Type space on a purely measurable parameter space

Several game theoretical topics require the analysis of hierarchical beliefs, particularly in incomplete information situations. For the problem of incomplete information, Hars´anyi suggested the concept of the type space. Later Mertens & Zamir gave a construction of such a type space under topological assumptions imposed on the parameter space. The topological assumptions were weakened by Heifetz, and by Brandenburger & Dekel. In this paper we show that at very natural assumptions upon the structure of the beliefs, the universal type space does exist. We construct a universal type space, which employs purely a measurable parameter space structure

Common priors for generalized type spaces

The notion of common prior is well-understood and widely-used in the incomplete information games literature. For ordinary type spaces the common prior is de�fined. Pint�er and Udvari (2011) introduce the notion of generalized type space. Generalized type spaces are models for various bonded rationality issues, for �nite belief hierarchies, unawareness among others. In this paper we de�ne the notion of common prior for generalized types spaces. Our results are as follows: the generalization (1) suggests a new form of common prior for ordinary type spaces, (2) shows some quantum game theoretic results (Brandenburger and La Mura, 2011) in new light

A Note on Common Prior

Harsányi introduced the concept of type space in an intuitive way. Later Heifetz and Samet formalized it. Harsányi used conditional probabilities to model the beliefs of the players, Heifetz and Samet avoided using conditional probabilities formally. We show that in both cases the concept of transition probability can reproduce the models, moreover, the transition probability approach fits to both Harsányi's intuition and the formalization of Heifetz and Samet. As a consequence, our results suggest that the concept of common prior is not appropriate to determine the players' beliefs. Two examples are also given.Beliefs, Conditional probability, Common Prior

On the completeness of the universal knowledge-belief space

Meier (2008) shows that the universal knowledge-belief space exists. However, besides the universality there is an other important property might be imposed on knowledge-belief spaces, inherited also from type spaces, the completeness. In this paper we introduce the notion of complete knowledge-belief space, and demonstrate that the universal knowledge-belief space is not complete, that is, some subjective beliefs (probability measures) on the universal knowledge-belief space are not knowledge-belief types

Immersions associated with holomorphic germs

A holomorphic germ \Phi: (C^2, 0) \to (C^3, 0), singular only at the origin, induces at the links level an immersion of S^3 into S^5. The regular homotopy type of such immersions are determined by their Smale invariant, defined up to a sign ambiguity. In this paper we fix a sign of the Smale invariant and we show that for immersions induced by holomorphic gems the sign-refined Smale invariant is the negative of the number of cross caps appearing in a generic perturbation of \Phi. Using the algebraic method we calculate it for some families of singularities, among others the A-D-E quotient singularities. As a corollary, we obtain that the regular homotopy classes which admit holomorphic representatives are exactly those, which have non-positive sign-refined Smale invariant. This answers a question of Mumford regarding exactly this correspondence. We also determine the sign ambiguity in the topological formulae of Hughes-Melvin and Ekholm-Szucs connecting the Smale invariant with (singular) Seifert surfaces. In the case of holomorphic realizations of Seifert surfaces, we also determine their involved invariants in terms of holomorhic geometry

On the impossibility of fair risk allocation

Measuring and allocating risk properly are crucial for performance evaluation and internal capital allocation of portfolios held by banks, insurance companies, investment funds and other entities subject to financial risk. We show that by using a coherent measure of risk it is impossible to allocate risk satisfying the natural requirements of (Solution) Core Compatibility, Equal Treatment Property and Strong Monotonicity. To obtain the result we characterize the Shapley value on the class of totally balanced games and also on the class of exact games

Implied volatility of foreign exchange options: is it worth tracking?

Market analysts and central banks often use the implied volatility of FX options as an indicator of expected exchange rate uncertainty. The aim of our study is to investigate the limits of this statistic. We present some key factors that may deviate the value of implied volatility from the exchange rate variability expected by the market. These biasing factors are linked to the simplifying assumptions of the Black-Scholes option pricing model. Our empirical results show that forint/euro implied volatilities carry useful information about future exchange rate uncertainty when the forecast horizon is shorter than one month. However, implied volatility provides a biased estimate, and does not encompass the information included in other (GARCH, ARMA) predictors of volatility calculated from historical exchange rate data. These results are in line with the findings of similar analyses of other currency pairs.option, volatility, exchange rate.

The effect of the MNB’s communication on financial markets

Our paper aims to assess how the Magyar Nemzeti Bank’s communication affects financial asset prices. We find that the central bank plays the most important role in influencing long-term yields. The effect on the exchange rate is less pronounced, while short-term yields are influenced only by the communication related to the exchange rate. Analysing the direction and channels of communication we observe two asymmetries. The central bank is more successful in signalling monetary policy tightening than easing and with the increase of time horizon the written communication gains in importance and dominates the verbal forms.communication, transmission mechanism.

Invariance under type morphisms: the bayesian Nash equilibrium

Ely and Peski (2006) and Friedenberg and Meier (2010) provide examples when changing the type space behind a game, taking a "bigger" type space, induces changes of Bayesian Nash Equilibria, in other words, the Bayesian Nash Equilibrium is not invariant under type morphisms. In this paper we introduce the notion of strong type morphism. Strong type morphisms are stronger than ordinary and conditional type morphisms (Ely and Peski, 2006), and we show that Bayesian Nash Equilibria are not invariant under strong type morphisms either. We present our results in a very simple, finite setting, and conclude that there is no chance to get reasonable assumptions for Bayesian Nash Equilibria to be invariant under any kind of reasonable type morphisms

The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The well-known class of airport games Littlechild and Thompson (1977) is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley's Shapley (1953) and Young (1985)'s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. In this paper we show that Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results can be proved by applying Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s proofs, that is those results are direct consequences of Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s results. Furthermore, we extend Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results to the class of irrigation games, that is we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost sharing problems given by rooted trees. We also note that for irrigation games the Shapley value is always stable, that is it is always in the core Gillies (1959)