On Fairness of Equilibria in Economies with Differential Information

The paper proposes a notion of fairness which overcomes the conflict arising between efficiency and the absence of envy in economies with uncertainty and asymmetrically informed agents. We do it in general economies which include, as particular cases, the main differential information economies studied in the literature. The analysis is further extended by allowing the presence of large traders, which may cause the lack of perfect competition.Mixed markets, fairness, envy, efficiency, asymmetric information

Mixed Markets with Public Goods

We use a mixed market model for analyzing economies with public projects in which the condition of perfect competition is violated. We discuss core-equivalence results in the general framework of non-Euclidean representation of the collective goods. We show that if large traders are similar to each other, then they lose their market power and hence the equivalence theorem can be restored. This is possible assuming a cost distribution function to fix the fraction that each large or small agent is expected to cover of the total cost of providing the project. We show that, for each given individual and coalitional contribution scheme, the resulting core is equivalent to the corresponding linear cost share equilibria. Finally, we investigate on weaker equivalences when the assumption that all large traders are of the same type is dropped. An analysis of mixed markets with public goods via atomless economies is provided, joint with an extension of Schmeidler and Vind results on the measure of blocking coalitions.Mixed markets, coalitional fairness, envy, efficiency, asymmetric information

Parametric effect analysis of free-form shape error during sheet metal forming

Compliant sheet metal parts or free-form shaped parts are widely used for automotive bodies, aerospace fuselage/wing or home appliances. Intrinsic flexibility of sheet metal along with forming process variability throws a number of challenges to produce geometrically conforming parts. Additionally, emerging optical non-contact metrology scanners offer to capture entire part geometric quality information which enables virtual design and manufacturing at early stage. This paper focuses on developing a generic functional data analysis based approach to quantify geometric error/shape error which are generated by process or material parameters (such as material thickness, stamping speed and blank holding force) during sheet metal forming process. The research methodology involves: (i) experimental investigation by varying the design parameters; (ii) capturing entire surface based shape error information (i.e. high density cloud-of-points, CoPs) by using optical scanner; (iii) functional mapping of shape error to design parameters (responsible to generate the data) by using deviation field decomposition approach; and (iv) parametric analysis of process parameters by developing analytical surrogate model. The proposed approach concentrates on finding root causes of failure, usually unforeseen if only based on heuristic approaches. The applicability and effectiveness of the proposed methodology have been illustrated with industrial case study

Oligopoly and cost sharing in economies with public goods

We study economies that involve both small and large traders as well as the choice of a public project. Within this framework, we establish two sufficient conditions under which the set of competitive allocations coincides with the core. Our first core equivalence result holds under the assumption that there is a countably infinite set of large traders similar to each other. The second result, independent of the number of large traders, requires the existence of a coalition of small traders with the same characteristics of the large traders. Finally, we show how the generalized Aubin approach to cooperation may dispense with both conditions

The Core of Economies with Collective Goods and a Social Division of Labor

This paper considers the Core of a competitive market economy with private commodities as well as (non-Samuelsonian) collective goods that are provided through an endogenous social division of labour. Our approach is founded on the hypothesis that every agent is a “consumer-producer”, producing private commodities as well as consuming collective and private goods. We develop the σ-core concept, assuming that collective goods are scalable with community size. We show that the σ-core can be founded on deviations of coalitions of arbitrary size, extending the seminal insights of Vind and Schmeidler for pure exchange economies. Our analysis also shows that self-organisation in a social division of labour can be incorporated into the Edgeworthian barter process directly. This is formulated as an equivalence of the σ-core and a structured σ-core concept based on blocking coalitions that use internal divisions of labour. Furthermore, Grodal’s theorem is extended, allowing applications of metrics that express productive similarities between agents making up blocking coalitions. Finally, we consider the equivalence of the σ-core and the set of cost share equilibrium allocations

The Core of economies with collective goods and a social division of labour

This paper considers the Core of a competitive market economy with private commodities as well as (non-Samuelsonian) collective goods that are provided through an endogenous social division of labour. Our approach is founded on the hypothesis that every agent is a “consumer–producer”—producing private commodities as well as consuming collective and private goods. We develop the σ-Core concept, assuming that collective goods are scalable with community size. We show that the σ-Core can be founded on deviations of coalitions of arbitrary size, extending the seminal insights of Vind and Schmeidler for pure exchange economies. Our analysis also shows that self-organisation in a social division of labour can be incorporated into the Edgeworthian barter process directly. This is formulated as an equivalence of the σ -Core and a structured σ -Core concept based on blocking coalitions that use internal divisions of labour. Furthermore, Grodal’s theorem is extended, allowing applications of metrics that express productive similarities between agents making up blocking coalitions. Finally, we consider the equivalence of the σ-Core and the set of cost share equilibrium allocations

Monitoring the freezing point of buffalo milk

The aim of this study was to evaluate the basic freezing point of buffalo milk. Bulk milk samples were collected from buffalo and cattle farms in Caserta area from 2008 to 2014. The analysis involved a total of 1886 buffalo milk samples and 1711 bovine milk samples. These were also tested for fat, protein and lactose contents by means of infrared spectrometry. The freezing point was determined by means of a thermistor cryoscope. Data underwent statistical analysis. Our research showed an average freezing point of -0.528°C for buffalo milk and - 0.522°C for bovine milk. Given the lack of data on the freezing point of buffalo milk, our study provides the first indication of a basic freezing point of the milk of this species in Italy