On the adequacy of current empirical evaluations of formal models of categorization

Categorization is one of the fundamental building blocks of cognition, and the study of categorization is notable for the extent to which formal modeling has been a central and influential component of research. However, the field has seen a proliferation of noncomplementary models with little consensus on the relative adequacy of these accounts. Progress in assessing the relative adequacy of formal categorization models has, to date, been limited because (a) formal model comparisons are narrow in the number of models and phenomena considered and (b) models do not often clearly define their explanatory scope. Progress is further hampered by the practice of fitting models with arbitrarily variable parameters to each data set independently. Reviewing examples of good practice in the literature, we conclude that model comparisons are most fruitful when relative adequacy is assessed by comparing well-defined models on the basis of the number and proportion of irreversible, ordinal, penetrable successes (principles of minimal flexibility, breadth, good-enough precision, maximal simplicity, and psychological focus)

Quantum like modelling of decision making: quantifying uncertainty with the aid of the Heisenberg-Robertson inequality

This paper contributes to quantum-like modeling of decision making (DM) under uncertainty through application of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle (in the form of the Robertson inequality). In this paper we apply this instrument to quantify uncertainty in DM performed by quantum-like agents. As an example, we apply the Heisenberg uncertainty principle to the determination of mutual interrelation of uncertainties for “incompatible questions” used to be asked in political opinion pools. We also consider the problem of representation of decision problems, e.g., in the form of questions, by Hermitian operators, commuting and noncommuting, corresponding to compatible and incompatible questions respectively. Our construction unifies the two different situations (compatible versus incompatible mental observables), by means of a single Hilbert space and of a deformation parameter which can be tuned to describe these opposite cases. One of the main foundational consequences of this paper for cognitive psychology is formalization of the mutual uncertainty about incompatible questions with the aid of Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle implying the mental state dependence of (in)compatibility of questions

On the adequacy of Bayesian evaluations of categorization models: Reply to Vanpaemel and Lee (2012)

Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) argue, and we agree, that the comparison of formal models can be facilitated by Bayesian methods. However, Bayesian methods neither precede nor supplant our proposals (Wills & Pothos, 2012), as Bayesian methods can be applied both to our proposals and to their polar opposites. Furthermore, the use of Bayesian methods to control for model complexity can be actively misleading when combined with the consideration of narrow data sets, and significant development work is required before Bayesian methods can be applied to some of the leading formal models of categorization. Even where Bayesian methods can be applied, the use of non-Bayesian methods is sometimes preferable due to their computational simplicity (Vanpaemel & Storms, 2010). We also clarify our position on arbitrarily variable parameters, and on the relationship between ordinal properties and overfitting

The self-relevance system?

We suggest that the Self Attention Network (SAN) maybe part of a larger self-regulatory system, which we term the Self-Relevance System (SRS) of which the “core” or default network is a major part. It is within the core network that memories are generated and the future imagined. Such memories and imaginings are the basis of preoccupations. Within the SRS then preoccupations drive the emergence of attentional biases (ABs). ABs in turn are modulated by the SAN activating and inhibiting circuits that shape behavior. We consider briefly how this might function in dysfunctional appetitive behaviors, e.g., substance abuse

State entropy and differentiation phenomenon

In the formalism of quantum theory, a state of a system is represented by a density operator . Mathematically, a density operator can be decomposed into a weighted sum of (projection) operators representing an ensemble of pure states (a state distribution), but such decomposition is not unique. Various pure states distributions are mathematically described by the same density operator. These distributions are categorized into classical ones obtained from the Schatten decomposition and other, non-classical, ones. In this paper, we define the quantity called the state entropy . It can be considered as a generalization of the von Neumann entropy evaluating the diversity of states constituting a distribution. Further, we apply the state entropy to the analysis of non-classical states created at the intermediate stages in the process of quantum measurement . To do this, we employ the model of differentiation , where a system experiences step by step state transitions under the influence of environmental factors. This approach can be used for modeling various natural and mental phenomena: cell’s differentiation, evolution of biological populations, and decision makin

Patterns and evolution of moral behavior: moral dynamics in everyday life

Recent research on moral dynamics (the processes and phenomena –collective or individual– by which moral behavior and moral attitudes emerge, evolve, spread, erode or disappear) shows that an individual’s ethical mind-set (i.e., outcome-based vs. rule-based) moderates the impact of an initial ethical or unethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically on a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mind-set facilitates Moral Balancing (behaving ethically or unethically decreases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behavior again later), whereas a rule-based mind-set facilitates Moral Consistency (engaging in an ethical or unethical behavior increases the likelihood of engaging in the same type of behavior later on). The objective was to look at the evolution of moral choice across a series of scenarios, that is, to explore if these moral patterns (Balancing vs. Consistency) are maintained over time. The results of three studies showed that Moral Balancing is not maintained over time. On the other hand, Moral Consistency could be maintained over time, if the mind-set was reinforced before making a new moral judgment (but not otherwise)

Perspectives on Correctness in Probabilistic Inference from Psychology

Research into decision making has enabled us to appreciate that the notion of correctness is multifaceted. Different normative framework for correctness can lead to different insights about correct behavior. We illustrate the shifts for correctness insights with two tasks, the Wason selection task and the conjunction fallacy task; these tasks have had key roles in the development of logical reasoning and decision making research respectively. The Wason selection task arguably has played an important part in the transition from understanding correctness using classical logic to classical probability theory (and information theory). The conjunction fallacy has enabled a similar shift from baseline classical probability theory to quantum probability. The focus of this overview is the latter, as it represents a novel way for understanding probabilistic inference in psychology. We conclude with some of the current challenges concerning the application of quantum probability theory in psychology in general and specifically for the problem of understanding correctness in decision making

Contemporary morality: moral judgments in digital contexts

Nowadays, several of the situations in which we have to make decisions are in digital form. In a first experiment (N=1010) we showed that people’s moral judgments depend on the Digital Context (Smartphone vs. PC) in which a dilemma is presented, becoming more utilitarian (vs. deontological) when using Smartphones in high conflict moral dilemmas. To provide additional evidence, we ran a second (N=250) and a third experiment (N=300), where we introduced time constraints and we manipulated time instructions. Our results provide an extended perspective on Dual-Process Models of Moral Judgment, as we showed that the use of smartphones, often assumed to be hurried which would be consistent with gut-feeling decision-making, increased the likelihood of utilitarian responses and decreased deontological ones. We suggest that the increase in utilitarian judgments is a result of inducing high construal, increasing psychological distance and giving rise to an abstract representation of actions. A fourth experiment (N=1211), where we measured psychological distance, provided some first evidence for our hypotheses. This is one of the first studies to look at the impact of the digital age on moral judgments and the results presented have consequences for understanding moral choice in our increasingly virtualized world

The triangle inequality constraint in similarity judgments

Since Tversky's (1977) seminal investigation, the triangle inequality, along with symmetry and minimality, have had a central role in investigations of the fundamental constraints on human similarity judgments. The meaning of minimality and symmetry in similarity judgments has been straightforward, but this is not the case for the triangle inequality. Expressed in terms of dissimilarities, and assuming a simple, linear function between dissimilarities and distances, the triangle inequality constraint implies that human behaviour should be consistent with Dissimilarity (A,B) + Dissimilarity (B,C) ≥ Dissimilarity (A,C), where A, B, and C are any three stimuli. We show how we can translate this constraint into one for similarities, using Shepard's (1987) generalization law, and so derive the multiplicative triangle inequality for similarities, Sim(A,C)≥Sim(A,B)(dot operator)Sim(B,C) where 0≤Sim(x,y)≤1. Can humans violate the multiplicative triangle inequality? An empirical demonstration shows that they can

Multiple feature use in pigeons’ category discrimination: The influence of stimulus set structure and the salience of stimulus differences

Two experiments investigated what makes it more likely that pigeons’ behavior will come under the control of multiple relevant visual stimulus dimensions. Experiment 1 investigated the effect of stimulus set structure ,using a conditional discrimination between circles that differed in both hue and diameter. Two training conditions differed in whether hue and diameter were correlated in the same way within positive and negative stimulus sets as between sets . Transfer tests showed that all pigeons came under the control of both dimensions, regardless of stimulus set structure. Experiment 2 investigated the effect of the relative salience of the stimulus differences on three visual dimensions. Pigeons learned a multiple simultaneous discrimination between circular patches of sinusoidal gratings that differed in hue, orientation and spatial frequency . In initial training, each stimulus only included one positive or negative feature, and the stimulus differences on the three dimensions were adjusted so that the rates of learning about the three dimensions were kept approximately equal . Transfer tests showed that all three dimensions acquired control over behavior, with no single dimension dominating consistently across pigeons . Subsequently the pigeons were trained in a polymorphous category discrimination using all three dimensions , and the level of control by the three dimensions tended to become more equal as polymorphous training continued. We conclude that the salience of the stimulus differences on different dimensions is an important factor in whether pigeons will come under the control of multiple dimensions of visual stimuli