Normative resistance to responsibility to protect in times of emerging multipolarity: the cases of Brazil and Russia

This article assesses the normative resistance to Responsibility to Protect adopted by Brazil and Russia against the backdrop of their international identities and self-assigned roles in a changing global order. Drawing upon the framework of Bloomsfield's norm dynamics role spectrum, it argues that while the ambiguous Russian role regarding this principle represents an example of 'norm antipreneurship', particularities of Brazil's resistance are better grasped by a new category left unaccounted for by this model, which this study portrays as 'contesting entrepreneur'.- (undefined

microRNA-184 induces a commitment switch to epidermal differentiation

miR-184 is a highly evolutionary conserved microRNA (miRNA) from fly to human. The importance of miR-184 was underscored by the discovery that point mutations in miR-184 gene led to corneal/lens blinding disease. However, miR-184-related function in vivo remained unclear. Here, we report that the miR-184 knockout mouse model displayed increased p63 expression in line with epidermal hyperplasia, while forced expression of miR-184 by stem/progenitor cells enhanced the Notch pathway and induced epidermal hypoplasia. In line, miR-184 reduced clonogenicity and accelerated differentiation of human epidermal cells. We showed that by directly repressing cytokeratin 15 (K15) and FIH1, miR-184 induces Notch activation and epidermal differentiation. The disease-causing miR-184C57U mutant failed to repress K15 and FIH1 and to induce Notch activation, suggesting a loss-of-function mechanism. Altogether, we propose that, by targeting K15 and FIH1, miR-184 regulates the transition from proliferation to early differentiation, while mis-expression or mutation in miR-184 results in impaired homeostasis

Russia and the Arab Spring: supporting the counter-revolution

Russia’s response to the Arab Spring ranged from apprehension to deep anxiety and diverged significantly from the US and the EU responses. While initially welcoming the popular demands for political reform in North Africa, the Russian reaction rapidly became more critical as a result of Western military intervention into Libya and the threat of the spread of Islamist extremism. It was these twin fears which prompted the Russian leadership to adopt an uncompromizing stance towards Syria. While geopolitical factors certainly played a role in driving Russian strategy, domestic political factors were also more significant. As the Russian leadership felt internally threatened by the growing opposition within the country, conflict in the Middle East highlighted the perceived flaws of the imposition of Western liberal democracy and the virtues of Russia’s own model of state-managed political order. There was, as such, a significant ideational and ideological dimension to the Russian response to the Arab Spring

Elite opinion and foreign policy in post-communist Russia

Russian elite opinion on matters of foreign policy may be classified as ‘Liberal Westerniser’, ‘Pragmatic Nationalist’ and ‘Fundamentalist Nationalist’, terms that reflect longstanding debates about the country’s relationship with the outside world. An analysis of press statements and election manifestoes together with a programme of elite interviews between 2004 and 2006 suggests a clustering of opinion on a series of strategic issues. Liberal Westernisers seek the closest possible relationship with Europe, and favour eventual membership of the EU and NATO. Pragmatic Nationalists are more inclined to favour practical co-operation, and do not assume an identity of values or interests with the Western countries. Fundamentalist Nationalists place more emphasis on the other former Soviet republics, and on Asia as much as Europe, and see the West as a threat to Russian values as well as to its state interests. Each of these positions, in turn, draws on an identifiable set of domestic constituencies: Liberal Westernisers on the promarket political parties, Pragmatic Nationalists on the presidential administration and defence and security ministries, and Fundamentalist Nationalists on the Orthodox Church and Communists

1989 as a mimetic revolution: Russia and the challenge of post-communism

Various terms have been used to describe the momentous events of 1989, including Jürgen Habermas’s ‘rectifying revolution,’ and my own notion of 1989 as a type of ‘anti-revolution’: repudiating not only what had come before, but also denying the political logic of communist power, as well as the emancipatory potential of revolutionary socialism in its entirety. In the event, while the negative agenda of 1989 has been fulfilled, it failed in the end to transcend the political logic of the systems that collapsed at that time. This paper explores the unfulfilled potential of 1989. Finally, 1989 became more of a counter- rather than an anti-revolution, replicating in an inverted form the practices of the mature state socialist regimes. The paucity of institutional and intellectual innovation arising from 1989 is striking. The dominant motif was ‘returnism,’ the attempt to join an established enterprise rather than transforming it. Thus, 1989 can be seen as mimetic revolution, in the sense that it emulated systems that were not organically developed in the societies in which they were implanted. For Eastern Europe ‘returning’ to Europe appeared natural, but for Russia the civilizational challenge of post-communism was of an entirely different order. There could be no return, and instead of a linear transition outlined by the classic transitological literature, Russia’s post-communism demonstrated that the history of others could not be mechanically transplanted from one society to another

Competition for co-operation: Roles and Realities in Russian Foreign Policy

The discursive reconstruction of Eurasia has brought about structural changes, which have strengthened Russia’s position internationally, and fortified its soft power. As such, the Eurasian project reflects Russia’s broader approach to parties including BRICS and the EU. Russia’s political elite routinely promotes specific conceptions of Russia’s international identity and role with different partners as a means to facilitate cooperation. This creates significant geographical and policy overlaps and breeds inconsistency and competition, but nonetheless contributes to Russia’s preferred low-cost, low-commitment version of co-operation. The Eurasian project therefore represents just one (albeit important) example of the Russian leadership’s conversion of ideas about the international arena into political realities. By balancing competing roles and relationships, Russia maintains a ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy that is flexible, unencumbered by restrictive alliances, and oriented towards sovereignty, great power and strength