Maximizing Revenue in the Presence of Intermediaries

We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of buyers. Our goal is to design robust mechanisms that are independent of the demand structure (i.e. how the buyers are partitioned across intermediaries), and perform well under a wide variety of possible contracts between intermediaries and buyers. We first study the case of $k$ identical items where each buyer draws its private valuation for an item i.i.d. from a known $\lambda$-regular distribution. We construct a robust mechanism that, independent of the demand structure and under certain conditions on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, obtains a constant factor of the revenue that the mechanism designer could obtain had she known the buyers' valuations. In other words, our mechanism's expected revenue achieves a constant factor of the optimal welfare, regardless of the demand structure. Our mechanism is a simple posted-price mechanism that sets a take-it-or-leave-it per-item price that depends on $k$ and the total number of buyers, but does not depend on the demand structure or the downstream contracts. Next we generalize our result to the case when the items are not identical. We assume that the item valuations are separable. For this case, we design a mechanism that obtains at least a constant fraction of the optimal welfare, by using a menu of posted prices. This mechanism is also independent of the demand structure, but makes a relatively stronger assumption on the contracts between intermediaries and buyers, namely that each intermediary prefers outcomes with a higher sum of utilities of the subset of buyers represented by it

A systematic review to identify areas of enhancements of pandemic simulation models for operational use at provincial and local levels

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>In recent years, computer simulation models have supported development of pandemic influenza preparedness policies. However, U.S. policymakers have raised several <it>concerns </it>about the practical use of these models. In this review paper, we examine the extent to which the current literature already addresses these <it>concerns </it>and identify means of enhancing the current models for higher operational use.</p> <p>Methods</p> <p>We surveyed PubMed and other sources for published research literature on simulation models for influenza pandemic preparedness. We identified 23 models published between 1990 and 2010 that consider single-region (e.g., country, province, city) outbreaks and multi-pronged mitigation strategies. We developed a plan for examination of the literature based on the concerns raised by the policymakers.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>While examining the concerns about the adequacy and validity of data, we found that though the epidemiological data supporting the models appears to be adequate, it should be validated through as many updates as possible during an outbreak. Demographical data must improve its interfaces for access, retrieval, and translation into model parameters. Regarding the concern about credibility and validity of modeling assumptions, we found that the models often simplify reality to reduce computational burden. Such simplifications may be permissible if they do not interfere with the performance assessment of the mitigation strategies. We also agreed with the concern that social behavior is inadequately represented in pandemic influenza models. Our review showed that the models consider only a few social-behavioral aspects including contact rates, withdrawal from work or school due to symptoms appearance or to care for sick relatives, and compliance to social distancing, vaccination, and antiviral prophylaxis. The concern about the degree of accessibility of the models is palpable, since we found three models that are currently accessible by the public while other models are seeking public accessibility. Policymakers would prefer models scalable to any population size that can be downloadable and operable in personal computers. But scaling models to larger populations would often require computational needs that cannot be handled with personal computers and laptops. As a limitation, we state that some existing models could not be included in our review due to their limited available documentation discussing the choice of relevant parameter values.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>To adequately address the concerns of the policymakers, we need continuing model enhancements in critical areas including: updating of epidemiological data during a pandemic, smooth handling of large demographical databases, incorporation of a broader spectrum of social-behavioral aspects, updating information for contact patterns, adaptation of recent methodologies for collecting human mobility data, and improvement of computational efficiency and accessibility.</p

Efficiency of non-truthful auctions under auto-bidding

Auto-bidding is now widely adopted as an interface between advertisers and internet advertising as it allows advertisers to specify high-level goals, such as maximizing value subject to a value-per-spend constraint. Prior research has mostly focused on auctions which are truthful (such as SPA) since uniform bidding is optimal in such auctions, which makes it manageable to reason about equilibria. A tantalizing question is whether one can obtain more efficient outcomes by leaving the realm of truthful auctions. This is the first paper to study non-truthful auctions in the prior-free auto-bidding setting. Our first result is that non-truthfulness provides no benefit when one considers deterministic auctions. Any deterministic mechanism has a price of anarchy (PoA) of at least $2$, even for $2$ bidders; this matches what can be achieved by deterministic truthful mechanisms. In particular, we prove that the first price auction has PoA of exactly $2$. For our second result, we construct a randomized non-truthful auction that achieves a PoA of $1.8$ for $2$ bidders. This is the best-known PoA for this problem. The previously best-known PoA for this problem was $1.9$ and was achieved with a truthful mechanism. Moreover, we demonstrate the benefit of non-truthfulness in this setting by showing that the truthful version of this randomized auction also has a PoA of $1.9$. Finally, we show that no auction (even randomized, non-truthful) can improve upon a PoA bound of $2$ as the number of advertisers grow to infinity