What promotes R&D? Comparative evidence from around the world

R&D drives innovation and productivity growth, but appropriability problems and financing difficulties likely keep R&D investment well below the socially optimal level, particularly in high- technology industries. Though countries around the world are increasingly interested in using tax incentives and other policy initiatives to address this underinvestment problem, there is little empirical evidence comparing the effectiveness of alternative domestic policies and institutions at spurring R&D. Using data from a broad sample of OECD economies, we find that financial market rules that improve accounting standards and strengthen contract enforcement share a significant positive relation with R&D in more innovative industries, as do stronger legal protections for intellectual property. In contrast, stronger creditor rights and more generous R&D tax credits have a negative differential relation with R&D in more innovative industries. These results suggest that domestic policies directly dealing with appropriability and financing problems may be more effective than traditional tax subsides at promoting the innovative investments that drive economic growth

Citizens' Blame of Politicians for Public Service Failure: Experimental Evidence about Blame Reduction through Delegation and Contracting

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this recordTheories of blame suggest that contracting out public service delivery reduces citizens' blame of politicians for service failure. The authors use an online experiment with 1,000 citizen participants to estimate the effects of information cues summarizing service delivery arrangements on citizens' blame of English local government politicians for poor street maintenance. Participants were randomized to one of four cues: no information about service delivery arrangements, politicians' involvement in managing delivery, delegation to a unit inside government managing delivery, and delegation through a contract with a private firm managing delivery. The politicians managing delivery cue raises blame compared to citizens having no information. However, the contract with a private firm cue does not reduce blame compared to either no information or the politicians managing delivery cue. Instead, the delegation to a unit inside government cue reduces blame compared to politicians managing delivery, suggesting that delegation to public managers, not contracting, reduces blame in this context.Funding support is acknowledged from European Community's Seventh Framework Programme, Grant no. 266887, Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future

Politics and Science in the Laetrile Controversy

In an analysis of the dispute between the proponents of Laetrile and those opposing the substance, the impact of both knowledge and value factors is explored. First, six related knowledge disputes are considered, with an emphasis on the difficulties of conflict resolution. It is suggested that when Laetrile supporters failed to obtain a favourable adjudication within the scientific community, they expanded the scope of the conflict through the use of the courts, state legislatures, and the freedom of choice appeal. Government regulatory bodies and leading members of the American medical community have tried to limit the scope of the conflict through claims of specialized knowledge and expertise. Finally, the concept of 'adjudication' is introduced to place the Laetrile dispute in an intellectual context which emphasizes the role of both knowledge and value factors in scientific controversies