Do investors understand really dirty surplus?

This study addresses whether firms’ share prices correctly reflect two accounting measures: dirty surplus and really dirty surplus. Dirty surplus is readily observable from the financial statements, but really dirty surplus, which arises from recognizing equity transactions such as employee stock option exercises at other than fair market value, is not. Findings show that dirty surplus and really dirty surplus are irrelevant for forecasting abnormal comprehensive income. However, findings also indicate that investors appear to undervalue really dirty surplus. Hedge returns are insignificant when portfolios are formed based on dirty surplus, but are significantly positive based on really dirty surplus. Really dirty surplus positive hedge returns are robust to a variety of sensitivity tests. Taken together, the findings are consistent with either investors over-valuing firms that have large negative really dirty surplus or really dirty surplus being correlated with an unmodeled risk factor

Theoretical studies of the historical development of the accounting discipline: a review and evidence

Many existing studies of the development of accounting thought have either been atheoretical or have adopted Kuhn's model of scientific growth. The limitations of this 35-year-old model are discussed. Four different general neo-Kuhnian models of scholarly knowledge development are reviewed and compared with reference to an analytical matrix. The models are found to be mutually consistent, with each focusing on a different aspect of development. A composite model is proposed. Based on a hand-crafted database, author co-citation analysis is used to map empirically the entire literature structure of the accounting discipline during two consecutive time periods, 1972–81 and 1982–90. The changing structure of the accounting literature is interpreted using the proposed composite model of scholarly knowledge development

An Empirical Analysis on Board Monitoring Role and Loan Portfolio Quality Measurement in Banks

This paper aims to analyze the effectiveness of the board monitoring role on specific loan portfolio quality measures in banks (default rate, recovery rate and provisioning rate). We use a sample comprises a totality of Italian-based banks, listed at Borsa Italiana SpA in 2006-2008 and a number of accounting proxies to express the loan portfolio quality of a bank. The results of the analysis show an overall weakness of the board role (expressed by Independents and Audit Committee on board) in monitoring loan portfolio quality of the bank, with the subsequent damage of the interests of stakeholders. A positive contribution of board monitoring, even if partial, is highlighted in two cases: Independents seems improve recovery rate, while the Audit committee enhances provisioning rate in banks. With reference to default rate, a total negative effect of board monitoring is reported. On the base of these results, some managerial implications are proposed

Accounting: A General Commentary on an Empirical Science

Many researchers have questioned the view of accounting as a science. Some maintain that it is a service activity rather than a science, yet others entertain the view that it is an art or merely a technology. While it is true that accounting provides a service and is a technology (a methodology for recording and reporting), that fact does not prevent accounting from being a science. Based upon the structure and knowledge base of the discipline, this paper presents the case for accounting as an empirical science

The Basu measure as an indicator of conditional conservatism: Evidence from U.K. earnings components

Following the work of Basu in 1997, the excess of the sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative share return over its sensitivity to positive share return (the Basu coefficient) has been interpreted as an indicator of conditional accounting conservatism. Although this interpretation is supported by substantial evidence that the Basu coefficient is associated with likely demands for conservatism, concerns have arisen that it may reflect factors not directly related to conservatism, and that this may adversely affect its validity as an indicator of that phenomenon. We argue that evidence on the validity of the Basu coefficient as an indicator of conditional conservatism can be obtained by disaggregating earnings into components, classifying those components by whether or not they are likely to be affected by conditional conservatism, and examining whether the Basu coefficient arises primarily from components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. We implement this procedure for UK firms reporting under FRS 3: Reporting Financial Performance from 1992 to 2004. Although a substantial proportion of the Basu coefficient emanates from cash flow from operating and investing activities (CFOI), which cannot directly reflect accounting conservatism, its incidence across other components of earnings is predominantly within those components likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. Also, although the bias documented by Patatoukas and Thomas in 2009 is present in all of our aggregate earnings measures, it is heavily concentrated in the CFOI component of earnings and largely absent from components classified as likely to be affected by conditional conservatism. With the important caveat that researchers should test the robustness of their results to the exclusion of the element of the Basu coefficient due to cash flows, our findings are consistent with the conditional conservatism interpretation of the coefficient

Financial distress and the earnings-sensitivity-difference measure of conservatism

Following Basu (1997), the difference between the sensitivity of accounting earnings to negative equity return (proxy for bad news) and its sensitivity to positive equity return (proxy for good news) is interpreted as an indicator of conditional accounting conservatism. However, there is concern that the earnings-sensitivity difference (ESD) may be affected by factors other than conditional conservatism, and that this may impair its reliability as an indicator of conditional conservatism. Motivated by such concerns and by recognition that financial distress could contribute to an ESD through a conditional-conservatism route and/or through a non-conditional-conservatism route, we examine the association between financial distress and the ESD for U.S. non-financial firms. By decomposing the association into an element arising from accruals, which can reflect conditional conservatism, and an element arising from cash flow from operating activities (CFO), which cannot directly reflect conditional conservatism, we seek evidence as to whether such association arises through a conditional-conservatism route or through a non-conditional-conservatism route. We find that positive association between financial distress and the ESD arises predominantly through the accruals component of earnings rather than the CFO component, consistent with it arising primarily because of a higher degree of conditional conservatism in relatively financially distressed firms. The inference that there is a positive association between financial distress and conditional conservatism is supported by other non-equity-return-based measures of conditional conservatism. The evidence in this paper suggests that the effect of financial distress does not significantly impair the reliability of the ESD as an indicator of conditional conservatism