Climate Policy Under Fat-Tailed Risk: An Application of Dice

Uncertainty plays a significant role in evaluating climate policy, and fat-tailed uncertainty may dominate policy advice. Should we make our utmost effort to prevent the arbitrarily large impacts of climate change under deep uncertainty? In order to answer to this question, we propose a new way of investigating the impact of (fat-tailed) uncertainty on optimal climate policy: the curvature of the optimal carbon tax against the uncertainty. We find that the optimal carbon tax increases as the uncertainty about climate sensitivity increases, but it does not accelerate as implied by Weitzman's Dismal Theorem. We find the same result in a wide variety of sensitivity analyses. These results emphasize the importance of balancing the costs of climate change against its benefits, also under deep uncertainty. © 2013 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

Impacts of Sea Level Rise on Economic Growth in Developing Asia

Global sea level rise (SLR) variations have undeniably begun to make an impact on highly vulnerable economies. These impacts of SLR are a key component of the projected economic damage of climate change, an important input to climate change policies and adaptive measures. This paper considers SLR projections and its impact on the economy and includes a consolidation of various related studies. Estimated global gross domestic product (GDP) loss by 2100 ranges from 0.3% to as high as of 9.3% (Hinkel et al. 2014; Pycroft, Abrell, and Ciscar 2015). Climate change impact should be addressed at the global level through a locally focused effort where education and acceptance by all stakeholders are crucial and warranted. Further, this paper tackles several adaptive strategies as a response to SLR which include retreat, accommodation, and protection. The retreat strategy simulates that SLR causes the loss of inundated land and incurs planned relocation (migration) costs above a certain sea level. The accommodation strategy allows usage of vulnerable areas or land and limits damage by floodproofing or raising structures. Finally, the protection strategy projects that land will be protected from SLR damage by sea walls or other barriers of a certain height. On the other hand, Diaz (2016) estimates a median adaptation cost from migration at 16% of GDP under the least-cost strategy by 2050. In general, the education of and the acceptance by the concerned local community will be crucial in the successful implementation of SLR adaptation strategies, notwithstanding parallel mitigation efforts on a global scale

Evidence-based neuroethics, deep brain stimulation and personality: deflating, but not bursting, the bubble

Gilbert et al. have raised important questions about the empirical grounding of neuroethical analyses of the apparent phenomenon of Deep Brain Stimulation ‘causing’ personality changes. In this paper, we consider how to make neuroethical claims appropriately calibrated to existing evidence, and the role that philosophical neuroethics has to play in this enterprise of ‘evidence-based neuroethics’. In the first half of the paper, we begin by highlighting the challenges we face in investigating changes to PIAAAS following DBS, explaining how different trial designs may be of different degrees of utility, depending on how changes to PIAAAS following DBS are manifested. In particular, we suggest that the trial designs Gilbert et al. call for may not be able to tell us whether or not DBS directly causes changes to personality. However, we suggest that this is not the most significant question about this phenomenon; the most significant question is whether these changes should matter morally, however they are caused. We go on to suggest that neuroethical analyses of novel neuro-interventions should be carried out in accordance with the levels of evidence hierarchy outlined by the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM), and explain different ways in which neuroethical analyses of changes to PIAAAS can be evidence-based on this framework. In the second half of the paper, we explain how philosophical neuroethics can play an important role in contributing to mechanism-based reasoning about potential effects on PIAAAS following DBS, a form of evidence that is also incorporated into the CEBM levels of evidence hierarchy

Evidence-based neuroethics, deep brain stimulation and personality: deflating, but not bursting, the bubble

Gilbert et al. have raised important questions about the empirical grounding of neuroethical analyses of the apparent phenomenon of Deep Brain Stimulation ‘causing’ personality changes. In this paper, we consider how to make neuroethical claims appropriately calibrated to existing evidence, and the role that philosophical neuroethics has to play in this enterprise of ‘evidence-based neuroethics’. In the first half of the paper, we begin by highlighting the challenges we face in investigating changes to PIAAAS following DBS, explaining how different trial designs may be of different degrees of utility, depending on how changes to PIAAAS following DBS are manifested. In particular, we suggest that the trial designs Gilbert et al. call for may not be able to tell us whether or not DBS directly causes changes to personality. However, we suggest that this is not the most significant question about this phenomenon; the most significant question is whether these changes should matter morally, however they are caused. We go on to suggest that neuroethical analyses of novel neuro-interventions should be carried out in accordance with the levels of evidence hierarchy outlined by the Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine (CEBM), and explain different ways in which neuroethical analyses of changes to PIAAAS can be evidence-based on this framework. In the second half of the paper, we explain how philosophical neuroethics can play an important role in contributing to mechanism-based reasoning about potential effects on PIAAAS following DBS, a form of evidence that is also incorporated into the CEBM levels of evidence hierarchy

Brainjacking in deep brain stimulation and autonomy

'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim that the possibility of brainjacking DBS raises particularly profound concerns about individual autonomy, since the possibility of hacking such devices raises the prospect of third parties exerting influence over the neural circuits underpinning the subject’s cognitive, emotional and motivational states. However, although it seems natural to assume that brainjacking represents a profound threat to individual autonomy, we suggest that the implications of brainjacking for individual autonomy are complicated by the fact that technologies targeted by brainjacking often serve to enhance certain aspects of the user’s autonomy. The difficulty of ascertaining the implications of brainjacking DBS for individual autonomy is exacerbated by the varied understandings of autonomy in the neuroethical and philosophical literature. In this paper, we seek to bring some conceptual clarity to this area by mapping out some of the prominent views concerning the different dimension of autonomous agency, and the implications of brainjacking DBS for each dimension. Drawing on three hypothetical case studies, we show that there could plausibly be some circumstances in which brainjacking could potentially be carried out in ways that could serve to enhance certain dimensions of the target’s autonomy. Our analysis raises further questions about the power, scope, and necessity of obtaining prior consent in seeking to protect patient autonomy when directly interfering with their neural states, in particular in the context of self-regulating closed-loop stimulation devices

Brainjacking in deep brain stimulation and autonomy

'Brainjacking’ refers to the exercise of unauthorized control of another’s electronic brain implant. Whilst the possibility of hacking a Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) has already been proven in both experimental and real-life settings, there is reason to believe that it will soon be possible to interfere with the software settings of the Implanted Pulse Generators (IPGs) that play a central role in Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) systems. Whilst brainjacking raises ethical concerns pertaining to privacy and physical or psychological harm, we claim that the possibility of brainjacking DBS raises particularly profound concerns about individual autonomy, since the possibility of hacking such devices raises the prospect of third parties exerting influence over the neural circuits underpinning the subject’s cognitive, emotional and motivational states. However, although it seems natural to assume that brainjacking represents a profound threat to individual autonomy, we suggest that the implications of brainjacking for individual autonomy are complicated by the fact that technologies targeted by brainjacking often serve to enhance certain aspects of the user’s autonomy. The difficulty of ascertaining the implications of brainjacking DBS for individual autonomy is exacerbated by the varied understandings of autonomy in the neuroethical and philosophical literature. In this paper, we seek to bring some conceptual clarity to this area by mapping out some of the prominent views concerning the different dimension of autonomous agency, and the implications of brainjacking DBS for each dimension. Drawing on three hypothetical case studies, we show that there could plausibly be some circumstances in which brainjacking could potentially be carried out in ways that could serve to enhance certain dimensions of the target’s autonomy. Our analysis raises further questions about the power, scope, and necessity of obtaining prior consent in seeking to protect patient autonomy when directly interfering with their neural states, in particular in the context of self-regulating closed-loop stimulation devices

Agriculture in land

PRIFPRI4EPT

Study on Distributional Impact Assessment

This study reviews the use of (ex-ante) Distributional Impact Assessment (DIA) in the budgetary processes in the EU Member States. DIA refers to the assessment of the impact of policies on the income distribution, poverty and income inequality. The study also provides suggestions for further increasing the use of DIA. Insights from this study support the preparation of the Commission’s guidance to Member States on making greater use of (ex-ante) DIA, as announced in the European Pillar of Social Rights Action Plan. In more detail: This study first presents to what extent and in what way EU Member States make use of (ex-ante) DIA for budgetary measures. It also identifies the main reasons limiting the use of DIA in the preparation of Draft Budgetary Plans (DBPs) and assesses the degree of similarity in the use of DIA among euro area Member States. The study shows that, even if most of the EU Member States performed at least some DIA in recent years for budgetary purposes, there is room for improvement in this respect and that euro area Member States rarely included DIA in their DBPs mostly due to organisational issues. To encourage the use of DIA as well as its inclusion in budgetary documents, such as the DBPs, the study then provides suggestions to both the European Commission and to the Member States aiming to help Member States to increase their use of DIA and ensure its relevance and quality