Russian and Chinese Responses to U.S. Military Plans in Space

Explores what countermeasures China and Russia are likely to take if the United States continues to pursue the weaponization of space, and what the broader implications for international security will be

START-Nachfolgeverhandlungen: Probleme und Fortschritte

Nach der Amtsübernahme durch Obama haben zwischen Russland und den USA Gespräche über ein START-Nachfolgeabkommen begonnen, das wohl vor dem vor dem Auslaufen des START-Abkommens am 5. Dezember 2009 unterzeichnet werden wird. Derzeit bestehen jedoch noch eine Reihe von Problemen, die in Verhandlungen zu lösen sind. Wenn das neue Abkommen die strategischen Kräfte auf die 1.500 bis 1.675 Sprengköpfe beschränken soll, auf die man sich im Juli 2009 geeinigt hat, muss es die strikten Zählungsregularien des START-Abkommens lockern und sich stattdessen auf eine der Versionen der US-Definition von »operativ einsatzbereiten Sprengköpfen« einlassen, die im Kontext des Moskauer Abkommens verwendet worden sind. Gravierend ist die Uneinigkeit über die Anzahl der Trägersysteme. Nachvollziehbarerweise versuchte jede Seite, eine Obergrenze durchzusetzen, die den eigenen Plänen entspricht. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass im Abkommen ein Kompromiss festgeschrieben wird, der die Obergrenze bei weniger als 1.100 ansetzt, den Vereinigten Staaten allerdings erlaubt, einige der Trägersysteme aus der Zählung des Vertrags herauszunehmen, indem sie beweisen, dass diese bereits umgerüstet wurden und atomar nicht mehr eingesetzt werden können

Cold War : a Transnational Approach to a Global Heritage

Although within living memory, many countries now consider their surviving Cold War architecture as part of their heritage. It can even be a priority for heritage managers given that significant buildings are often suitable for reuse while extensive ‘brownfield’ sites such as airfields can be used for large-scale redevelopment. In a number of countries whose work we refer to here (notably the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe), agencies responsible for managing their country’s heritage have approached this priority by creating national inventories of sites and buildings with a view to taking informed decisions on their future. This paper presents the argument that the wider international context of the Cold War provides a more appropriate (or additional, higher-level) framework for such decision making. Such a ‘transnational’ approach would allow the comparison of similar (e.g. European) sites not merely within national borders but across the full extent of their western NATO1 deployment in Europe and North America. Taking this approach would also allow comparison with related sites in countries that formed part of the eastern-bloc Warsaw Pact.2 After outlining some examples of how national agencies have approached their Cold War heritage, this paper presents the four stages of this transnational approach making provision for an improved understanding and management of Cold War heritage sites wherever they occur. With a specific focus on the direct comparison between England and Russia, and also referring to sites surviving elsewhere within the former NATO and Warsaw Pact regions, as well as the United States, we argue that this four-stage approach: provides new understandings of a complex archaeological and architectural record; gives fresh perspectives on significance; and (importantly in a time of geopolitical instability) does so in a spirit of cooperation and friendship

Russia’s Current Nuclear Modernization and Arms Control

Russia’s strategic modernization program suggests that it is determined to continue its reliance on nuclear weapons as a key element of its national security strategy. The US is now also committed to the large-scale modernization of its strategic forces. Combined with uncertainty about the future of US-Russian arms control, these developments have given rise to concerns about a potential new round of the arms race that could reverse the progress in nuclear disarmament that has been achieved since the end of the Cold War. This paper considers Russia’s key modernization efforts and the factors that influence the decisions in that area. It concludes that modernization is shaped primarily by internal factors and traditional arms control, and that an emphasis on strategic stability plays a limited role in the process