Time consistency in Petroleum Taxation - The case of Norway

,Petroleum; Taxation

International Competition for R&D Investments (new title: Spillovers and international competition for investments)

Two jurisdictions compete to attract shares of the R&D investment budget of a large multinational enterprise, whose investments potentially confer positive spillovers on national firms. The firm contributes to local welfare by these spillovers (should they materialize), by tax payments and by dividends paid to local investors. The firm has private information both about its efficiency and about spillovers, and in particular whether the latter do exist or not. It is shown that strategic tax competition may lead to overinvestments relative to the first-best allocation, that the excessive investments occur in the country where the positive spillover effects are lowest, and that they are most severe for the least efficient firms.Tax competition, R&D, common agency

Multinationals, tax competition, and outside options

.Tax competition; mobility; common agency; countervailing incentives

Asymmetry and uncertainty in capital formation: An application to oil investment

,Oil; Investment

CCS from the gas-fired power station at Kårstø A commercial analysis

.Carbon Capture;

Disposal of Petroleum Installations - Major Policy Issues

Following the Brent Spar controversy, the OSPAR countries reached a unanimous agreement in 1998 for the future rules for disposal of petroleum installations. The vast majority of existing offshore installations will be re-used or returned to shore for recycling or disposal. For installations where there is no generic solution, one should take a case-by-case approach. We provide a survey of international economic and regulatory issues pertaining to disposal of petroleum installations, and provide specific examples by analysing the Norwegian decommissioning and disposal policy. Optimal disposal policy can be analysed by cost-benefit analyses with distributional effects, subject to environmental and goodwill constraints.Petroleum installations, decommissioning, disposal, externalities

Strategic Tax Competition; Implications of National Ownership

Two jurisdictions compete to capture the rents of a large multinational enterprise (MNE) which invests locally and which is partly owned by local investors. The MNE contributes to local welfare by tax payments and dividends, and it has private information about the efficiency of the operations in the two localisations. It is shown that the distortions in the MNE's real investment portfolio are determined by a trade-off between fiscal externalities and equity externalities, and that investments in the case of strategic tax competition may be lower than in the co-operative case. Ownership matters, and we show how the firm may reduce its overall tax payments by influencing the distribution of owner shares between investors in the two countries.Tax competition, mobility, common agency

Innovation in the Supply and Procurement of Rig Services

Substantial elements of innovation have been observable during recent years in rig supply, in particular regarding contracts and organisation. This trend has been driven by the fact that rising costs over many years have put profitability under pressure. On the basis of theory and available empirical insights, the paper outlines the conditions where specific organisational and contractual solutions are best suited. Optimum rig procurement will depend in part on whether the oil companies have time-critical drilling targets, the ability and willingness of the parties to bear risk and the purchaser's competence and capacity to manage and follow up procurement

Petroleum Taxation: Experience and Issues

,Oil; Taxation

Rig Services and Taxation

A long period of rig scarcity and high rates has led to innovation in the procurement of rig services and in relationships between oil companies and rig contractors. Discussions have been conducted on joint ventures between companies and contractors, for instance. This paper describes and analyses such a solution from a taxation perspective. Could a joint venture pose problems for revenue capture from the petroleum sector? Challenges in taxing drilling services - including recently adopted British restrictions on determining internal charter rates for drilling units - are also analysed. In addition to analysing topical issues related to taxation and rigs, the paper makes a general contribution by highlighting the connection between taxing rig services at oil-company and rig-contractor levels, and by placing rig taxation in a broader resource management perspective