Continuity and change in Ciskei chiefship

African Studies Seminar series. Paper presented August 1977The conventional wisdom of South African ethnologists, whether liberal or conservative, has been dominated by the idea that African politics operated according to certain fixed rules ("customs") which were hallowed by tradition and therefore never changed. A corollary of this is that if these rules were correctly identified and fairly applied, everyone would be satisfied and chiefship could perhaps be saved. It is, however, fairly well established that genealogies are often falsified, that new rules are coined and old rules bent to accommodate changing configurations of power, and that ‘age-old’ customs may turn out to be fairly recent innovations; in short, that "organisational ideas do not directly control action, but only the interpretation of action". The conventional wisdom was successfully challenged by Comaroff in his important article, ‘Chiefship in a South African Homeland’, which demonstrated that by adhering too closely to the formal features of traditional government and politics among the Tswana, especially those concerning succession, the Government wrecked the political processes which had enabled the Tswana to choose the most suitable candidate as chief. And yet Comaroff’s article begs a good many questions. Let us imagine that the Government ethnologists read the article, and as a result allow Tswana chiefs to compete for office as before, permitting "consultative decision-making and participation in executive processes". Would this prevent the Tswana chiefship from dying? Can we, in fact, discuss chiefship in political terms alone without considering whether the material conditions in which it flourished still exist? The present article will attempt to situate the question of chiefship in a somewhat wider framework than that usually provided by administrative theory or transactional analysis

The implosion of Transkei and Ciskei

African Studies Seminar series. Paper presented 4 May 1992The South African government’s policy of granting "independence" to the black reserves within its borders evoked considerable initial interest, particularly with regard to Transkei, the first black territory to be so blessed. Liberal writers approached the so-called "homelands" with sympathy, giving serious consideration to their possible viability, and exploring their potential as an engine for future change. Three well-known American academics went so far as to dub Transkei as ‘virtually the only ground where Africans can voice non-violent opposition to (the South African) regime’…. It is naturally impossible for me to give a comprehensive account of the entire collapse within the limits of a single paper. My object is the more modest one of relating the hitherto uncompiled history of the Transkei and Ciskei 'independent' homelands which spearheaded the process. By implosion, I do not mean to denote a catastrophe of literally astrophysical proportions. I merely use the word to imply comparison with the physical process whereby a weakness at the centre is unable to support the outer facade of a structure and results in its inward collapse. The weakness at the centre may be found in the disjuncture between the homeland leadership and the homeland bourgeoisie, who might have constituted their local class base. I will return to this subject in my conclusion

The holocaust and apartheid: similarities and differences: a comparative study

Bibliography: leaves 170-173.In recent years it has become fairly commonplace to make comparisons between the Holocaust and Apartheid. This dissertation explores similarities and differences. It acknowledges that both systems were rooted in ideas of race, but while the tools used by the Nazis in Germany and the apartheid government in South Africa are superficially similar, their very different objectives brought about radically different outcomes once their policies were enforced. The dissertation opens with a discussion of the methods used by each of the different systems to define the victim races, and justify their inferior status. In Germany the reasons given were the desire to preserve the pure Aryan volk and protect the volkisch culture. In South Africa the stated premise was that each 'ethnic' group would best realise its full potential if it was encouraged to preserve its integrity and promote its own culture. In both countries separation was followed by deprivation of citizenship. Under German rule Jews were rendered stateless and expelled as far as possible from the Reich. In South Africa 'blacks' were made citizens of 'ethnic homelands'. Unlike the German Jews, South African 'blacks' had at least some kind of nominal right to equality in their designated 'homelands'. Freedom of movement was restricted and residential segregation enforced in both countries. Jews, previously prominent in the cultural, academic and economic life of Germany, were impoverished and dehumanized. 'Blacks' in South Africa were locked into their role of unskilled, manual labourers, a position that they had occupied since the beginning of 'white' settlement in the Cape. Initially Jews were confined to ghettos, eventually to labour and death camps. In South Africa people of colour were forcibly removed to rural 'homelands'. However the demand for cheap labour eventually necessitated their admission to the urban industrial areas, and although they were restricted to living in 'townships' their exclusion was never total and their physical destruction was never contemplated. In both countries government controlled local authorities kept tight rein on the administration of the residential areas that were demarcated for the disadvantaged. In Nazi Germany the SS appointed Judenrate (Jewish Councils) to administer the ghettos. These councils were used to secure the peaceful acquiescence of Jews en route to the death camps. Eventually the councillors were killed together with the people they were supposed to govern. In South Africa town councils were established for local government in the townships, but these councils were unsuccessful because they were government controlled and illegitimate. Their purpose was to administer the separate development areas, not to pave the way for eventual extermination of their inhabitants. In neither Germany nor South Africa did churches play an active role in preventing discrimination and injustice. In Germany this was simply a continuation of the traditional attitude of anti-Judaism nurtured by the refusal of Jews to convert to Christianity. In South Africa missionaries worked hard to convert 'blacks' to Christianity, but Dutch Reformed Church ministers believed that it was God's will that 'black' and 'white' should be kept separate, church services were strictly segregated, and this was in keeping with the apartheid ideal. With regard to the media, both Nazi Germany and the apartheid regime backed those sectors of the media that promoted negative images of Jews and 'blacks', while censoring those that were more liberally inclined. The fundamental differences between the Holocaust and apartheid became most apparent in their terminal stages. Whereas Nazism led to genocide, the leitmotif of apartheid was cheap labour, not planned extermination. The Nazis created death camps and designed advanced technology especially for the purpose of speeding up mass murder and body disposal. Apartheid killings in South Africa were carried out by traditional means on an individual basis and not by large-scale extermination techniques. The killings in South Africa were directed only at opponents of the regime and not for the purpose of exterminating a specific ethnic group. This dissertation presents two case studies of racist ideology which promoted discrimination and the elevation of a 'superior' race at the expense of the disadvantaged. In Germany this resulted in a programme of genocide whereas the apartheid system in South Africa, though intended to service the material interests of the ruling group, nevertheless proved dysfunctional and sowed the seeds of its own demise

Secrecy and violence in rural Tsolo

Paper presented at the Wits History Workshop: Forging the links between historical research and the policy process, 18-19 September 1999. Also presented to the South African Historical Association. University of the Western Cape, 14th July 1999.This paper gives the history violence in the Tsolo District of the Eastern Cape. Emphasis is on that which occurred between 1993 and 1999. Starting as an Anti-stocktheft movement, Mafelandawonye, the violence degenerated into action for revenge, opportunistic killings of "inconvenient" people and the victimization of people through guilt by association. A culture of silence, secrecy and fear made resolving the situation difficult

Soft believers and hard unbelievers in the Xhosa cattle-killing

A substantial minority, perhaps 15 per cent of all Xhosa, refused to obey the prophetess Nongqawuse's orders to kill their cattle and destroy their corn. This divided Xhosaland into two parties, the amathamba (‘soft’ ones, or believers) and the amagogotya (‘hard’ ones, or unbelievers). The affiliation of individuals was partly determined by a number of factors – lungsickness in cattle, political attitude towards the Cape Colony, religious beliefs, kinship, age and gender – but a systematic analysis of each of these factors in turn suggests that none of them was sufficiently important to constitute the basis of either party. The key to understanding the division lies in an analysis of the indigenous Xhosa terms ‘soft’ and ‘hard’. ‘Softness’ in Xhosa denotes the submissiveness of the individual to the common will of the community, whereas ‘hardness’ denotes the determination of the individual to pursue his own ends, even at communal expense. Translated into social terms, the ‘soft’ believers were those who remained committed to the mutual aid ethic of the declining precolonial society, whereas the ‘hard’ unbelievers were those who sought to seize advantage of the new opportunities offered by the colonial presence to increase their wealth and social prominence. The conflict between the social and personal imperatives was well expressed by Chief Smith Mhala, the unbelieving son of a believing father, when he said, ‘They say I am killing my father – so I would kill him before I would kill my cattle.’ Certainly, the division between amathamba and amagogotya ran much deeper than the division between belief and unbelief, and the Xhosa, in conferring these names, seem to have recognized the fact

Unsocial bandits: the stock thieves of Qumbu and their enemies

Paper presented at the Wits History Workshop: Democracy, Popular Precedents, Practice and Culture, 13-15 July, 1994

History versus customary law: Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims

This article examines the practices of the Commission on Traditional Leadership: Disputes and Claims, set up under the Framework Act of 2003 to ‘cleanse’ the institution of traditional leadership by ridding it of the illegitimate traditional leaders installed during the colonial and homeland eras. Close analysis of the Commission’s hearings and determinations with regard to kingship claims by the Western Mpondo and Mpumalanga Ndebele shows that the Commission violated not only the historical past but even the limited constraints of binding legislation, in order to impose its own preferences in the name of custom. The experience of the Commission therefore highlights one of the most fundamental deficiencies in the Framework Act, namely insisting on the guiding role of ‘custom’ while failing to define the meaning of the term and its implications

The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing

The Xhosa cattle-killing movement of 1856–7 cannot be explained as a superstitious ‘pagan reaction’ to the intrusion of colonial rule and Christian civilization. It owes its peculiar form to the lungsickness epidemic of 1854, which carried off over 100,000 Xhosa cattle. The Xhosa theory of disease indicated that the sick cattle had been contaminated by the witchcraft practices of the people, and that these tainted cattle would have to be slaughtered lest they infect the pure new cattle which were about to rise. The idea of the resurrection of the dead was partly due to the Xhosa belief that the dead do not really die or depart from the world of the living, and partly to the Xhosa myth of creation, which held that all life originated in a certain cavern in the ground which might yet again pour forth its blessings on the earth. Christian doctrines, transmitted through the prophets Nxele and Mhlakaza, supplemented and elaborated these indigenous Xhosa beliefs. The Xhosa and the Christian elements united together in the person of the expected redeemer Sifuba-sibanzi (the broad-chested one). The central beliefs of the Xhosa cattle-killing were neither irrational nor atavistic. Ironically, it was probably because they were so rational and so appropriate that they ultimately proved to be so deadly

A history of the Xhosa, c1700-1835

The boundaries of the territory occupied by the Xhosa fluctuated considerably, but in the period 1700-1835 they did not often extend west of the Sundays River, or east of the Mbashe River, along the coastal strip which separates the escarpment of South Africa's inland plateau from the Indian Ocean. It is an area of temperate grassland, permitting the cultivation of cereals and light crops, such as maize, millet, tobacco and pumpkins but better suited to stock-farming than intensive agriculture

Nxele, Ntsikana and the origins of the Xhosa religious reaction

The sudden expulsion of the Xhosa across the Fish River in 1811–12 created a practical and conceptual crisis which the traditional political authorities were unable to resolve. Two commoners, Nxele and Ntsikana, emerged in this vacuum, each proposing his own solution to the problems posed by the white irruption. Although these responses were religious responses, they were neither irrational nor incomprehensible. Xhosa religion had long functioned as an instrument for the control of the material world. By incorporating selected Christian concepts with the Xhosa world-view, Nxele and Ntsikana were able to provide the Xhosa with acceptable explanations of past events and prescriptions for future action. Nxele urged resistance and Ntsikana preached submission, but an examination of their personal histories shows that these final conclusions were more the product of exterior pressure than interior revelation. It may be suggested that the future reputations of the two men, like their past actions, will be determined more by the popular mood than by anything they themselves did or said