Ressenyes

Obra ressenyada: M. NAVAS ; P. PUMARES ; J. SÁNCHEZ ; M.C. GARCÍA ; A.J. ROJAS ; I. CUADRADO ; M. ASENSIO ; J.S. FERNÁNDEZ, Estrategias y actitudes de aculturación : la perspectiva de los inmigrantes y de los autóctonos en Almería. Granada: Junta de Andalucía. Dirección General de Coordinación de Políticas Migratorias. Consejería de Gobernación, 2004

Ressenyes

Obra ressenyada: Gonzalo HERRANZ DE RAFAEL, Sociología y delincuencia. Granada: Alhulia, 2003

Contract enforcement and Argentina's long-run decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson's "Contract Intensive Money", conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country's relative international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina's unique experience of long-run economic decline

Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.Publicad

Institutional instability and growth in Argentina: a long-run view

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. What did originate Argentina's economic retardation?. In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which institutional instability, as captured by "Contract Intensive Money" (Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1999), conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country's relative international position. Our results suggest that institutional instability played a major role in Argentina's unique historical experience of economic decline

INSTITUTIONAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH IN ARGENTINA: A LONG-RUN VIEW

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. What did originate Argentina’s economic retardation?. In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which institutional instability, as captured by “Contract Intensive Money” (Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson, 1999), conditioned capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country’s relative international position. Our results suggest that institutional instability played a major role in Argentina’s unique historical experience of economic decline.

Contract enforcement, capital accumulation, and Argentina's long-run decline.

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten world’s richest countries by the eve of World War I to its current position close to mid-range developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? We employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which the enforceability of contracts and the security of property rights, as measured by Clague et al.’s “contract intensive money” (CIM), conditioned broad capital accumulation and, subsequently, economic performance in Argentina. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a significant role at the origins of Argentina’s unique experience of long-run decline.Contract intensive money; Economic decline; Argentina;

Contract Enforcement and Argentina’s Long-Run Decline

Argentina has slipped from being among the ten richest countries in the world by the eve of World War I to its current position close to developing countries. Why did Argentina fall behind? In this paper we employ a structural model to investigate the extent to which contract enforcement, as captured by Clague, Keefer, Knack, and Olson’s “Contract Intensive Money”, conditioned broad capital accumulation and economic growth in Argentina and, consequently, the country’s relative international position. Our results suggest that poor contract enforcement played a major role in Argentina’s unique experience of long-run economic decline.