Perceived entitlement causes discrimination against attractive job candidates in the domain of relatively less desirable jobs

People generally hold positive stereotypes of physically attractive people and because of those stereotypes often treat them more favorably. However, we propose that some beliefs about attractive people, specifically, the perception that attractive individuals have a greater sense of entitlement than less attractive individuals, can result in negative treatment of attractive people. We examine this in the context of job selection and propose that for relatively less desirable jobs, attractive candidates will be discriminated against. We argue that the ascribed sense of entitlement to good outcomes leads to perceptions that attractive individuals are more likely to be dissatisfied working in relatively less desirable jobs. When selecting candidates for relatively less desirable jobs, decision makers try to ascertain whether a candidate would be satisfied in those jobs, and the stereotype of attractive individuals feeling entitled to good outcomes makes decision makers judge attractive candidates as more likely to be dissatisfied in relatively less (but not more) desirable jobs. Consequently, attractive candidates are discriminated against in the selection for relatively less desirable jobs. Four experiments found support for this theory. Our results suggest that different discriminatory processes operate when decision makers select among candidates for relatively less desirable jobs and that attractive people might be systematically discriminated against in a segment of the workforce

Robust Aggregation for Federated Learning

We present a robust aggregation approach to make federated learning robust to settings when a fraction of the devices may be sending corrupted updates to the server. The proposed approach relies on a robust secure aggregation oracle based on the geometric median, which returns a robust aggregate using a constant number of calls to a regular non-robust secure average oracle. The robust aggregation oracle is privacy-preserving, similar to the secure average oracle it builds upon. We provide experimental results of the proposed approach with linear models and deep networks for two tasks in computer vision and natural language processing. The robust aggregation approach is agnostic to the level of corruption; it outperforms the classical aggregation approach in terms of robustness when the level of corruption is high, while being competitive in the regime of low corruption

Negotiation Impasses: Types, Causes, and Resolutions

Although impasses are frequently experienced by negotiators, are featured in newspaper articles, and are reflected in online searches and can be costly, negotiation scholarship does not appear to consider them seriously as phenomena worth explaining. A review of negotiation tasks to study impasses reveals that they bias negotiators toward agreement. We systematically organize past findings on impasses and integrate them in the impasse type, cause, and resolution model (ITCR model). Our fundamental assumption is that a positive bargaining zone does not imply symmetric preferences for an agreement. One or both negotiators may prefer an impasse over an agreement despite a positive bargaining zone. We argue that it is beneficial for management research to distinguish between three impasse types: If both negotiators perceive benefit from an impasse, they are wanted; if one negotiator perceives benefits from an impasse, they are forced; and if both do not perceive benefits from the impasse, they are unwanted. We review structural (e.g., bargaining zone, communication channels), interpersonal (e.g., tough tactics, emotions), and intrapersonal (e.g., biases, available information, and framing) factors as the likely antecedents of the three impasse types. We also examine evidence that suggests that wanted impasses can be resolved by changing the negotiation structure for both parties, forced impasses can be resolved through persuasion, and unwanted impasses can be overcome by debiasing both parties. Finally, we review current methodological guidance and provide updated recommendations on how scholars should deal with impasses in both study designs and data analyses

A Markov Chain Theory Approach to Characterizing the Minimax Optimality of Stochastic Gradient Descent (for Least Squares)

This work provides a simplified proof of the statistical minimax optimality of (iterate averaged) stochastic gradient descent (SGD), for the special case of least squares. This result is obtained by analyzing SGD as a stochastic process and by sharply characterizing the stationary covariance matrix of this process. The finite rate optimality characterization captures the constant factors and addresses model mis-specification

Unethical for the sake of the group: Risk of social exclusion and pro-group unethical behavior

This research tested the idea that the risk of exclusion from one’s group motivates group members to engage in unethical behaviors that secure better outcomes for the group (pro-group unethical behaviors). We theorized that this effect occurs because those at risk of exclusion seek to improve their inclusionary status by engaging in unethical behaviors that benefit the group; we tested this assumption by examining how the effect of exclusion risk on pro-group unethical behavior varies as a function of group members’ need for inclusion. A 2-wave field study conducted among a diverse sample of employees working in groups (Study 1) and a constructive replication using a laboratory experiment (Study 2) provided converging evidence for the theory. Study 1 found that perceived risk of exclusion from one’s workgroup predicted employees’ engagement in pro-group unethical behaviors, but only when employees have a high (not low) need for inclusion. In Study 2, compared to low risk of exclusion from a group, high risk of exclusion led to more pro-group (but not pro-self) unethical behaviors, but only for participants with a high (not low) need for inclusion. We discuss implications for theory and the management of unethical behaviors in organizations

Unintended consequences of cooperation inducing and maintaining mechanisms in public goods dilemmas: Sanctions and moral appeals

Research suggests that contribution to public goods (i.e. cooperation) will increase when groups use sanctions. We argue that when groups use rewards and punishments to induce members to cooperate in a social dilemma, individuals' natural propensity to cooperate may be reduced. Results from two laboratory experiments provide consistent support for our hypothesis. Specifi cally, we found that cooperation (in groups that adopted sanctioning systems, including both reward and punishment) decreased signifi cantly following the removal of sanctioning systems. We also found that a moral appeal to cooperate was as effective as sanctions in inducing cooperation. Moreover, cooperation induced through appeals was more likely to sustain than that induced through sanctions. We found that people's trust in others' cooperation mediated the relationship between the use of sanctions and appeals and the level of cooperation after these inducing practices were removed. Implications of these results are discussed in the group and organizational context

Evaluation of Loss Coefficient For Stand Alone Radiator

Abstract In the UK, domestic heating contributes to about 40% of annual energy consumption. Effective and efficient heating systems are essential to drive the cost of heating down. Although there are several types of heating systems, radiators are the most popular heat emitters. Head loss in a radiator depends on various design parameters based on fluid flow path conditions and design of the radiator. The work presented in this paper identifies and compares the loss co-efficient for two most common configurations of radiators used in domestic heating systems. These are Bottom-Bottom Opposite Ends (BBOE) and Bottom-Top Opposite Ends (BTOE) configurations for a standalone system. In a standalone radiator design the loss co-efficient K value varies with the panel configuration and flow path in the BBOE and BTOE layouts. Similar to loss co-efficient in a pipe system the K value in a radiator system is a function of the Reynolds number. It has been found that double and single panel radiators have significantly different behaviour for the two flow layouts with higher K values for the BTOE configuration at lower velocity