. III. The problems of harmony within the alliance, compatibility with US forces und of the creation of "European Armed Forces" for a "European defence" within the alliance as the hidden agenda behind the EC programme of 1999/2000

L'Allemagne fédérale et l'accord sur les FNI

The INF Treaty and Germany, by Lothar Rûhl The USSR finally accepted the West's propositions, abandoning its own, which had become inadequate and even risky. In fact, the Treaty cannot be judged solely on its contents, but also on its European political, psychological and military context ; with what means can the NATO strategy be implemented ? Will the allies be able to modernize their régional nuclear forces in Europe ? It is certainly not politically advantageous to stress the negociations on short-range weapon Systems or to seek a third zero option. On the other hand, negociations on the USSR's conventional armament's supremacy seem indispensable ; this would avoid highlighting Germany's singular position in the allied defence System.L'URSS a finalement accepté les propositions occidentales et renoncé à sa position, devenue inadéquate et même risquée. En fait, le Traité ne peut être jugé uniquement sur son contenu, mais doit l'être également dans le contexte politique, psychologique et militaire européen : avec quels moyens la stratégie de l'OTAN pourra-t-elle être mise en œuvre ? Les alliés pourront-ils moderniser leurs forces nucléaires régionales en Europe ? Il ne convient sûrement pas de privilégier la négociation sur les systèmes d'armes à courte portée ni de rechercher une troisième option zéro. En revanche, une négociation sur la domination du pacte de Varsovie en matière d'armements conventionnels s'avère indispensable. Ceci éviterait à l'Allemagne d'être « singularisée » au sein du dispositif interallié.Rühl Lothar. L'Allemagne fédérale et l'accord sur les FNI. In: Politique étrangère, n°1 - 1988 - 53ᵉannée. pp. 93-99

September 11 and the Future of the Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation, 2003. ZEI Discussion Paper: 2003, C120

[Table of Contents]. September 11 – Consequences for German Foreign Policy, by Christoph Zöpel; September 11 – Consequences for German Foreign Policy, by Lothar Rühl; The future of EMP, by Àlvaro de Vasconcelos; After September 11, is there a future for the Barcelona Process?, by Ahmed Driss; Future Challenges from the Mediterranean for German Foreign Policy: An Economic Perspective, by Volker Nienhaus; Mediterranean Enlargement of the European Union: New Challenges for Germany, by Arslan Chikhaoui; Why Germany should become more active in the Mediterranean, by Carlo Masala

The CSCE as a Model to Transform Western Relations with the Greater Middle East. ZEI Discussion Paper C 137, 2004

[Table of Contents]. Kühnhardt, Ludger. "System-opening and Cooperative Transformation of the Greater Middle East. A New Transatlantic Project and a Joint Euro-Atlantic-Arab Task"; Laschet, Armin. "Euro-Mediterranean Partnership: Beyond the Iraq crisis"; Lothar Rühl, Lothar. "Can the CSCE be a Role-Model to Frame the Political Processes of the Greater Middle East with Europe and the United States?"; Alnawwab, Nabil. "Conflict of Mythologies: The Debate on Reform of the Greater Middle East"; Masala, Carlo. "Is the Model of the Baskets Applicable to the Greater Middle East?"; Fröhlich, Stefan. "How much Regional Differentiation is Necessary to Establish a Successful CSCE-analogous Process?"; Baðci, Hüseyin. "The Greater Middle East Project and Turkey’s Attitude towards it"; Voskanian, Ashot. "South Caucasus within the Perspective of Contemporary Integration Processes"; Magen, Amichai. "Building Democratic Peace in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Inevitably Ambitious Agenda"; Posch, Walter. "What Preconditions for a CSCE-like Approach for the Region?"; Hitti, Nassif. "The Fantasies of a Middle Eastern OSCE"; Lesser, Ian O. "Institutional Issues Surrounding a CSCE-like Approach to the Middle East"