In the era of rapid mRNA-based vaccines: why is there no effective hepatitis C virus vaccine yet?

Hepatitis C virus (HCV) is responsible for no less than 71 million people chronically infected and is one of the most frequent indications for liver transplantation worldwide. Despite direct-acting antiviral therapies fuel optimism in controlling HCV infections, there are several obstacles regarding treatment accessibility and reinfection continues to remain a possibility. Indeed, the majority of new HCV infections in developed countries occur in people who inject drugs and are more plausible to get reinfected. To achieve global epidemic control of this virus the development of an effective prophylactic or therapeutic vaccine becomes a must. The coronavirus disease 19 (COVID-19) pandemic led to auspicious vaccine development against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) virus, which has renewed interest on fighting HCV epidemic with vaccination. The aim of this review is to highlight the current situation of HCV vaccine candidates designed to prevent and/or to reduce HCV infectious cases and their complications. We will emphasize on some of the crossroads encountered during vaccine development against this insidious virus, together with some key aspects of HCV immunology which have, so far, hampered the progress in this area. The main focus will be on nucleic acid-based as well as recombinant viral vector-based vaccine candidates as the most novel vaccine approaches, some of which have been recently and successfully employed for SARS-CoV-2 vaccines. Finally, some ideas will be presented on which methods to explore for the design of live-attenuated vaccines against HCV

Evaluation of SYBR Green real time PCR for detecting SARS-CoV-2 from clinical samples

The pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2 has triggered an extraordinary collapse of healthcare systems and hundred thousand of deaths worldwide. Following the declaration of the outbreak as a Public Health Emergency of International Concern by the World Health Organization (WHO) on January 30th, 2020, it has become imperative to develop diagnostic tools to reliably detect the virus in infected patients. Several methods based on real time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (RT-qPCR) for the detection of SARS-CoV-2 genomic RNA have been developed. In addition, these methods have been recommended by the WHO for laboratory diagnosis. Since most of these protocols are based on the use of fluorogenic probes and one-step reagents (cDNA synthesis followed by PCR amplification in the same tube), these techniques can be difficult to perform given the limited supply of reagents in low- and middle-income countries. In order to develop an inexpensive SARS-CoV-2 detection protocol using available resources we evaluated the SYBR Green based detection of SARS-CoV-2 to establish a suitable assay. To do so, we adapted one of the WHO recommended TaqMan-based one-step real time PCR protocols (from the University of Hong Kong) to SYBR Green. Our results indicate that SYBR-Green detection of ORF1b-nsp14 target represents a reliable cost-effective alternative to increase the testing capacity.ANII: FCE_1_2019_1_156157ANII: FCE_1_2019_1_15593

One-year monitoring SARS-CoV-2 RNA surface contamination in hospitals reveals no correlation with organic material and negative pressure as a limiting factor for contamination

Understanding transmission routes of SARS-CoV-2 is crucial to establish effective interventions in healthcare institutions. Although the role of surface contamination in SARS-CoV-2 transmission has been controversial, fomites have been proposed as a contributing factor. Longitudinal studies about SARS-CoV-2 surface contamination in hospitals with different infrastructure (presence or absence of negative pressure systems) are needed to improve our understanding of their effectiveness on patient healthcare and to advance our knowledge about the viral spread. We performed a one-year longitudinal study to evaluate surface contamination with SARS-CoV-2 RNA in reference hospitals. These hospitals have to admit all COVID-19 patients from public health services that require hospitalization. Surfaces samples were molecular tested for SARS-CoV-2 RNA presence considering three factors: the dirtiness by measuring organic material, the circulation of a high transmissibility variant, and the presence or absence of negative pressure systems in hospitalized patients' rooms. Our results show that: (i) There is no correlation between the amount of organic material dirtiness and SARS-CoV-2 RNA detected on surfaces; (ii) SARS-CoV-2 high transmissible Gamma variant introduction significantly increased surface contamination; (iii) the hospital with negative pressure systems was associated with lower levels of SARS-CoV-2 surface contamination and, iv) most environmental samples recovered from contaminated surfaces were assigned as non-infectious. This study provides data gathered for one year about the surface contamination with SARS-CoV-2 RNA sampling hospital settings. Our results suggest that spatial dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 RNA contamination varies according with the type of SARS-CoV-2 genetic variant and the presence of negative pressure systems. In addition, we showed that there is no correlation between the amount of organic material dirtiness and the quantity of viral RNA detected in hospital settings. Our findings suggest that SARS CoV-2 RNA surface contamination monitoring might be useful for the understanding of SARS-CoV-2 dissemination with impact on hospital management and public health policies. This is of special relevance for the Latin-American region where ICU rooms with negative pressure are insufficient.Agencia Nacional de Investigación e Innovació

Early transcontinental import of SARS-CoV-2 variant of concern 202012/01 (B.1.1.7) from Europe to Uruguay

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variant B.1.1.7 causes a more transmissible and apparently more severe disease. We report its early introduction from Europe to South America from a traveler who arrived in Uruguay from the United Kingdom, even before B.1.1.7 was recognized as a variant of concern. This highlights the risk of introduction of SARS-CoV-2 variants despite strict contingency protocols and underscores the need of improving real-time surveillance worldwide.ANII: POS_NAC_2018_1_15149

Emergence and spread of a B.1.1.28-derived P.6 lineage with Q675H and Q677H spike mutations in Uruguay

Uruguay controlled the viral dissemination during the first nine months of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Unfortunately, towards the end of 2020, the number of daily new cases exponentially increased. Herein, we analyzed the country-wide genetic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 between November 2020 and April 2021. We identified that the most prevalent viral variant during the first epidemic wave in Uruguay (December 2020–February 2021) was a B.1.1.28 sublineage carrying Spike mutations Q675H + Q677H, now designated as P.6, followed by lineages P.2 and P.7. P.6 probably arose around November 2020, in Montevideo, Uruguay’s capital department, and rapidly spread to other departments, with evidence of further local transmission clusters; it also spread sporadically to the USA and Spain. The more efficient dissemination of lineage P.6 with respect to P.2 and P.7 and the presence of mutations (Q675H and Q677H) in the proximity of the key cleavage site at the S1/S2 boundary suggest that P.6 may be more transmissible than other lineages co-circulating in Uruguay. Although P.6 was replaced by the variant of concern (VOC) P.1 as the predominant lineage in Uruguay since April 2021, the monitoring of the concurrent emergence of Q675H + Q677H in VOCs should be of worldwide interest

Real-Time genomic surveillance for SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern, Uruguay

We developed a genomic surveillance program for realtime monitoring of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) variants of concern (VOCs) in Uruguay. We report on a PCR method for SARSCoV- 2 VOCs, the surveillance workflow, and multiple independent introductions and community transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 P.1 VOC in Uruguay

Emergence and Spread of a B.1.1.28-Derived P.6 Lineage with Q675H and Q677H Spike Mutations in Uruguay

Uruguay controlled the viral dissemination during the first nine months of the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Unfortunately, towards the end of 2020, the number of daily new cases exponentially increased. Herein, we analyzed the country-wide genetic diversity of SARS-CoV-2 between November 2020 and April 2021. We identified that the most prevalent viral variant during the first epidemic wave in Uruguay (December 2020–February 2021) was a B.1.1.28 sublineage carrying Spike mutations Q675H + Q677H, now designated as P.6, followed by lineages P.2 and P.7. P.6 probably arose around November 2020, in Montevideo, Uruguay’s capital department, and rapidly spread to other departments, with evidence of further local transmission clusters; it also spread sporadically to the USA and Spain. The more efficient dissemination of lineage P.6 with respect to P.2 and P.7 and the presence of mutations (Q675H and Q677H) in the proximity of the key cleavage site at the S1/S2 boundary suggest that P.6 may be more transmissible than other lineages co-circulating in Uruguay. Although P.6 was replaced by the variant of concern (VOC) P.1 as the predominant lineage in Uruguay since April 2021, the monitoring of the concurrent emergence of Q675H + Q677H in VOCs should be of worldwide interest