Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.Second-generation immigrants ; schooling attainments ; fixed term employment

Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.schooling attainments, second-generation immigrants, fixed term employment

Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

We estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital.Second-generation immigrants ; schooling attainments ; fixed term employment

Updating beliefs with imperfect signals: experimental evidence

This article analyses belief updating when agents receive a signal that restricts the number of possible states of the world. We create an experiment on individual choice under uncertainty. In this experiment, the subject observes an urn, containing yellow and blue balls, whose composition is partially revealed. The subject has to assess the composition of the urn and form an initial belief. Then, he receives a signal that restricts the set of the possible urns from which the initial observed sample is drawn. Once again, he has to estimate the composition of the urn. Our results show that, on the whole, this type of signal increases the frequency of correct assessment. However, differences appear between validating and invalidating signals (i.e. signals that either confirm or disprove the initial belief). The later significantly increase the probability to make a correct assessment whereas validating signals reduce the frequency of correct estimations. We find evidences of lack of persistence in choice under uncertainty. The literature shows that people may persist with their choice even when they are wrong. We show that they may also change even if they are right.Beliefs; Imperfect Information; Experiment

Estimating a Model of Qualitative and Quantitative Education Choices in France

We estimate a structural model of education choices in which individuals choose between a professional (or technical) and a general track at both high school and university levels using French panel data (Génération 98 ). The average per-period utility of attending general high school (about 10,000 euros per year) is 20% higher than that of professional high school (about 8000 euros per year). About 64% of total higher education enrollments are explained by this differential. At the same time, professional high school graduates would earn 5% to 6% more than general high school graduates if they both entered the labor market around age 18. The return to post-high school general education is highly convex (as in the US) and is reaped mostly toward the end of the higher education curriculum. Public policies targeting an increase in professional high school enrollments of 10 percentage points would require a subsidy of 300 euros pervyear of professional high school

Education and Early Career Outcomes of Second-Generation Immigrants in France

International audienceWe estimate a flexible dynamic model of education choices and early career employment outcomes of the French population. Individuals are allowed to choose between 4 options: continue to the next grade, accept a permanent contract, accept a temporary contract, or withdraw from the labor force (a residual state). Our analysis focuses on the comparison between French Second-Generation Immigrants whose parents are born in Africa and French-natives. We find that schooling attainments explain around two thirds of the differences in access to early career employment stability. However, one third cannot be linked to observed investment in human capital

Estimating a Model of Qualitative and Quantitative Education Choices in France

We estimate a structural model of education choices in which individuals choose between a professional (or technical) and a general track at both high school and university levels using French panel data (Génération 98 ). The average per-period utility of attending general high school (about 10,000 euros per year) is 20% higher than that of professional high school (about 8000 euros per year). About 64% of total higher education enrollments are explained by this differential. At the same time, professional high school graduates would earn 5% to 6% more than general high school graduates if they both entered the labor market around age 18. The return to post-high school general education is highly convex (as in the US) and is reaped mostly toward the end of the higher education curriculum. Public policies targeting an increase in professional high school enrollments of 10 percentage points would require a subsidy of 300 euros pervyear of professional high school

Promotion Determinants in Corporate Hierarchies: An Examination of Fast Tracks and Functional Area

This chapter estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an employer–employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the United States in the period from 1981 to 1988. The estimation conditions on unobserved individual heterogeneity and allows for both an endogenous initial condition and sample attrition linked to individual heterogeneity in demonstrating the relative importance of variables that influence promotion. The role of the executive’s functional area in promotion is considered along with the existence and source of promotion fast tracks. We find that while the principal determinant of promotions is unobserved individual heterogeneity, functional area has a high explanatory power, resulting in promotion probabilities that differ by functional area for executives at the same reporting level and firm. No evidence is found that an executive’s recent speed of advancement in pay grade has a positive causal impact on in-sample promotions after conditioning on the executive’s career speed of advancement, except for the lowest level executives the data. Fast tracks appear to largely result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics, not from an inherent benefit in recent advancement itself

Promotion Determinants in Corporate Hierarchies: An Examination of Fast Tracks and Functional Area

This article estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an employer-employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the U.S. in the period from 1981 to 1988. The estimation conditions on unobserved individual heterogeneity and allows for both an endogenous initial condition and sample attrition linked to individual heterogeneity in demonstrating the relative importance of variables that influence promotion. The role of the executive's functional area in promotion is considered along with the existence and source of promotion fast tracks. We find that while the principal determinant of promotions is unobserved individual heterogeneity, functional area has a high explanatory power, resulting in promotion probabilities that differ by functional area for executives at the same reporting level and firm. No evidence is found that an executive's recent speed of advancement in pay grade has a causal impact on in- sample promotions after conditioning on the executive's career speed of advancement. For high-level executives, fast tracks appear to result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics, not from an inherent benefit in recent advancement itself

Promotion Determinants in Corporate Hierarchies: An Examination of Fast Tracks and Functional Area

This article estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an employer-employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the U.S. in the period from 1981 to 1988. The estimation conditions on unobserved individual heterogeneity and allows for both an endogenous initial condition and sample attrition linked to individual heterogeneity in demonstrating the relative importance of variables that influence promotion. The role of the executive's functional area in promotion is considered along with the existence and source of promotion fast tracks. We find that while the principal determinant of promotions is unobserved individual heterogeneity, functional area has a high explanatory power, resulting in promotion probabilities that differ by functional area for executives at the same reporting level and firm. No evidence is found that an executive's recent speed of advancement in pay grade has a causal impact on in- sample promotions after conditioning on the executive's career speed of advancement. For high-level executives, fast tracks appear to result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics, not from an inherent benefit in recent advancement itself