10 research outputs found

    Short-term, medium-term and long-term effects of early parenting interventions in low- and middle-income countries: a systematic review

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    INTRODUCTION: Parenting interventions during early childhood are known to improve various child development outcomes immediately following programme implementation. However, less is known about whether these initial benefits are sustained over time. METHODS: We conducted a systematic literature review of parenting interventions in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) that were delivered during the first 3 years of life and had completed a follow-up evaluation of the intervention cohort at least 1 year after the primary postintervention endpoint. We summarized intervention effects over time by child-level and parent-level outcomes as well as by timing of follow-up rounds in the short-term (1-3 years after programme completion), medium-term (4-9 years), and long-term (10+ years). We also conducted exploratory meta-analyses to compare effects on children's cognitive and behavioral development by these subgroups of follow-up rounds. RESULTS: We identified 24 articles reporting on seven randomised controlled trials of parenting interventions delivered during early childhood that had at least one follow-up study in seven LMICs. The majority of follow-up studies were in the short-term. Three trials conducted a medium-term follow-up evaluation, and only two trials conducted a long-term follow-up evaluation. Although trials consistently supported wide-ranging benefits on early child development outcomes immediately after programme completion, results revealed a general fading of effects on children's outcomes over time. Short-term effects were mixed, and medium-term and long-term effects were largely inconclusive. The exploratory meta-analysis on cognitive development found that pooled effects were significant at postintervention and in the short-term (albeit smaller in magnitude), but the effects were not significant in the medium-term and long-term. For behavioural development, the effects were consistently null over time. CONCLUSIONS: There have been few longer-term follow-up studies of early parenting interventions in LMICs. Greater investments in longitudinal intervention cohorts are needed in order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of the effectiveness of parenting interventions over the life course and to improve the design of future interventions so they can have greater potential for achieving and sustaining programme benefits over time

    Sequential auctions for objects with common and private values

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    Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for buying/selling multiple objects. Existing work has studied sequential auctions for objects that are exclusively either common value or private value. However, in many real-world cases an object has both features. Also, in such cases, the common value component (which is the same for all bidders) depends on how much each bidder values the object. Moreover, an individual bidder generally does not know how much the other bidders value it. On the other hand, a bidder's private value is independent of the others' private values. Given this, we study settings that have both common and private value elements by treating each bidder's information about the common value as uncertain. We first determine equilibrium bidding strategies for each auction in a sequence using English auction rules. On the basis of this equilibrium, we analyse the efficiency of auctions. Specifically, we show that the inefficiency that arises as a result of uncertainty about the common values can be reduced if the auctioneer makes its information about the common value known to all bidders. Moreover, our analysis also shows that the inefficiency of auctions in an agent-based setting is higher than that in an all-human setting

    Asymmetric contests with liquidity constraints

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    We consider two bidders with asymmetric valuations competing to win an exogenous prize. Capital markets are imperfect, such that the contestants possibly face a liquidity constraint. We show that aggregate investments are lower if at least one bidder has a liquidity constraint, even if the low-valuation bidder possibly increases his/her investments. Furthermore, the effect of the high-valuation bidder’s liquidity constraint on competitive balance is ambiguous. However, if the low-valuation bidder is constrained, greater wealth unambiguously increases competitive balance. Surprisingly, if the low-valuation bidder has a constraint, a tighter constraint can increase his/her profit

    Hiring Teams from Rivals: Theory and Evidence on the Evolving Relationships in the Corporate Legal Market

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