Institutional spillovers from the negotiation and formulation of East Asian free trade agreements: government-business relations in the policymaking of bilateral free trade agreements

East Asian countries have implemented around 60 free trade agreements (FTAs), mostly bilateral, to become one of the most active sites of regionalism. The dominant analyses portray these FTAs as driven primarily by foreign policy motivations and promoted by political leaders with businesses marginally involved or interested. It is contended here that, compared to other forms of liberalization, bilateral FTA negotiations promote new institutional arrangements within government agencies and business associations and unique configurations of government–business relations. Formulation of FTAs imposes greater information demands on government officials, which should compel them to consult business associations. In turn, clearer identification of FTAs' impacts and greater chances to affect their formulation should increase business incentives to lobby for or against FTA liberalization domestically and across borders. Demands on officials and business associations upon successive FTAs should foster institutional change/creation to reduce information and coordination costs. These hypotheses were tested on the bilateral FTAs of Thailand and Malaysia. FTAs in these countries stimulated government–business consultations and lobbying by businesses that, for some key FTAs, took the initiative. Successive negotiations strengthened the technical capacities of officials and business associations and stimulated the emergence of new institutions, which may endure to provide similar functions for multilateral rounds

Liberalisation and protection under overlapping free trade agreements: dynamic interplay between free trade agreements and investment

Two decades into the most recent wave of regionalism many of its implications remain to be fully understood. A vast literature has explored the impacts of free trade agreements (FTAs) on investment flows, but less attention has been given to how existing patterns of investment alter FTA liberalisation. It is contended here that the dynamic interplay between overlapping FTA areas and the investment sunk in them shapes governments' and firms' positions regarding further FTA liberalisation. During trade negotiations, a country may decide to exclude a sector from FTA liberalisation to prevent (concession prevention) future FTA partners from making similar demands. Concession prevention could also occur when a foreign firm, holding a dominant market position in a host country, relinquishes liberalisation demands in an FTA between host and home countries to prevent its current position being eroded if the host country grants similar (or better) concessions to competing firms from other countries in future FTAs. Conversely, investment sunk into a country's sensitive sector in the territory of partners from previous FTAs could pre-empt (concession pre-emption) the protectionist position of that country when it subsequently negotiates FTAs with the investment-source countries. These arguments were tested in the negotiations around the liberalisation of the automotive industry that Thailand and Malaysia had with Japan in their respective bilateral FTAs. The distinct interaction between investment and the FTAs in which these countries participate resulted either in entrenchment of protectionism in the sector or its liberalisation across subsequent FTAs

The vaccine R&D system and production network in Thailand: possibilities for strengthening domestic and international partnerships

While Thailand enjoys self-sufficiency in many of the vaccines it needs, when COVID-19 hit, the country’s R&D preparedness and response were not strong enough to develop vaccines in a timely manner. And amid supply shortages after COVID-19 vaccines were developed, Thailand, like the rest of ASEAN, initially relied on vaccines produced elsewhere. Thailand ranks high among ASEAN countries in many indicators of R&D inputs and outputs. However, its R&D and innovation systems are not yet sufficiently developed to translate vaccine R&D inputs into patents that can then lead to new vaccines. Public and private pharmaceutical firms in Thailand conduct vaccine R&D in the national immunisation programme in collaboration with universities and research institutes in Thailand and abroad. Thailand is also home to many international and domestic contract research organisations. ASEAN has launched several initiatives to strengthen its biomedical R&D infrastructure and human resources, build a network of research centres across the region, and promote cooperation in R&D among ASEAN members, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners, the United States, and the European Union. Thailand and ASEAN can strengthen their vaccine security by pooling and coordinating their financial and scientific resources to address diseases of regional concern

Vaccine Research and Development (R&D) in the Asia-Pacific: the economics of vaccine R&D and policy recommendations to overcome market failures and promote R&D cooperation

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted both the strengths and weaknesses of national, regional, and global vaccine research and development (R&D) systems. Translating public and private R&D efforts into effective vaccines in a timely manner requires not only sufficient financial and scientific resources but also a policy-driven R&D ecosystem that fosters innovation, public-private partnerships, and international cooperation. This paper outlines several supply-side and demand-side factors behind vaccine R&D that generate economic disincentives for pharmaceutical firms to invest in vaccine R&D and can lead to a market failure for vaccines targeting diseases in low-income countries. Most developing countries in Asia-Pacific not only lack the financial and technological resources to invest in vaccine R&D, but it is also not sensible to develop and replicate R&D capabilities in each country. Consequently, low-income countries are dependent on vaccines researched, developed, and manufactured by other nations that they must obtain through trade and international cooperation. The Asia-Pacific region accounts for the largest share of global R&D spending and large shares in publications and patents on vaccine R&D. The region is home to dozens of state-owned and private pharmaceutical firms and contract research organizations that conduct vaccine R&D. Global pharmaceutical firms have not only offshored part of their vaccine manufacturing to Asia-Pacific but also transferred some of their R&D activities. Countries in Asia-Pacific have used several supply-side and demand-side approaches to incentivize investments in vaccine R&D. For instance, high-income countries are major contributors to product development partnerships and philanthropic foundations and have launched programs to boost university-industry R&D ties. During the COVID-19 pandemic, many high- and middle-income countries in the region established advanced market commitments for vaccine doses. The COVID-19 pandemic also showed the possibilities and challenges of international cooperation in vaccine R&D. Pharmaceutical firms in some developing countries built their vaccine R&D capabilities through technological transfer from high-income countries. Regional institutions and intergovernmental organizations in Asia-Pacific have also helped promote and coordinate regional cooperation in vaccine R&D. This paper proposes policy actions to stimulate investments in vaccine R&D and promote regional cooperation along four dimensions, namely a) on the prioritization of targets in the vaccine R&D pipeline; b) on how to overcome market failures in vaccine R&D; c) on fostering partnerships between relevant stakeholders at the national and regional levels; and d) on increasing the preparedness and response of national and regional vaccine R&D systems

Governing the digital economy in Thailand: domestic regulations and international agreements

Thailand is among the ASEAN countries that have seen the most rapid growth in digital infrastructure and e-commerce since the COVID-19 pandemic. In a 2022 study conducted by the Asian Development Bank, Thailand was among just eight countries in the Asia-Pacific region that have implemented comprehensive legislation governing digital trade. In the absence of a multilateral agreement, Thailand, like many other countries, is leveraging its participation in FTAs to shape global rules for digital trade; but this approach requires significant administrative resources and can lead to regulatory fragmentation and increased business costs. Alternatively, the standalone Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) is emerging as a key consensus-building platform towards a multilateral digital economy regime that Thailand may consider joining

Production networks and regionalism in East Asia: firms and states in the bilateral free trade agreements of Thailand and Malaysia

Investment and trade flows across East Asia during the last three decades have fostered the development of production networks and economic integration. However, only since the turn of the century, have East Asian countries begun to institutionalize such integration through free trade agreements (FTAs). With the exception of Japan, the literature portrays East Asian FTAs as driven by political elites on primarily foreign policy motivations and with marginal participation of businesses in their formulation and utilization. Most of these narratives have, however, overlooked endogenous sources of trade preferences, shortcoming that this Thesis attempted to correct by analyzing how FTAs fit within the strategies of states and firms. The project investigated the mutual interaction between evolving trends within East Asian production networks and states’ and firms’ preferences on FTA liberalization using as case studies the bilateral FTAs negotiated by Thailand and Malaysia within the context of key production networks, particularly the automotive industry. Research involved extensive process-tracing through semi-structured interviews and trade data analyses. The main findings of this dissertation were: 1) Compared to multilateral liberalization, greater technical complexity and easier assessment of impacts in bilateral FTA negotiations resulted in more intense government-business consultations and corporate lobbying. Successive FTA negotiations strengthened the technical capacities of bureaucrats and firms and prompted the emergence of new institutional structures for intermediation and coordination among all actors; 2) Sectors that had successfully lobbied ex-ante for FTA liberalization and/or benefited from unilateral liberalization schemes have made extensive utilization of FTAs; 3) Governments and firms in both countries sought and extracted selective rents in FTAs to improve their relative position not only with respect to states and firms outside the bloc but also inside, and; 4) The interplay between overlapping FTA areas and the investment sunk in them shaped governments’ and firms’ positions on further FTA liberalization

Active Transcriptional Repression by the Rb–E2F Complex Mediates G1 Arrest Triggered by p16INK4a, TGFβ, and Contact Inhibition

AbstractRb inhibits progression from G1 to S phase of the cell cycle. It associates with a number of cellular proteins; however, the nature of these interactions and their relative significance in cell cycle regulation are still unclear. We present evidence that Rb must normally interact with the E2F family of transcription factors to arrest cells in G1, and that this arrest results from active transcriptional repression by the Rb–E2F complex, not from inactivation of E2F. Thus, a major role of E2F in cell cycle regulation is assembly of this repressor complex. We demonstrate that active repression by Rb–E2F mediates the G1 arrest triggered by TGFβ, p16INK4a, and contact inhibition