Scan path visualization and comparison using visual aggregation techniques

We demonstrate the use of different visual aggregation techniques to obtain non-cluttered visual representations of scanpaths. First, fixation points are clustered using the mean-shift algorithm. Second, saccades are aggregated using the Attribute-Driven Edge Bundling (ADEB) algorithm that handles a saccades direction, onset timestamp, magnitude or their combination for the edge compatibility criterion. Flow direction maps, computed during bundling, can be visualized separately (vertical or horizontal components) or as a single image using the Oriented Line Integral Convolution (OLIC) algorithm. Furthermore, cosine similarity between two flow direction maps provides a similarity map to compare two scanpaths. Last, we provide examples of basic patterns, visual search task, and art perception. Used together, these techniques provide valuable insights about scanpath exploration and informative illustrations of the eye movement data

Computing large market equilibria using abstractions

Computing market equilibria is an important practical problem for market design (e.g. fair division, item allocation). However, computing equilibria requires large amounts of information (e.g. all valuations for all buyers for all items) and compute power. We consider ameliorating these issues by applying a method used for solving complex games: constructing a coarsened abstraction of a given market, solving for the equilibrium in the abstraction, and lifting the prices and allocations back to the original market. We show how to bound important quantities such as regret, envy, Nash social welfare, Pareto optimality, and maximin share when the abstracted prices and allocations are used in place of the real equilibrium. We then study two abstraction methods of interest for practitioners: 1) filling in unknown valuations using techniques from matrix completion, 2) reducing the problem size by aggregating groups of buyers/items into smaller numbers of representative buyers/items and solving for equilibrium in this coarsened market. We find that in real data allocations/prices that are relatively close to equilibria can be computed from even very coarse abstractions