Experimental determination of the maximum flame temperatures and of the laminar burning velocities for some combustible dust-air mixtures

International audienceIn view of the possible consequences of a dust explosion, it is acknowledged that there is a need for assessing the reliability 'of the tools used to assess the explosion hazard and of the protection method. Surely for this, a better understanding of the mechanisms of dust explosion development is compulsar

Pour une théorie "motrice" de la simulation

La genèse de la mentalisation, souvent expliquée par la maîtrise progressive ou innée d'un ensemble de concepts mentaux, peut être plus économiquement comprise à partir de l'exercice de procédures primitivement liées à la simulation de l'agir. Le présente article s'attache à démontrer comment, dans le cadre d'une approche dite "radicale" de la simulation, l'information sur l'action pourrait structurer les situations dans lesquelles un sujet s'engage pour jouer, pour simuler autrui ou pour planifier une action dans des circonstances inhabituelles. Les perturbations de la mentalisation dans l'autisme pourraient être liées à une difficulté primaire à s'engager mentalement dans des situations non familières

Thinking of oneself as the same

What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own internal states). This view is compatible with the hypothesis that the self is a dynamic representation emerging out of a higher level control system, - valuation control - whose articulation with control of plans and perceptual/motor control is discussed in the context of normal and pertrubed agency

Indexes for action

This articles examines three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic representations of a single action can be tightened up in order to remedy the puzzle of deviant causation. A first move consists in making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A second step brings in the action-effect principle, emphasizing the teleological relation of each pragmatic representation type with its external effects. A final step consists in elucidating the constitutive character of demonstrative reference for the contents of working memory states

Why evolution has to matter to cognitive psychology and to philosophy of mind

Growing suspicions were raised however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional contents, was hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and development were either entirely ignored, or insufficiently taken into account in inquiries about the structure of mental contents. I will discuss how evolutionary and developmental approaches to human cognition are now in a position to substantially alter the central paradigms currently used in cognitive science