A Socio-economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales

This socio-economic study aims to better understand the functioning and the evolution of timber sales held by the French public forest service. The auction mechanism is the historical institution which has been used in France for centuries. The recent will to develop supply contracts through private agreements is a major change in the French timber industry. It accurately raises questions about the timber prices issue.Timber sales, timber auctions, timber prices, French public forests, French wood industry, institution

Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes : the role of a collective bonus

This survey was funded by the ONEMA in the framework of the 2011 call for research projects ‘Changer les pratiques agricoles pour préserver les services écosystémiques’, supporting the implementation of the French National Action plan Ecophyto 2018.This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.PostprintPeer reviewe

Nudges, social norms and permanence in agri-environmental schemes

The permanence of land management practices adopted under Agri-environmental schemes (AES) is often questioned. This paper investigates the drivers of farmers’ decision as to whether to maintain “pro-environment” practices beyond the duration of a contract, and in particular the effect of social norms. Our results, based on the stated intentions of 395 French farmers, show that both pecuniary and non-pecuniary motivations drive farmers’ decision, which is also significantly influenced by information about a social norm. Therefore “nudging” farmers, by conveying information to them on other farmers’ pro-environmental practices, appears as a means of maintaining the long-run benefits of AES.PostprintPeer reviewe

Individual preferences and collective incentives: what design for agri-environmental contracts?:The case of wine-growers’ herbicide use reduction

The CAP reform is an opportunity to improve the design of existing agri-environmental schemes. Understanding the design attributes affecting farmers’ choices when they adopt an agri-environmental contract can help to identify ways of increasing their participation. The aim of this article is to measure with a choice experiment, the preferences of wine-growers for different types of contracts limiting the use of herbicides in the Languedoc-Roussillon region (France). We test the effect of introducing a collective dimension in the contracts. A monetary “bonus” would be paid to each engaged farmer, provided that the proportion of land collectively enrolled in the scheme reaches a predefined threshold. Despite a high heterogeneity among wine-growers, respondents show a preference for the contracts including this bonus and are more willing to provide environmental efforts when their neighbours also do so. Then, the presence of this bonus in the contracts terms could enhance farmers’ participation

Compensating environmental losses versus creating environmental gains Implications for biodiversity offsets and agri-environmental contracts

In the economic literature on the motivations underlying voluntary contributions to environmental public goods, little attention is granted to the way the overall objective of the environmental program is framed. A program which contributes to an increase of environmental quality can be perceived differently from a program designed to bring back the environmental quality to its original level, after it was damaged by human intervention, even if net environmental gain is equivalent in both programs. How does it impact participation rates and contribution levels? This paper addresses this issue in the context of agri-environmental contracts for biodiversity conservation. It compares farmers’ willingness to participate in two equivalent agri-environmental schemes, one being framed as part of a biodiversity offset program, the other one as a biodiversity conservation program. We demonstrate with a discrete choice experiment that biodiversity –offsets programs must offer a greater payment to enroll farmers compared to the latter. This is explained by the sensitivity of farmers to environmental issues

French territorialized agri-environmental measures for water issue: a false good idea?

Territorialized agri-environmental measures (MAEt) were introduced in France for the 2007-2013 Common Agricultural Policy program, in order to improve the cost-effectiveness of agri-environmental policies. This paper assesses qualitatively the innovations of MAEt with special attention paid to water pollution issues. We analyse the advantages and limits of the partial decentralization of decision-making in the setting-up of agri-environmentalprojects; of improved targeting through the identification of eligible priority areas; and of greater flexibility introduced in the design of agri-environmental contracts. This analysis is illustrated by the results of a survey conducted with farmers in a French sub-region, Eure-et-Loir. This survey helps us to identify the reasons why farmers choose to sign agri-environmental contracts or not. The article concludes with a set of recommendations to improve the French agri-environmental system in the perspective of the 2013 CAP reform