Maintaining Freedom of Navigation and Overflight in the Exclusive Economic Zone and on the High Seas

Efforts to expand coastal State jurisdiction to include security jurisdiction in the EEZ were soundly rejected by a majority of the nations that participated in the UNCLOS negotiations The delegates present achieved consensus on provisions that accommodate the resource interests of the coastal State in the EEZ without diminishing user State interests in freedom of navigation and other internationally lawful uses of the sea in the zone. Continued efforts by some States to reinterpret the Convention to unilaterally and unlawfully advance their national interests in the EEZ impinge on traditional uses of the oceans by all States and are inconsistent with international law, long-standing state practice and the intent and negotiating history of UNCLOS. If these efforts succeed, the Convention will unravel over time and the international community will once again be plagued by a new wave of excessive maritime claims. Coastal State competency in the EEZ is strictly limited to resource rights, jurisdiction over resource-related offshore installations and structures, marine scientific research, and protection of the marine environment. Coastal States do not retain security jurisdiction in the EEZ, and may not regulate lawful military activities in the EEZ that are consistent with the UN Charter, UNCLOS, the Chicago Convention, and other relevant international law instruments. The creation of the EEZ was a package deal—coastal States were granted exclusive resource rights and user States retained the high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas associated with those freedoms, which have always applied beyond the territorial sea

Is a South China Sea Code of Conduct Viable?

For over twenty years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has stonewalled efforts by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to negotiate a binding Code of Conduct that would form the basis for a peaceful and durable solution to the territorial and maritime disputes in the South China Sea (SCS). At the same time, the PRC engaged in a series of malign activities, to include the militarization of several reclaimed artificial islands, that have forever changed the landscape and status quo of the SCS. In 2020, the PRC unexpectedly called on ASEAN to resume the negotiations as soon as possible. The PRC’s sudden urgency to conclude a code at the earliest opportunity begs the question—is it still in ASEAN’s interests to conclude a binding Code of Conduct? This article concludes that, given that the status quo in the SCS has been significantly changed in favor of the PRC, Beijing has nothing to lose and everything to gain by concluding a Code of Conduct that solidifies its claims and advances its national security and economic interests, all at the expense of ASEAN

China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare

China is reportedly developing long-range cruise missiles that can be fired from standard shipping containers loaded on merchant vessels. China is also converting heavy-lift civilian ships and roll-on roll-off (RORO) ferries to serve as de facto amphibious assault ships to support People’s Liberation Army (PLA) amphibious operations. While none of these activities are illegal per se, they do raise potential concerns under the law of naval warfare. Only warships can engage in offensive belligerent rights during an international armed conflict. Using merchant vessels to engage in belligerent rights would violate international law unless China first converts the vessels into warships in accordance with the rules set out in the 1907 Hague Convention VII. Using converted commercial ships to directly support military operations increases the risk that all Chinese-flagged container ships and RORO ferries will be targeted as military objectives given that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between a converted and non-converted vessel

Closing the Turkish Straits in Times of War

This article originally appeared in Articles of War, the online publication of the Lieber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy, Mar. 3, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/closing-turkish-straits-war/

Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: East Asia Focus

In August 2014, a Chinese fighter aggressively intercepted a U.S. Navy surveillance plane over the South China Sea. This incident once again raises the issue of the legality of conducting military activities in and over the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) without coastal State notice or consent. All nations have a right under international law to conduct military activities in foreign EEZs. The article discusses the legal bases for conducting these activities and reviews some of the more prominent arguments used by States that purport to regulate such activities in the EEZ. It concludes that the right to engage in military activities in the EEZ is consistent with international law, both customary and conventional, as well as State practice

Maritime Exclusion Zones in Armed Conflicts

This article originally appeared in Articles of War, the online publication of the Lieber Institute at the U.S. Military Academy, Apr. 12, 2022, https://lieber.westpoint.edu/maritime-exclusion-zones-armed-conflicts/

China’s New Law on Foreign Relations: Transforming the Rules-Based International Order with Chinese Characteristics

In 2023 China adopted a comprehensive Law on Foreign Relations. Although the law is intended to shape China’s diplomatic relations and its cultural, economic, and other exchanges, as well as China’s relations with the United Nations and other international organizations, implementation of the law will be guided by (inter alia) Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era. The law makes clear that China’s foreign relations will be conducted to uphold its system of socialism with Chinese characteristics, safeguard its sovereignty, unification and territorial integrity, and promote its economic and social development. This revisionist “rule by law” manifesto is a direct attack on the existing rules-based international order. Riddled with Communist propaganda and falsehoods, the new law describes Xi Jinping’s vision of building a new type of international relations that will allow China to reform the global governance system with a new sovereignty-based order that better reflects its domestic and global interests. This article examines select portions of the new law to demonstrate that China’s actions are in direct opposition to the words in the law and that China sees itself as above the law and rules-based international order

Protecting the Free Flow of Commerce from Houthi Attacks off the Arabian Peninsula

This article reviews recent maritime incidents involving Houthi missile and drone attacks on commercial shipping and foreign warships off the Arabian Peninsula, purportedly in response to the Israeli military operations in Gaza following the October 7, 2023, Hamas-led attack that killed over 1,300 Israeli civilians. The article discusses the legality of the U.S. response to those incidents, including U.S. counter-piracy operations and the right of unit and collective self-defense. The article also discusses whether the United States should consider conducting land-based attacks on Houthi missile and drone sites in Yemen under the principle of self-help to preempt further attacks on U.S. and foreign-flagged ships operating in the region