Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. Te surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.Equilibrium Selection, Global Games, Strategic Complementarities, Supermodular Games

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection

Equilibrium Selection in Global Games with Strategic Complementarities

We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the incomplete information game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme for two player, two action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient conditions on payoffs for there to be noise-independent selection.

Recurrent hemorrhagic pericardial effusion in a child due to diffuse lymphangiohemangiomatosis: a case report

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Introduction</p> <p>Recurrent hemorrhagic pericardial effusion in children with no identifiable cause is a rare presentation.</p> <p>Case presentation</p> <p>We report the case of a 4-year-old Indian girl who presented with recurrent hemorrhagic pericardial effusion. Diffuse lymphangiomatosis was suspected when associated pulmonary involvement, soft tissue mediastinal mass, and lytic bone lesions were found. Pericardiectomy and lung biopsy confirmed the diagnosis of diffuse lymphangiohemangiomatosis. Partial clinical improvement occurred with thalidomide and low-dose radiotherapy, but our patient died from progressive respiratory failure.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>Diffuse lymphangiohemangiomatosis should be considered in the differential diagnosis of hemorrhagic pericardial effusion of unclear cause.</p

Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises due to diversification of investment portfolios’,

ABSTRACT We explore a model with two countries. Each might be subject to a self-fulfilling crisis, induced by agents withdrawing their investments in the fear that others will do so. While the fundamentals of the two countries are independent, the fact that they share the same group of investors may generate a contagion of crises. The realization of a crisis in one country reduces agents&apos; wealth and thus makes them more risk averse (we assume decreasing absolute risk aversion). This reduces their incentive to maintain their investments in the second country since doing so exposes them to the strategic risk associated with the unknown behavior of other agents. Consequently, the probability of a crisis in the second country increases. This yields a positive correlation between the returns on investments in the two countries even though they are completely independent in terms of fundamentals. We discuss the effect of diversification on the probabilities of crises and on welfare. Finally, we discuss the applicability of the model to real world episodes of contagion