Happy Self-Surrender and Unhappy Self-Assertion: A Comparison between Admiration and Emulative Envy

In this chapter, I argue that a certain kind of envy is not only morally permissible, but also, sometimes, more fitting and productive than admiration. Envy and admiration are part of our emotional palette, our toolbox of evolutionary adaptations, and they play complementary roles. I start by introducing my original taxonomy of envy, which allows me to present emulative envy, a species of envy sometimes confused with admiration. After reviewing how the two emotions differ from a psychological perspective, I focus in particular on the distinct and complementary roles they play in the ethical and political domains

‘I'm not envious, I'm just jealous!’: On the Difference Between Envy and Jealousy

I argue for the view that envy and jealousy are distinct emotions, whose crucial difference is that envy involves a perception of lack while jealousy involves a perception of loss. I start by noting the common practice of using ‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ almost interchangeably, and I contrast it with the empirical evidence that shows that envy and jealousy are distinct, albeit similar and often co-occurring, emotions. I then argue in favor of a specific way of understanding their distinction: the view that envy is a response to a perceived lack of a valuable object, while jealousy is a response to a perceived loss of a valuable object. I compare such a view with the most compelling alternative theories, and show that it accounts better for paradigmatic cases. I conclude by showing how the lack vs. loss model can handle complications: ambiguous cases, that is, when it is epistemically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss; hybrid cases, that is, when one seems to experience both lack and loss; and borderline cases, that is, when it is metaphysically unclear whether one experiences lack or loss

"Mama, Do You Love Me?": A Defense of Unloving Parents

In this chapter I critique the contemporary Western ideal of unconditional maternal love. In the first section, I draw some preliminary distinctions and clarify the scope and limitations of my inquiry. In the second section, I argue that unloving mothers exist, and are not psychologically abnormal. In the third section, I go further and suggest that lack of maternal love can be fitting and even morally permissible. In the fourth section, I sketch some implications that lack of maternal love and unrequited filial love have for the debate on reasons for love. I conclude with avenues for future research

Invideo et Amo: on Envying the Beloved

Can we love and envy the same person at the same time? There is an overwhelming, cross-cultural and cross-disciplinary, consensus that love and envy are deeply incompatible. In this paper, I challenge this consensus, and focus in particular on the normative thesis that true love should be void of envy proper. I first propose an indirect argument. Because love and envy thrive in the same psychological conditions, it is not unlikely to feel envy toward the beloved. If we want ideals that do not go against our psychological propensities, then we should not aim for a love that is wholly void of envy. I then propose a direct argument, in defense of two positive ideals. I argue that a certain kind of envy—emulative envy—can be beneficial to the loving relationship; in turn, a certain kind of love—wise love— which accepts the presence of envy, can be beneficial to our lives. Thus, that love and envy are so linked in our psychology is not something that we should merely tolerate, but wholeheartedly embrace

The Perfect Bikini Body: Can We All Really Have It? Loving Gaze as an Antioppressive Beauty Ideal

In this paper, I ask whether there is a defensible philosophical view according to which everybody is beautiful. I review two purely aesthetical versions of this claim. The No Standards View claims that everybody is maximally and equally beautiful. The Multiple Standards View encourages us to widen our standards of beauty. I argue that both approaches are problematic. The former fails to be aspirational and empowering, while the latter fails to be sufficiently inclusive. I conclude by presenting a hybrid ethical–aesthetical view according to which everybody is beautiful in the sense that everybody can be perceived through a loving gaze. I show that this view is inclusive, aspirational and empowering, and authentically aesthetical

Membrane glucocorticoid receptors are localised in the extracellular matrix and signal through the MAPK pathway in mammalian skeletal muscle fibres

A number of studies have previously proposed the existence of glucocorticoid receptors on the plasma membrane of many cell types including skeletal muscle fibres. However, their exact localisation and the cellular signalling pathway(s) they utilise to communicate with the rest of the cell are still poorly understood. In this study, we investigated the localisation and the mechanism(s) underlying the non-genomic physiological functions of these receptors in mouse skeletal muscle cells. The results show that the receptors were localised in the cytoplasm in myoblasts, in the nucleus in myotubes and in the extracellular matrix, in satellite cells and in the proximity of mitochondria in adult muscle fibres. Also, they bound laminin in a glucocorticoid-dependent manner. Treating small skeletal muscle fibre bundles with the synthetic glucocorticoid, beclomethasone dipropionate, increased the phosphorylation (=activation) of extracellular-signal regulated kinase 1&2, c-Jun N-terminal kinase and p38 mitogen-activated protein kinase. This occurred within 5min and depended on the fibre-type and the duration of the treatment. It was also abolished by the glucocorticoid receptor inhibitor, mifepristone, and a monoclonal antibody against the receptor. From these results we conclude that the non-genomic/non-canonical physiological functions of glucocorticoids, in adult skeletal muscle fibres are mediated by a glucocorticoid receptor localised in the extracellular matrix, in satellite cells and close to mitochondria and involve activation of the MAPK pathway

Role of the JP45-Calsequestrin Complex on Calcium Entry in Slow Twitch Skeletal Muscles

We exploited a variety of mouse models to assess the roles of JP45-CASQ1 (CASQ, calsequestrin) and JP45-CASQ2 on calcium entry in slow twitch muscles. In flexor digitorum brevis (FDB) fibers isolated from JP45-CASQ1-CASQ2 triple KO mice, calcium transients induced by tetanic stimulation rely on calcium entry via La3+- and nifedipine-sensitive calcium channels. The comparison of excitation-coupled calcium entry (ECCE) between FDB fibers from WT, JP45KO, CASQ1KO, CASQ2KO, JP45-CASQ1 double KO, JP45-CASQ2 double KO, and JP45-CASQ1-CASQ2 triple KO shows that ECCE enhancement requires ablation of both CASQs and JP45. Calcium entry activated by ablation of both JP45-CASQ1 and JP45-CASQ2 complexes supports tetanic force development in slow twitch soleus muscles. In addition, we show that CASQs interact with JP45 at Ca2+ concentrations similar to those present in the lumen of the sarcoplasmic reticulum at rest, whereas Ca2+ concentrations similar to those present in the SR lumen after depolarization-induced calcium release cause the dissociation of JP45 from CASQs. Our results show that the complex JP45-CASQs is a negative regulator of ECCE and that tetanic force development in slow twitch muscles is supported by the dynamic interaction between JP45 and CASQs

Envy and Resentment in the Time of Coronavirus

I examine the role played by the emotions of envy and resentment in interpersonal online dynamics during the COVID19 pandemic. I start by reviewing what we know about the interplay of social media use, social comparison and well-being, and by applying this knowledge to current circumstances. Then, I introduce some philosophical distinctions that complicate the already complex empirical evidence, differentiating, in particular, between envy and resentment, and between different kinds of envy. I argue that we can use the knowledge of these distinctions to better cope with these painful, but sometimes productive and always informative, emotions

Varieties of Envy

In this paper I present a novel taxonomy of envy, according to which there are four kinds of envy: emulative, inert, aggressive and spiteful envy. An inquiry into the varieties of envy is valuable not only to understand it as a psychological phenomenon, but also to shed light on the nature of its alleged viciousness. The first section introduces the intuition that there is more than one kind of envy, together with the anecdotal and linguistic evidence that supports it. The second section proposes and explains in detail a definition of envy tout court. The third section presents a recurring distinction between behavioral tendencies of envy, which has been explained in two distinct ways, one mostly proposed by psychologists, the other discernible in the philosophical tradition. The fourth section argues that these models of explanation track two variables, whose interplay is responsible for the existence of the four envies. The fifth section illustrates four paradigmatic cases, and provides a detailed analysis of the phenomenology, motivational structure, and typical behavioral outputs of each. The paper ends with a brief discussion of the implications of the taxonomy for moral education