60 research outputs found
Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice
Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last decade. This paper establishes some stylized facts. In addition, it provides a systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows much diversity in information disclosure, even for central banks with the same monetary policy framework, including inflation targeting. Nevertheless, the paper finds significant differences in transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empirical findings are explained using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this paper aims to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency.transparency, monetary policy, central bank communication
Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence.transparency, monetary policy, political pressures
Political Pressures and Monetary Mystique
Central bank independence and transparency have become best practice in monetary policy. This paper cautions that transparency about economic information may not be beneficial in the absence of central bank independence. The reason is that it reduces monetary uncertainty, which could make the government less inhibited to interfere with monetary policy. In fact, a central bank could use monetary mystique to obtain greater insulation from political pressures, even if the government faces no direct cost of overriding. As a result, economic secrecy could be beneficial and provide the central bank greater political independence
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Transparency of Monetary Policy: Theory and Practice
Transparency has become one of the main features of monetary policymaking during the last decade. This paper establishes some stylized facts. In addition, it provides a systematic overview of the practice of monetary policy transparency around the world. It shows much diversity in information disclosure, even for central banks with the same monetary policy framework, including inflation targeting. Nevertheless, the paper finds significant differences in transparency across monetary policy frameworks. The empirical findings are explained using key insights distilled from the theoretical literature. Thus, this paper aims to bridge the gap between the theory and practice of monetary policy transparency
Trends in Monetary Policy Transparency
Transparency has become a prominent feature of monetary policy. This paper provides an overview of central bank communication practices and is the first to systematically analyze transparency trends throughout the world and across monetary policy frameworks. It shows that increases in information disclosure have not been confined to inflation targeting but extend to other monetary policy frameworks, although there are significant differences. In addition, countries with higher inflation and economic development have undergone larger increases in transparency. Moreover, it shows that greater transparency has been followed by lower average inflation.transparency, monetary policy, central bank communication, monetary policy frameworks
Precommitment, Transparency and Monetary Policy
Conventional wisdom says that commitment eliminates the inflationary bias of monetary policy. However, this paper shows that the inflation bias can persist even when the central bank commits. A simple model is presented in which the central bank precommits by setting the policy instrument, and the subsequent adjustment of inflation expectations is part of the transmission mechanism. Generally there is still an inflation bias, despite the absence of a time-inconsistency problem. It is caused by uncertainty about the economic disturbances to which the central bank responds. Only perfect transparency about economic information completely eliminates the inflation bias. -- Ăblicherweise wird angenommen, dass ein Inflationsbias verschwindet, wenn sich eine Zentralbank glaubwĂŒrdig im voraus auf ihre Politik festlegt. Dieses Papier zeigt, dass ein Inflationsbias trotzdem fortbestehen kann. Es wird ein einfaches Modell dargestellt, in dem die Zentralbank im voraus ihre Instrumente festlegt und die anschlieĂende Anpassung der Inflationserwartungen Teil des Transmissionsprozesses ist. Im allgemeinen existiert ein Inflationsbias weiter, obwohl kein Zeitinkonsistenzproblem mehr auftritt. Ursache ist die Unsicherheit ĂŒber die ökonomischen Störungen, auf die die Zentralbank reagiert. Nur vollkommene Transparenz hinsichtlich der Informationen beseitigt vollstĂ€ndig den Inflationsbias.
Why adopt transparency? The publication of central bank forecasts
Recently, several central banks have abandoned the usual secrecy in monetary policy and become very transparent. This paper provides an explanation for this puzzling fact, focussing on the disclosure of central bank forecasts. It shows that transparency reduces the inflationary bias and gives the central bank greater flexibility to respond to shocks in the economy. Furthermore, it makes it easier for a central bank to build reputation. To achieve these benefits of transparency it is generally necessary to publish the conditional central bank forecasts for both inflation and output. JEL Classification: E52, E58
ECB Credibility and Transparency
This paper argues that ECB credibility in delivering price stability is being progressively eroded; this problem could be overcome by embracing greater transparency especially about the ECB's objectives, macroeconomic forecasts and decision-making.ĂÂ During the ECB's first decade, average inflation in the euro area has been low, but it has failed to meet the ECB's criterion of below but close to 2% over the medium term. Although this could be attributed to unanticipated shocks, the analysis in this paper points to some structural shortcomings. In particular, there has been an upward trend in medium and long term inflation expectations in the euro area, which have even reached over 2%, and the credibility of the ECB achieving price stability in the medium term has gradually eroded to critically low levels. In addition, there is evidence that medium and long term inflation expectations are negatively affected by the inflation experience of the euro area. However, this paper argues that these problems could be overcome embracing by greater transparency, especially about the ECB's objectives, macroeconomic forecasts and decision-making.ECB, monetary policy, inflation expectations, Geraats
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Intertemporal Substitution and Hyperbolic Discounting
Evidence from behavioural experiments suggests that intertemporal preferences reflect a hyperbolic discount function. This paper shows that in contrast to exponential discounting, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution for hyperbolic consumers depends on the persistence of the change in the intertemporal relative price. In particular, lasting changes in the real interest rate are likely to generate a smaller degree of intertemporal substitution in consumption than temporary changes. This result holds for both sophisticated and naive hyperbolic consumers. It provides a novel testable implication of hyperbolic discounting and a new perspective on intertemporal substitution
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Transparency and Reputation: The Publication of Central Bank Forecasts
Transparency has become one of the key features of monetary policy. This paper analyzes the reputational incentives related to transparency, focusing on the publication of central bank forecasts. A simple dynamic monetary policy game shows how transparency reduces inflation, as has been found empirically. Although transparency exposes weak central banks, the negative market feedback in response to secrecy could provide a sufficiently strong inducement to become transparent. Thus, reputational concerns could lead to transparency, even without formal disclosure requirements
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