The Financing Activities of Canadian Small and Medium-sized Enterprises in Tourism Industries

Though there has been substantial research on small and medium sized enterprises in tourism, information on access to financing for these businesses is limited. Given the importance of financing to the success and growth of a business, this report investigates the financing activities of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in tourism industries and assesses whether this group of SMEs faces unique financing obstacles. Using data from Statistics Canada’s, Survey on Financing of Small and Medium Enterprises, this report finds that Canadian SMEs in tourism industries, although less likely to request external financing, were significantly less likely to be approved for external financing compared to SMEs in non-tourism industries. SMEs in the accommodation industry, which required the most capital, had the most difficulty, receiving on average, less than half of the debt financing they requested in 2007

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

This paper considers a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both A and $B$ can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). First we show that an outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a certain market share in the final good market. This generates an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect, which is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Finally, it is shown that whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other contract

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

We consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). An outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a specific market share, resulting in an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect that is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts making both firms and all consumers better off, but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. It is also shown that if firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in its negotiations with A, then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

We consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). An outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a specific market share, resulting in an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect that is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts making both firms and all consumers better off, but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. It is also shown that if firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in its negotiations with A, then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

We consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). An outsourcing order is equivalent to building an endogenous capacity and it generates a Stackelberg leadership effect for firm A which is absent in technology transfer. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts (making both firms better off and all consumers at least weakly better off), but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. It is also shown that if firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in its negotiations with A, then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

This paper considers a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both A and $B$ can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). First we show that an outsourcing order acts as a credible commitment on part of A to maintain a certain market share in the final good market. This generates an indirect Stackelberg leadership effect, which is absent in a technology transfer contract. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts, there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. Finally, it is shown that whenever both firms prefer one of the two contracts, all consumers prefer the other contract

Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg

We consider a Hotelling duopoly with two firms A and B in the final good market. Both can produce the required intermediate good, firm B having a lower cost due to a superior technology. We compare two contracts: outsourcing (A orders the intermediate good from B) and technology transfer (B transfers its technology to A). An outsourcing order is equivalent to building an endogenous capacity and it generates a Stackelberg leadership effect for firm A which is absent in technology transfer. We show that compared to the situation of no contracts there are always Pareto improving outsourcing contracts (making both firms better off and all consumers at least weakly better off), but no Pareto improving technology transfer contracts. It is also shown that if firm B has a relatively large bargaining power in its negotiations with A, then both firms prefer technology transfer while all consumers prefer outsourcing

A Bi-Directional Refinement Algorithm for the Calculus of (Co)Inductive Constructions

The paper describes the refinement algorithm for the Calculus of (Co)Inductive Constructions (CIC) implemented in the interactive theorem prover Matita. The refinement algorithm is in charge of giving a meaning to the terms, types and proof terms directly written by the user or generated by using tactics, decision procedures or general automation. The terms are written in an "external syntax" meant to be user friendly that allows omission of information, untyped binders and a certain liberal use of user defined sub-typing. The refiner modifies the terms to obtain related well typed terms in the internal syntax understood by the kernel of the ITP. In particular, it acts as a type inference algorithm when all the binders are untyped. The proposed algorithm is bi-directional: given a term in external syntax and a type expected for the term, it propagates as much typing information as possible towards the leaves of the term. Traditional mono-directional algorithms, instead, proceed in a bottom-up way by inferring the type of a sub-term and comparing (unifying) it with the type expected by its context only at the end. We propose some novel bi-directional rules for CIC that are particularly effective. Among the benefits of bi-directionality we have better error message reporting and better inference of dependent types. Moreover, thanks to bi-directionality, the coercion system for sub-typing is more effective and type inference generates simpler unification problems that are more likely to be solved by the inherently incomplete higher order unification algorithms implemented. Finally we introduce in the external syntax the notion of vector of placeholders that enables to omit at once an arbitrary number of arguments. Vectors of placeholders allow a trivial implementation of implicit arguments and greatly simplify the implementation of primitive and simple tactics

Simplex GPS and InSAR Inversion Software

Changes in the shape of the Earth's surface can be routinely measured with precisions better than centimeters. Processes below the surface often drive these changes and as a result, investigators require models with inversion methods to characterize the sources. Simplex inverts any combination of GPS (global positioning system), UAVSAR (uninhabited aerial vehicle synthetic aperture radar), and InSAR (interferometric synthetic aperture radar) data simultaneously for elastic response from fault and fluid motions. It can be used to solve for multiple faults and parameters, all of which can be specified or allowed to vary. The software can be used to study long-term tectonic motions and the faults responsible for those motions, or can be used to invert for co-seismic slip from earthquakes. Solutions involving estimation of fault motion and changes in fluid reservoirs such as magma or water are possible. Any arbitrary number of faults or parameters can be considered. Simplex specifically solves for any of location, geometry, fault slip, and expansion/contraction of a single or multiple faults. It inverts GPS and InSAR data for elastic dislocations in a half-space. Slip parameters include strike slip, dip slip, and tensile dislocations. It includes a map interface for both setting up the models and viewing the results. Results, including faults, and observed, computed, and residual displacements, are output in text format, a map interface, and can be exported to KML. The software interfaces with the QuakeTables database allowing a user to select existing fault parameters or data. Simplex can be accessed through the QuakeSim portal graphical user interface or run from a UNIX command line

Trade and the Environment with Heterogeneous Firms

As the world is becoming more globalized and international trade agreements proliferate, there is a rising concern that trade liberalization may be detrimental to the environment. In a seminal paper Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) identify three channels through which may trade affect the environment: Reducing trade barriers increases output (scale effect), abatement expenditures (technique effect), and changes the composition of goods produced (composition effect). All these channels operate at the country level and/or the industry levels. In this paper we focus on the effect that trade liberalization has on the pollution behavior of individual firms. We develop a theoretical framework that is able to account for differences in pollution behavior across firms within the same industry by embedding a model of trade with heterogeneous firms into the classical literature of trade and the environment following Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor (2001). The model shows that firm heterogeneity is important in determining the economy’s aggregate behavior. In particular, more productive firms are less pollution intensive and are more likely to be exporters than less productive firms. The model identifies a new channel through which trade affects the environment: a “selection effect”. International trade causes the less productive firms within an industry to exit. Since less productive firms are more pollution intensive, through this channel international trade reduces pollution intensity by “selecting” these firms out of the industry