The Maze of Taste: On Bataille, Derrida, and Kant

The case of Kant\u27s Critique of Judgment offers a powerful example of the radical disruption of the metaphysical text, enacted by Bataille\u27s major сoncepts. The analysis of the metaphor of economy in Kant, Bataille and Derrida suggests the crucial importance of Bataille\u27s general economy—as the economy of loss—for deconstructing the Kantian conception of genius and the whole scheme of taste—as an economy of consumption—and inscribing a complex interplay forces that the general economy is designed to account for. Once however taste, art and the economy of genius can no longer be inscribed through the restricted economy of the metaphysical text, the question of genre and style of a different inscription—a general economy—acquires a crucial significance. Bataille\u27s own discursive practice can be seen as an exemplification of such a different—plural— style

Demons of Chance, Angels of Probability: Thomas Pynchon’s Novels and the Philosophy of Chance and Probability

This article discusses the relationships between Thomas Pynchon’s novels and the philosophy of chance and probability, especially in connection with quantum theory, which radically redefined our thinking concerning both concepts, and to begin with, the nature of physical reality. The article considers how different scientific theories dealing with chance and probability figure in Pynchon’s major novels, which, the article argues, helps us to think more deeply about Pynchon’s use of these theories or other mathematical and scientific theories, and about the relationships among literature, philosophy, and mathematics and science in general.Cet essai s’interroge sur les relations que tissent les romans de Thomas Pynchon avec la philosophie du hasard et de la probabilité, notamment dans son rapport avec la théorie quantique, qui a radicalement redéfini la façon dont nous pensons ces deux concepts, ainsi que, pour commencer, la nature même de la réalité physique. Cet article interroge la présence de diverses théories scientifiques traitant du hasard et de la probabilité dans les principaux romans de Pynchon, et cherche à approfondir la réflexion autour de l’utilisation que fait le romancier de ces théories et d’autres, qu’elles soient mathématiques ou scientifiques. Ce sont donc les articulations entre littérature, philosophie, mathématiques et, plus largement, la science que cet article vise à interroger

Transitions without connections: quantum states, from Bohr and Heisenberg to quantum information theory

In his recent paper, L. Freidel noted that instead of representing the motion of electrons in terms of oscillators and predicting their future states on the basis on this representation, as in the previous, classical, electron theory of H. Lorentz, quantum theory was, beginning nearly with its inception, concerned with the probabilities of transitions between states of electrons, without necessarily representing how these transitions come about. Taking N. Bohr’s and then W. Heisenberg’s thinking along these lines in, respectively, Bohr’s 1913 atomic theory and Heisenberg’s quantum mechanics of 1925 as a point of departure, this article reconsiders, from a nonrealist perspective (which suspends or even precludes this representation of the mechanism behind these transitions), the concept of quantum state, as a physical concept, in contradistinction to the mathematical concept of quantum state, a vector in the Hilbert-space formalism of quantum mechanics. Transitions between quantum states appear, from this perspective, as “transitions without connections,” because, while one can register the change from one quantum phenomena to another, observed in measuring instruments, we have no means of representing or possibly even conceiving of how this change comes about. The article will also discuss quantum field theory and, in closing, briefly quantum information theory as confirming, and giving additional dimensions to, these concepts of quantum state and transitions between them

“Something happened:” on the real, the actual, and the virtual in elementary particle physics

Throughout the history of quantum theory, “an elementary particle” has been a problem to which only fragments of a possible solution could be offered. At a certain point of this history, “a virtual particle” has become part of this problem. While still considering this problem as a problem, this article, in contrast to most approaches to it, which are realist in nature, offers a nonrealist one. This approach is grounded in the concept of reality without realism, RWR, introduced by this author previously, and an interpretation of high-energy quantum phenomena and quantum field theory (QFT), grounded in this concept, which allows for a range of (RWR-type) interpretations. The status of real and virtual particles is different in the present interpretation. While, in this interpretation, both concepts are idealizations, that of real particles is required by it. By contrast, the concept of virtual particles is not required, although, because of certain observable effects in high-energy quantum regimes, this interpretation assumes that there exists something in nature, especially manifested in high-energy quantum regimes, that may be handled by means of the concept of virtual particles. RWR-type interpretations do, however, permit an idealization defined by this concept and may adopt it, because of its practical effectiveness. This article will do so, while still maintaining the essential difference in the nature of the idealizations defined by the concepts of real and virtual particles

The Real and the Mathematical in Quantum Modeling: From Principles to Models and from Models to Principles

The history of mathematical modeling outside physics has been dominated by the use of classical mathematical models, C-models, primarily those of a probabilistic or statistical nature. More recently, however, quantum mathematical models, Q-models, based in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory have become more prominent in psychology, economics, and decision science. The use of Q-models in these fields remains controversial, in part because it is not entirely clear whether Q-models are necessary for dealing with the phenomena in question or whether C-models would still suffice. My aim, however, is not to assess the necessity of Q-models in these fields, but instead to reflect on what the possible applicability of Q-models may tell us about the corresponding phenomena there, vis-à-vis quantum phenomena in physics. In order to do so, I shall first discuss the key reasons for the use of Q-models in physics. In particular, I shall examine the fundamental principles that led to the development of quantum mechanics. Then I shall consider a possible role of similar principles in using Q-models outside physics. Psychology, economics, and decision science borrow already available Q-models from quantum theory, rather than derive them from their own internal principles, while quantum mechanics was derived from such principles, because there was no readily available mathematical model to handle quantum phenomena, although the mathematics ultimately used in quantum did in fact exist then. I shall argue, however, that the principle perspective on mathematical modeling outside physics might help us to understand better the role of Q-models in these fields and possibly to envision new models, conceptually analogous to but mathematically different from those of quantum theory, that may be helpful or even necessary there or in physics itself. I shall, in closing, suggest one possible type of such models, singularized probabilistic models, SP-models, some of which are time-dependent, TDSP-models. The necessity of using such models may change the nature of mathematical modeling in science and, thus, the nature of science, as it happened in the case of Q-models, which not only led to a revolutionary transformation of physics but also opened new possibilities for scientific thinking and mathematical modeling beyond physics