Skill in epistemology II: Skill and know how

The prequel to this paper has discussed the relation between knowledge and skill and introduced the topic of the relationship between skill and know how. This sequel continues the discussion. First, I survey the recent debate on intellectualism about knowing how (§1-3). Then, I tackle the question as to whether intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about skill and intellectualism (and anti-intellectualism) about know how fall or stand together (§4-5)

On the Meaning of 'Therefore'

I argue for an analysis of ‘therefore’ as presupposition trigger against the more standard conventional implicature story originally put forward by Grice (1975). I propose that we model the relevant presupposition as “testing” the context in a way that is similar to how, according to some dynamic treatments of epistemic `must', ‘must’ tests the context. But whereas the presupposition analysis is plausible for ‘therefore’, ‘must’ is not plausibly a presupposition trigger. Moreover, whereas ‘must’ can naturally occur under a supposition, the same is not true for ‘therefore’. In the light of these differences, I suggest we distinguish between different sorts of tests on the basis of the mechanisms whereby these expressions test the context (whether through a presupposition or through their core content) and on the basis of whether they can operate only on categorical contexts or on both categorical and hypothetical contexts

Probabilistic Knowledge in Action

According to a standard assumption in epistemology, if one only partially believes that p , then one cannot thereby have knowledge that p. For example, if one only partially believes that that it is raining outside, one cannot know that it is raining outside; and if one only partially believes that it is likely that it will rain outside, one cannot know that it is likely that it will rain outside. Many epistemologists will agree that epistemic agents are capable of partial beliefs in addition to full beliefs and that partial beliefs can be epistemically assessed along some dimensions. However, it has been generally assumed that such doxastic attitudes cannot possibly amount to knowledge. In Probabilistic Knowledge, Moss challenges this standard assumption and provides a formidable defense of the claim that probabilistic beliefs—a class of doxastic attitudes including credences and degrees of beliefs—can amount to knowledge too. Call this the probabilistic knowledge claim . Throughout the book, Moss goes to great lengths to show that probabilistic knowledge can be fruitfully applied to a variety of debates in epistemology and beyond. My goal in this essay is to explore a further application for probabilistic knowledge. I want to look at the role of probabilistic knowledge within a “knowledge-centered” psychology—a kind of psychology that assigns knowledge a central stage in explanations of intentional behavior. My suggestion is that Moss’s notion of probabilistic knowledge considerably helps further both a knowledge-centered psychology and a broadly intellectualist picture of action and know-how that naturally goes along with it. At the same time, though, it raises some interesting issues about the notion of explanation afforded by the resulting psychology

Skill in epistemology I: Skill and knowledge

Knowledge and skill are intimately connected. In this essay, I discuss the question of their relationship and of which (if any) is prior to which in the order of explanation. I review some of the answers that have been given thus far in the literature, with a particular focus on the many foundational issues in epistemology that intersect with the philosophy of skill

On qq-covering designs

A $q$-covering design $\mathbb{C}_q(n, k, r)$, $k \ge r$, is a collection $\mathcal X$ of $(k-1)$-spaces of $\mathrm{PG}(n-1, q)$ such that every $(r-1)$-space of $\mathrm{PG}(n-1, q)$ is contained in at least one element of $\mathcal X$ . Let $\mathcal{C}_q(n, k, r)$ denote the minimum number of $(k-1)$-spaces in a $q$-covering design $\mathbb{C}_q(n, k, r)$. In this paper improved upper bounds on $\mathcal{C}_q(2n, 3, 2)$, $n \ge 4$, $\mathcal{C}_q(3n + 8, 4, 2)$, $n \ge 0$, and $\mathcal{C}_q(2n,4,3)$, $n \ge 4$, are presented. The results are achieved by constructing the related $q$-covering designs

Practical Representation

This chapter discusses recent attempts to clarify the notion of practical representation and its theoretical fruitfulness. The ultimate goal is not just to show that intellectualists are on good grounds when they appeal to practical representation in their theories of know-how. Rather, it is to argue that ​ any plausible theory of skill and know-how has to appeal to the notion of practical representation developed here. §1 explains the notion of a mode of presentation and introduces practical modes of presentation. §2 illustrates practical representation by discussing models of motor control in current theories of sensori-motor psychology; §3 puts forward an argument for positing practical representation. §4 goes from practical non-conceptual representations to practical conceptual representations — to practical concepts. §5 concludes

Hedonic Housing Price Indices: The Turinese Experience

This study presents the methodology used by the Agenzia del territorio to produce real-estate indices for the analysis of the housing market in the Turinese area districts. The importance of an index is highlighted by the fact that a significant percentage of national wealth is the property sector. To this end, we use a rich and detailed database on transaction prices which allows us to study the dynamics of the residential housing market through the estimation of hedonic price indexes for Turin. This study carried out an hedonic methodology, not yet applied in Italy, on data collected and aggregates in homogeneous areas for the city of Turin. The results obtained appear to be of valid significance in the ratios, also in terms of values. Home price increased 40 percent from first semester of 2003 through the second semester of 2007.