Development of Design Data for Propulsion PMR-15 Composites

The continuing development of PMR-15 composite materials and their associated design properties is pacing the implementation of this technology on commercial aircraft. The guidelines that the FAA has issued regarding the certification of advanced composite structures are very significant with respect to future PMR-15 research and development activities. The FAA has issued an advisory circular dated 1-5-83 concerning guidelines for composite aircraft structures. Of particular significance to PMR-15 technology development is the reliance on combined environmental exposure and component testing, coupled with the stipulation that reliance on previous experience be limited to where common structures and materials have been used for a similar function. Critical environmental exposures for commercial propulsion structures include 50,000 cycle service life, exposure to skydrol, moisture and other fluids, and nacelle fire conditions

Social Assets

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

Social Assets

We present a model incorporating both social and economic components, and analyze their interaction. The notion of a social asset, an attribute that has value only because of the social institutions governing society, is introduced. In the basic model, agents match on the basis of income and unproductive attributes. An attribute has value in some equilibrium social institutions (matching patterns), but not in others. We then show that productive attributes (such as education) can have their value increased above their inherent productive value by some social institutions, leading to the notion of the social value of an asset.Social assets, social capital, social arrangements, nonmarket interactions, social norms

Application of Gr/PMR-15 to commercial aircraft

Following from early experience with polyimides on the SST program and Shuttle aft flap studies the Boeing Company is now working on collaborative programs with its principal nacelle suppliers to pursue the development of Gr/PMR-15 nacelle components. Two programs are currently in effect. The first program is directed specifically towards the flight test and service evaluation at the earliest possible date of a 747 nacelle core cowl structure. The second program seeks to firmly establish the producibility and cost of a 757 thrust reverser C duct in a production environment. The near term objectives of these programs include: (1) the comparison of estimated cost and weight of Gr/PMR-15 versus metal structure, (2) the engine test of representative composite structure, (3) the preliminary design and analysis of the C duct structure, and (4) the preparation of cost data and time schedules for the development and producibility program. In addition to powerplant structure, the propulsion ducting system has shown to be a strong candidate for Gr/PMR-15 application. Currently, the Boeing 747 Organization is evaluating the use of PMR-15 matrix composites to replace nearly 800 lbs of titanium ducting per airplane

"Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets",Second Version

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers---created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of "coordination failures," while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Pricing in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices---a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of premuneration values---the values in the absence of any muneration (payments)---created by the buyer-seller match. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria agree. In this case, we have efficient allocations, including pre-match investment decisions, without the costs of personalized pricing. We then examine the inefficiencies that arise when the premuneration values preclude the agreement of uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria. We view premuneration valuesas an important consideration in market design.Directed search, matching, premuneration value, prematch investments, search

Pricing and Investments in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in some markets, and personalized prices tailored to the buyer in others. We examine a setting in which buyers and sellers make investments before matching in a competitive market. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values to the transacting agents prior to any transfers -- created by a buyer-seller match. Personalized price equilibrium outcomes are independent of premuneration values and exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of "coordination failures," while uniform-price equilibria depend on premuneration values and in general feature inefficient investments even without coordination failures. There is thus a trade-off between the costs of personalizing prices and the inefficient investments under uniform prices. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price equilibria similarly exhibit inefficiencies only in the event of coordination failures.Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search

Pricing in Matching Markets

Different markets are cleared by different types of prices -- a universal price for all buyers and sellers in some markets, seller-specific prices that are uniform across buyers in others, and personalized prices tailored to both the buyer and the seller in yet others. We introduce the notion of premuneration values -- the values in the absence of any muneration (payments) -- created by the buyer-seller match. We characterize the premuneration values under which uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria agree. In this case, we have efficient allocations, including pre-match investment decisions, without the costs of personalized pricing. We then examine the inefficiencies that arise when the premuneration values preclude the agreement of uniform-price and personalized-price equilibria. We view premuneration values as an important consideration in market design.Directed search, Matching, Premuneration value, Prematch investments, Search