Distributed Generation, Storage, Demand Response, and Energy Efficiency as Alternatives to Grid Capacity Enhancement

The need for investment in capital intensive electricity networks is on the rise in many countries. A major advantage of distributed resources is their potential for deferring investments in distribution network capacity. However, utilizing the full benefits of these resources requires addressing several technical, economic and regulatory challenges. A significant barrier pertains to the lack of an efficient market mechanism that enables this concept and also is consistent with business model of distribution companies under an unbundled power sector paradigm. This paper proposes a market-oriented approach termed as “contract for deferral scheme” (CDS). The scheme outlines how an economically efficient portfolio of distributed generation, storage, demand response and energy efficiency can be integrated as network resources to reduce the need for grid capacity and defer demand driven network investments

Electricity Supply Interruptions: Sectoral Interdependencies and the Cost of Energy Not Served for the Scottish Economy

The power sector has a central role in modern economies and other interdependent infrastructures rely heavily upon secure electricity supplies. Due to interdependencies, major electricity supply interruptions result in cascading effects in other sectors of the economy. This paper investigates the economic effects of large power supply disruptions taking such interdependencies into account. We apply a dynamic inoperability input–output model (DIIM) to 101 sectors (including households) of the Scottish economy in 2009 in order to explore direct, indirect, and induced effects of electricity supply interruptions. We then estimate the societal cost of energy not supplied (SCENS) due to interruption, in the presence of interdependency among the sectors. The results show that the most economically affected industries, following an outage, can be different from the most inoperable ones. The results also indicate that SCENS varies with duration of a power cut, ranging from around £4300/MWh for a one-minute outage to around £8100/MWh for a three hour (and higher) interruption. The economic impact of estimates can be used to design policies for contingencies such as roll-out priorities as well as preventive investments in the sector

Determinants of Investment under Incentive Regulation: The Case of the Norwegian Electricity Distribution Networks

Investment in electricity networks, as regulated natural monopolies, is among the highest regulatory and energy policy priorities. The electricity sector regulators adopt different incentive mechanisms to ensure that the firms undertake sufficient investment to maintain and modernise the grid. Thus, an effective regulatory treatment of investment requires understanding the response of companies to the regulatory incentives. This study analyses the determinants of investment in electricity distribution networks using a panel dataset of 129 Norwegian companies observed from 2004 to 2010. A Bayesian Model Averaging approach is used to provide a robust statistical inference by taking into account the uncertainties around model selection and estimation. The results show that three factors drive nearly all network investments: investment in previous period, social-economic costs of energy not supplied and finally useful life of assets. The results indicate that Norwegian companies have, to some degree, responded to the investment incentives provided by the regulatory framework. However, some of the incentives do not appear to be effective in driving the investments

A New Perspective: Investment and Efficiency under Incentive Regulation

Following the liberalisation of the electricity industry since the early 1990s, many sector regulators have adopted incentive regulation aided by benchmarking and productivity analysis. This approach has often resulted in efficiency and quality of service improvement. However, there remains a growing concern as to whether the utilities invest sufficiently and efficiently in maintaining and modernising their networks. This paper studies the relationship between investments and cost efficiency in the context of incentive regulation with ex-post regulatory treatment of investments using a panel dataset of 129 Norwegian distribution companies from 2004 to 2010. We introduce the concept of "no impact efficiency" as a revenue-neutral efficiency effect of investment under incentive regulation that makes a firm "investment efficient" in cost benchmarking. Also, we estimate the observed efficiency effect of investments and compare these with the no impact efficiency. Finally, we discuss the implications of cost benchmarking for investment behaviour of network companies